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As this thesis is being written, the Nation is caught
up in events which are unsurpassed in importance by any here-
tofore experienced in our history. For the second time in
just less than two hundred years a President faces the possi-
bility of i]i^>eachment. The underlying act which precipitated
this procedure of constitutional last resort was the bur-
gl2u:izing of the Democratic Party's national headquarters
at the Watergate complex in Washington. Subsequent probing
by various entities has uncovered other acts steeped in al-
leged criminality attributable to public officials at the
highest levels of government. Numerous individuals who have
been ensnared by the ever-expemding web of cooplicity have
found themselves in the throes of a dilemma—either to answer
questions propounded by those seeking incriminating evidence
or face criminal sanctions as the price of silence.
The most recent example is that of Q. Gordon Liddy,
one of the seven original conspirators involved in the Water-

2All of this servas to bring into shairp focus a basic
conflict between the testimonial rights of the individual and
the compulsive powers of the government within the realm of
the criminal justice system. Despite the protections einbodied
2in the Fifth Amendment individuals in every stratum of our
society daily find themselves in the position of having to
choose between a penalty for ronaining silent or succunibing
to the overwhelming power wielded by the instrumentalities
of the state and by so doing subjecting theoiselves to conse-
quences which are at least equally onerous.
This dilemma is shared by the criminal defense attorney
who must be able to predict accurately the use to which state-
ments, which have been or may be made by his client, might
be put by the prosecution. In advising his client with respect
to such matters so that the client may come to an educated
gate burglary, who was adjudged guilty on two counts of con-
tempt of Congress for his failure to testify before a House
subcommittee concerning related aspects of the case, and who
is currently incarcerated for his failure to testify before
a federal grand jury which delved into similar matters. The
Miami Herald, May 11, 1974, I A, at 30, col. 1. The action
was the result of a contempt action voted by the House in early
fall, 1973. Id., Septeaaber 11, 1973, • A, at 2, col. 3.
^U. S. Const, amend. V provides in pertinent part
that "Mo person . . . shall be cosqpelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself . . . .
"

3decision relating to his future course of action^ the attorney
must consider a wide variety of possibilities. If the client
faces a future criminal prosecution subsequent to alleged
illegal police activity, the effect of the client's disclos-
ures while in custody or his testimony given during a pre-
trial motion to suppress evidence must be viewed in the light
of their possible use by the prosecution during the trial
on the merits. One who has been subpoenaed to appear and
testify before a state or federal grand jury, administrative
agency, or legislative committee needs to be informed of the
price which may be exacted for either compliance or recalcl-
trzuice. Similarly, clients forced to come to grips with man-
datory medical examinations and mandatory disclosure statutes
will be required to make hard choices. Ho less difficult is
the position of one who is called as a witness in a civil or
criminal case or one who is the unwilling subject of a qpasi-
judicial proceeding.
It is beyond question that While the attorney has
the initial responsibility to inform his client fully of rele-
vant considerations, as well as the possible effect of alter-
natives, the ultimate responsibility for decisions such as
whether or not the client will speak in his own behalf reposes
in the client. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethi-
cal considerations 7-7, 7-8; ABA Standards for Criminal Justice,
Sttmdards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense
Function, I 5.2 (Approved Draft, 1971).

4While the primary sources of information available
to the attorney are statutes and case law, he would do well
to consider the various uniform rules and codes which have
been the object of the labors of bench, bar, and scholars
in a continuing effort aimed at improving criminal juris-
prudence. Scrutiny of the Uhiform Rules of Bvidence,^ the
Model Code of Evidence, and the Model Penal Code often
provides the practitioner with valu2a>le insight concerning
the evolution of existing law. The Federal Rules of Evidence,^
A
Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953)
.
^Model Code of Evidence (1942)
.
^Model Penal Code (Proposed Official Draft, 1962)
.
7Originally entitled Rules of Evidence for united
States Courts and Magistrates, these Rules were promulgated
by the Uhited States Supreme Court on Hoverober 20, 1972 pur-
suant to its authority to prescribe rules of practice and
procedure for the federal courts under the provisions of
18 U.S.C. II 3402, 3771, 3772 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. II 2072,
2073 (1970). 56 F.R.O. 184 (1972). They were submitted to
Congress on February 5, 1973 and were scheduled to become
effective automatically on July 1, 1973. 119 Cong. Rec.
H5452 (daily ed. June 26, 1973) (remarks of Representative
Hungate) ; 56 F.R.D. 184 (1972) . However, Congress subse-
quently enacted legislation which precluded the Rules from
having force or effect pending express approval by act of
Congress. Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. NO. 93-12, 87 Stat.
9 ; U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative Wews ^ 93d Cong .
,
1st Sess. (1973) at 11. An ameiuled version of the Rules
passed in the House by roll call vote on February 6, 1974
and was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
the following day. Digest of Public General Bills and
Resolutions, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., First Issue, Library of
Congress, 1974 at 209.
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prob2Q>ly a model for future state enactments, undoubtedly
will affect the rights of criminal defendants in both federal
and state courts.
In the pages that follow the writer will analyze the
cases and statutes which are inextricably intertwined with
9the situation involving compulsory testimonial self-incrimina<
tion. Where such is applicable, a discussion of one or more
of the uniform codes and rules will be included. The object
of this effort is an attempt to put into proper perspective
a long cherished constitutional protection which, when viewed
in the context of numerous specific factual settings, proves
all too often to be merely illusory.
a
The promulgation of rules for use in federal court
has historically been shown to have an impact upon practice
and procedure in state courts since the states have tended
to follow the federal lead. E.£. , Fed. R. Crim. P.; Fed. R.
Civ. P.
q
It was early held by the Supreme Court that whether
or not an activity was testimonial in nature depended upon
whether or not such was "conmunicative. " Holt v. United
States . 218 U.S. 245, 252-253 (1910). While one authority
advocates that communicativeness should be limited, in this
context, to spoken words, 8 Wigmore, Evidence I 2263, at 378-
379 (McNaughton rev. 1961), such a view has not found favor
with the Court. See Schmerber v. California . 384 U.S. 757,
763 n. 7 (1966) . Another view, asserted to reflect the
weight of authority, is that conmunicativeness includes not
merely spoken words but also actions intended to communicate
thoughts. See McCormick. Evidence I 124, at 265 (2d ed. 1972)
It is regard for the latter that necessitates an investiga-




STATBMEOTS COMPELLED BY ILLEGAL POLICE ACTIVITY t
THE HARRIS-SIMMOHS-WALDBR TRILOGY
"We are well on our way to forbidding anv utter-
ance of 2m accused to be used against him unless it is made
in open court . " These words , expressed in apparent despair
by the then circuit judge Warren E. Burger in his partial
dissent in an oft overlooked case, portended an inevit-
able result. This sentiment stemaed from what judge Burger
saw as a natural consequence of Miranda which consisted
of the production of intricate procedural rules which, in
application, hampered the efforts of even the roost able ad-
vocates and jurists as well as those of the police. Three
years later, as Chief Justice of the Uhited States Supreme
Court, Warren E. Burger had an opportunity to rectify, at
least in some measure, a situation viewed by some as having
^°Frazier v. Ohited States , 419 P. 2d 1161, 1176
(D.C. Cir. 1969)
.
11Miranda v. Arizona . 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6

gotten completely out of hand. However, in the process,
the Court sanctioned activity which runs completely counter
to the belief that convictions in criainal cetses which arm
based wholly or in part upon confessions axe objectionable
in that a system which is subject to extreme abuse is there-
12
by fostered. Nonetheless the judicial barriers thereto-
fore carefully erected to preclude testimonial evidence,
compelled from the criminal accused through illegal police
procedures, from being utilized in court were severely dam-
aged.
When the Court undertook to decide Harris v. Mew
13York it had to face squarely the fact that the evidence
which aided the prosecution in obtaining the petitioner's
conviction in state court wjui the product of unlawful police
activity. Harris had been charged, subsequent to indict-
Bient, with the sale of narcotics to a police undercover
agent on two occasions. This agent testified at trial aad
was essentially the only witness against the accused.
^
^Bscobedo v. Illinois . 378 U.S. 478, 488-489 (1964);
cf. , Havnes v. Washington . 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963).
^^401 U.S. 222 (1971)
.
^*ld. at 223-224.
Another officer testified with respect to collat-
eral details of the sales; a third officer's testimony re-
lated to chemical analysis, i^. at 222.

eAt the conclusion of the state's case in chief the accused
testified in his own behalf^^ and repudiated the first
tramsaction while describing the second as a deception
wherein the svibject of the "sale" was two glassine bags
17
containing baking powder. On cross-examination Harris
was asked whether or not he had made certain statements to
the police subsequent to his arrest which specifically re-
lated to these events. In response, the accused indicated
that he did not remember zmd the court gave a limiting in-
struction to the jury to the effect that the statements
which the prosecution sought to attribute to the defendant
could not be used as evidence of guilt but were to be re-
stricted to the issue of credibility. Notwithstanding this
instruction Harris was convicted of the offense relating to
the second tremsaction
.
The common law disability which precluded a de-
fendant in federal court from taking the witness steuid has
long been abrogated by statute and case law. See 18 U.S.C.
3481 (1970) formerly ch. 37, 20 Stat, at L. 30 (1878); Bruno
V. United States . 308 U.S. 287 (1939). The same is true in
state court prosecutions. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence I 488
(3d ed. 1940) (collecting statutes and cases) ; McCormick,
Evidence i 65 at 144 (2d ed. 1972); 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses
I 106 (1948) .
^^401 U.S. at 223; id. at 226.

9Chxef Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
was quick to characterize as dicta those comments in
19
Miranda which indicated that statonents of the accused
which were obtained by illegal police activity were inad-
20
missible for any purpose. Seemingly preoccupied with
the notion that since an accused allegedly made a state-
ment out of court which was inconsistent with his trial
21
testimony then the latter must be untrue, the majority
avowed that perjured testimony would not be allofwed to
stand uncontradicted merely because illegal police action
had produced evidence which, but for the illegality, the
prosecution would have had available as a countervailing
22
weapon. Characterizing the prosecution's use of Harris'
prior statements as merely a part of "traditional truth-
18Joining in the opinion were Justices Harlan,
Stewart, White and Blackmun. Justice Brennan filed a dis-
senting opinion joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall;
Justice Black dissented without opinion.
^
^Miranda v. Arizona . 384 U.S. 436 (1966). This
view has also been favored by some scholars. See . £•£•
*
2 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure I 408 at 110 (1969)





23testing devices of the adversary process," the majority
view indicates, via example, hofw far it has missed the mark.
Asserting that an accused, who has confessed to a homicide
and led the police to the victim under circumstances Which
would make his confession inadmissible, should not be al-
lowed to deny, unopposed, by way of testimony at trial,
24his prior statements, the opinion overlooks a vital dis-
tinction. In the hypothetical case cooqplicity was demon-
strated by words and an act . The latter serves to add a
measure of credibility to the former. In the case under
consideration only statwoents were involved. Ihe net ef-
fect of allowing the jury to hear the out-of-court state-
ments allegedly attributable to the accused was to pit the
word of a police officer against that of the defendant,
aptly noted by the minority opinion as being highly pre-
judicial in such a context, especially when the officer's
testimony did not convince the jury respecting the first
25
offense charged. Had the jury not heard the substance
of the statements it %#ould have been free to decide the
^*Id. at n. 2.
2^1d. at 229 n. 2,
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ultimate issue upon in-court credibility without having
to resort to the much denounced practice o£ attempting to
consider the statements only in regard to the credibility
issue.
The majority opinion points out that Harris did
not claim that the extra-judicial statwnents were involun-
tary or coerced, intimating that a different issue would
be raised had this been asserted. ^ Implicit in this ob-
servation is that, since the petitioner made no move to
challenge the statements on either or both of these bases,
the statements must be viewed as being trustworthy. As
such, exclusion on the basis of restraining in^>ermi8sible
police conduct would be unwarranted and the 2uitithesis of
the rationale underlying the judicially created exclusion-
ary rule. However, as recognized by the dissenters, deter-
ring illegal police conduct is not the main objective of
the judiciary in these cases; rather it is the preservation
26
The opinion conditions the utilization of evidence,
made inadmissible by police failure to follow the dictates
of Miranda # on the requirement that the traditional standards
regarding confessions have to be met. id, at 224. In this
regard completely ignored is the recognition in Miranda
that while statenents made during in-custody interrogation
might not be thought of as involuntary in traditional
terms, custodial interrogation is inherently coercive,
Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 457-458 (1966), and thus




of the adversary system with its inherent respect and dig-
nity for citizens which is predicated upon the provisions
27
of the Fifth Amendment. As such, admissibility of evi-
dence should not be determined on the basis of considera-
tions which tend to undermine recognized social objectives
28
since to do so would encourage increased latwlessness
.
the possibility of such illegal activity is dis-
counted by the majority which is instead content with fur-
ther grounding its decision on the theory that the WeeK^
doctrine should not be es^anded to include impeachment
situations. It does this by placing reliance on an earlier
30
case where prosecution witnesses were allowed to testify
to contradict statements made by the accused during direct
examination. While it is true that "the Fourth and Fifth
^%01 U.S. 222, 231-232 (1971).
2®!^. at 232.
^^Weeks v. United States , 232 U.S. 383 (1914) an-
novmced the judicial rule that in a federal prosecution the
Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through
2U1 illegal search and seizure.
^^Walder v. United States . 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
The Harris majority erroneously noted that physi-
cal evidence was utilized for this purpose. Cgnpare 401
U.S. 222 at 224 with 347 U.S. 62 at 64.

13
Amendments r\in almost into each other" the Harris major-
ity attempts to fuse them completely by the escpediency of
lifting language out of context to serve its own designs.
33
The "illegal method" referred to in Walder 2md quoted
34
with approval in Harris achieved that status due to a
violation of the command of the Fourth Amendment. To util-
ize such rationale to defeat petitioner's claim which is
founded entirely on Fifth Amendment grounds seems to go
far afield. The implication seems inescapable that the
majority was attempting both to reestablish the vitality
35
of Walder which stood threatened in the wake of Miryida
and undermine to the greatest degree possible the holding
of the latter case.
To do this the majority had to dispose of the sole
remaining argument of the dissenters who obviously saw lit-
tle hope that Miramda would be dispositive of the issue
raised by the appellimt in Harris . As their main thrust
the minority sought to distinguish the case from Waldey on
the facta, characterizing that case as involving collateral
^^
Bovd V. United States . 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
^^347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954)
.
^^401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971).
Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

umatters whereas the Instant case Involved natters which
were directly concerned with the crimes charged. The
majority summarily dispatched that contention with the view
that it was nonpersuasive adding that sufficient deterrence
to illegal police activity is realized by precluding the
prosecution's use of the tainted evidence in its case in
37
chief —an obvious gratuitous pronouncement directed to-
ward the minority's foremost concern.
This concern was aptly illustrated the following
38term when essentially the same Coxirt denied certiorari
in a case which also involved statements made by an accused
39
while in police custody. This time, however, instead of
the statements relating to an act, as was the case in both
Harris and Walder , the central issue at trial was that of
intent. In Riddle the petitioner was charged with shooting
a neighbor in the foot during an argument over the conduct
^^401 U.S. 222, 227 (1971).
^^J[d. at 225.
38Justices Powell 2uid Rehnquist had by this time
tzOcen the seats formerly occupied by Justices Harlan 2md
Black. Since only Justice Harlan had voiced assent in
Harris , the realignment would in no way tend to alter the
disposition of similar cases.
^
^Riddle V. Rhav , 79 Wash. 2d 248, 484 P. 2d 907,
cert , denied . 404 U.S. 974 (1971).

15
of the latter' 8 dog. After Riddle testified on his own be-
half that he did not Intend to discharge the weapon and
that he did not have his finger on the trigger when It dld«
the prosecution was allowed to put before the jury another
statement allegedly attributable to the defendant. The
substaunce of that statement, given to the police, was that
Riddle cocked the hammer euid pulled the trigger. Intending
40
only to scare the neighbor. In the dissent, written by
Justice Douglas and joined therein by Justice Brennan, It
is asserted that this latter statement was, in essence, a
direct admission of the veiry point at issue. Fvirther, the
disclosure of the statement to the jury, although offered
for the mere purpose of undermining the defendzmt's cred-
ibility, "Vas certain to have a prejudicizJ., if not con-
41
elusive, effect on the jury,** the same point made in the
42
Harris dissent. It is clear that the Riddle dissenters
now saw as a reality that which was presaged in Harris .
Any incentive that law enforcement authorities might have
had to safeguard an accused's Fifth Amendment rights by
43
compliance with the dictates of Miranda evaporates with
*°404 U.S. at 974.
*^404 U.S. at 974-975.
*^401 U.S. 222, 229 n. 2 (1971).
^^Miranda v. Arizona . 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the knowledge of police Interrogators that they may take
calculated risks in light of Harris and that euiy statement
they are able to extract from a svibject in custody will be
available for use against him if he elects to testify at
trial. To allow such a practice, in the view of Justice
Douglas, would be to place undeserved credence in the
trustworthiness of such utteremces.
A siroileu: issue of trustworthiness was presented
when Justices Douglas and Black dissented without opinion
46in WaXder . There the petitioner, like Harris, was con-
victed of selling narcotics to police agents. As the only
defense witness the accused testified on direct examination
that he had never sold or possessed illegal drugs. The
same assertion was made in response to questions pro-
pounded during cross-examination. At this point, over de-
fense objection, the accused was querried concerning nar-
cotics which had been seized unlawfully from his hone two
years earlier. After the defendant reiterated denial of
possession, the prosecution was allowed to prove the prior
^404 U.S. 974, 976 (1971).
Id. at 497. This is the precise point which was
overlooked by the majority in Harris . See note 26, supra
and accompanying text.
^
^alder v. United States , 347 U.S. 62 (1954).

17
possession through the testimony of two police witnesses.^^
The jury received a limiting Instruction and the accused
was convicted.
Writing for the seven-member majority Justice
Frankfurter addressed the issue of whether or not the ex-
clusionary rule unbraced situations such as the one pre-
sented where illegally obtained evidence was utilized at
trial for purposes other than the prosecution's case in
chief. After reviewing the authorities which supported
the xxile the majority recited the language which was
seized upon by the Harris majority to the effect that,
while the prosecution may be precluded from affirmative
use of illegally obtained evidence, that same illegality
should not be allowed to prevent contradiction of the ac-
49
cused who resorts to untruths in his trial testimony.
However, unlike the situation in Harris , here there was
credible evidence from which the Court could conclude that
the defendzmt's direct testimony was false. That evidence
^7xd. at 64. unlike Harris the contradictory evi-
dence was elicited from two police officers Who testified
concerning both the act and chemical analysis. See note 15
supra and accompanying text.




consisted of statements, which acknowledged possession*
made by the accused in connection with a pretrial motion
to suppress as evidence in the previous case the narcotics
which had been seized unlawfully. As swoicn in>court
testimony those statements rightly deseirved a presumption
51
of trustworthiness. In that nothing was evident which
would cast doubt upon this presumption the conclusion was
inevitable that the accused's trial testimony was indeed
perjured. Thus, while the trustworthiness of an accused's
prior statements played a part in the Court's decisions in
both Harris and Walder . such was demonstrated by the evi-
dence in the latter while being merely assumed in the for-
mer.
In disposing of the problem presented in Walder
the majority took pains to distinguish the prior case of
52Aqnello v. United States . There the accused was simi-
l2urly convicted of offenses grounded in narcotics posses-
sion. Subsequent to the presentation of the prosecution's
case the defendemt testified in his own behalf wherein he
made no reference to either the narcotics which were in-
^°id. at 64 n. 1.
^^Cf. , Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966).
^^269 U.S. 20 (1925).

19
volved in the case or to tuny other matter dealing with
narcotics. After receiving a negative response to an in-
quiry concerning Whether or not the accused had ever seen
narcotics before, the prosecution was allowed to introduce
a can of cocaine which was the product of an illegal search
and seizure. On appeal, the Court reversed the conviction
stressing that in his testimony the accused did nothing
more than to deny complicity, which he had every right to
do, free from the prejudice of the tainted evidence. ^^
Rather than hinge the decision in Waldyr on the quoted pro-
54
nouncement of Justice Holmes in Silverthorne , the major-
ity opined that, since the accused chose to go beyond a
mere denial of complicity in the crime with which he was
charged zuid instead raised the issue of prior non-involve-
ment concerning naurcotics, he was thereby precluded from
preventing the prosecution from utilizing the otherwise
^The Court found that the defendemt "did nothing
to waive his constitutional protection or to justify cross-
examination in respect of the evidence claimed to have been
obtained by the search. As said in Silverthorne liUiaber Co«
V, United States . . . 'The essence of a provision permit-
ting the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before
the court, but that it shall not be used at all."* 269
U.S. at 35 (citation omitted).
^^251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).

20
inadmissible evidence to attack his credibility. The fal-
lacy of this position is not readily apparent. To lend sup-
port for his rationale Justice Frankfurter relies on lan-
guage gleaned from a prior case which on its face tends
to bolster the proposition that by testifying regarding
matters not limited to a denial of the elements of the case
57
against him the accused in Walder opened the door to a
valid prosecutorial attack on his credibility. However,
Michelson involved not the impeachment of an accused who
had elected to testify but rather the impeachment of a
character witness called by the accused for the puirpose of
establishing that the latter 's reputation reflected a life
and habit which were incompatible with the c<»onission of
the crime charged. In such a situation the underlying pol-
icy considerations are quite different in that constitu-
55
347 U.S. at 65-66.
^^Michelson v. United States . 335 U.S. 469 (1948),
cited at 347 U.S. at 65 n. 3. Justice Frankfurter filed a
concurring opinion in the case. See 335 U.S. at 487.
^^"The price a defendant must pay for attempting to
prove his good name is to throw open the entire subject
which the law has kept closed for his benefit and to make
himself vulnerable where the law otherwise shields him."
Michelson v. United States . 335 U.S. 469, 479 (1948).

21
tional provisions do not apply to the ordinary witness in
the same sense that they apply to an accused.
The decision in Walder has been criticixed both on
constitutional grounds and on the basis that it violates
the rule which prohibits contradiction on a collateral mat-
ter. Further, lower courts were not in the least loath
to abandon its teachings especially where the line between
direct and collateral matters was less than distinct.
Other courts shrank from the decision on the premise that
the rule therein embodied was easier in the elucidation
than in the application. For some time after the deci-
sion in Miranda numerous courts had questioned the validity
of Walder in light of the then new Supreme Court pronoxmce-
62




, 2 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure




1 Wigroore, Evidence I 15, at 76 (3d ed. Supp.
^^SSS. S.'3.-> United States v. Birrel. 276 F. Supp<
798, 817 n. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (collecting cases).
^^SAft «•£•' united states v. Prebish. 292 F. Supp.
268 (S.D. Fla. 1968); State v. Brewton . 422 P. 2d 581 (Ore,
1967), cert , denied . 387 U.S. 943 (1967).
^^See e.g.. Aqius v. united states , 413 F.2d 915
(5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Fox . 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.
1968); Qroshart v. United States . 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir.
1968); Proctor v. United States . 404 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir.
1968)
;
Wheeler v. United States. 382 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1967);

22
vitalize Walder notwithstanding Miranda , inconsistancies
mar the efficacy of the two former opinions. In Walder
the evidence used for impeachment purposes was related to
a different activity from that which formed the basis of
the offense for which the accused was standing trial. The
evidence which was similarly utilized in Harris related
directly to the offense charged. Vfhereas in Walder the
underlying physical evidence was obtained pursuant to an
illegal search and seizure the testimonial evidence in
Harris was produced by way of proscribed police custodial
activity. Most iiiq;K>rtantly, however, the evidence used
against the defendant in Walder had the paramount charac-
teristic of presumptive trustworthiness which was patently
absent in Harris in that the former was obtained during the
course of a pretrial suppression motion. It was just such
a proceeding which formed the factual basis for another case,
which, although seemingly unrelated, requires scrutiny.
In Simnons v. United States three defendants, in-
cluding one Garrett, were tried for the crime of armed rob-
bery. Prior to trial Giurrett moved to suppress a suitcase
which contained items implicating him in the coomission of
United States ex rel. Hill v. Pinto . 394 P. 2d 470, 476 n. 14
(3d Cir. 1968) (collecting cases)
.
^^390 U.S. 377 (1968).

23
the offense charged. !Po meet the threshold requirement of
standing to object to the use of the physical evidence the
accused testified at the pretrial hearing that the suitcase
was similar to one that he had owned and that some of the
items foimd therein belonged to him. The suppression mo-
tion was denied and Qaurrett's testimony was ultimately ad-
mitted for use against him during the prosecution's case
in chief.
The issue of standing was basic to the problem
faced by the Court in this case* Writing for the six-
member majority. Justice Hiurlan reviewed the prior judi-
cially 2umounced requirements which an accused must meet
in this regard, those being that he was either the OMmer or
possessor of the property illegally seized or that he had
a possessory interest in the premises which were the situs
of the unlawful police activity. Further, the majority
opinion noted that these requirements had been altered so
that 2m accused was relieved of the responsibility to es-
tablish standing where the evidence unlawfully seized was
an essential element of the crime charged or where the de-




when the search took place"^; in such cases the government
was to be affirmatively precluded from asserting that the
accused lacked the stemding requisite to challenge the use
against him at trial of the evidence thus unlawfully se-
cured. As respects cases falling squarely within these
parameters an accused would be relieved of the necessity
of having to testify at any pretrial suppression hearing,
thereby risking that his testimony could be used against
him later at trial. This was necessitated by what the
Court had viewed as an intolereU^le dilemma which severely
limited an accused's ability to defend himself, especially in
cases which involved possessory offenses, in that the very
testimony needed to estaiblish standing would also prove an ele-
ment of the offense,^^ However, the situation in the instant
case did not come within the relatively narrow scope of the
Jones decision. Here Garrett was neither present when the
physical evidence was seized nor was he invested with a posses-
sory interest in the premises. Since the evidence seized was
not an essential element of the robbery charge the accused
was denied presumptive standing. In such a position the
defendant was forced to establish affirmatively the requisite
^^Id. at 390 citing Jones v. United States , 362
U.S. 257 (1960)
.
6^390 U.S. 377, 391 (1968).
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standing or suffer the consequences that the illegally ob-
tained evidence would be used against him at trial, a re-
ality acknowledged but not precluded by the Jones deci-
sion.^*'
At the core of the accused's dilemma are not only
the nature of the evidence seized but, more importantly,
the nature of the crime charged. In Simmons had the accused
been tried for the crime of receiving or concealing stolen
property the contents of the suitcase would have been an
essential element of the crime and the accused would not
have been forced into the situation in which Garrett found
himself. The real distinction to be addressed therefore is
that between possessory and non-possessory crimes, an issue
which was not highlighted by the respective Courts in
either Harris or Walder but which required consideration by
the Court in Simmons , although merely in passing, niere
the Court went on to fashion a rule which, although probably
intended to supplement the rule announced in Jones , is pat-
ently more sweeping in its application.^^ The rationale
^^362 U.S. 257, 262 (1960).
^®390 U.S. 377, 391-392 (1968).
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"We therefore hold that when a defendant testi-
fies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth
Amendment groxinds, his testimony may not thereafter be ad-
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which underlies the formulation of this new rule is that
an accused should not have to suffer the "undeniable ten-
sion" of having to choose between protections afforded by
two different constitutional provisions. Such a situa-
tion was viewed to trzuiscend that presented where the ac-
cused gives up a mere benefit to secure the protection af-
71forded him by the Constitution, the implication being
that this was a blatant form of coercion, especially in
view of the fact that the testimony of the accused at the
hearing on the suppression motion will be usually fore-
72
closed frcHD trial use only where the motion is granted. '*
Such coercion, which collaterally serves to undermine the
purposes sought to be served by the exclusionary rule,
tends to vitiate the voluntariness of the accused's state-
73
ments.
mitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless
he makes no objection." Jjd. at 394.
^°1^. at 393-394.
Id . at 394. Although not relied on by the Court,
the reference to language in Garritv v. New Jersey . 385 U.
S. 493, 496, 498 (1967) is obvious.
"^^390 U.S. 377, 392-393 (1968).
The Court was careful to point out that in those
jurisdictions where the testimony is allowed to be utilized
at trial after the pretrial motion has failed the underlying
rationale is that of volxintariness } if the motion succeeds
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The trustworthiness of the statements attributable
to the accused in Slwons ^ although not mentioned by the
majority opinion, did not escape the consideration of the
dissenters. Both Justices Black and Vfhite contended that
the accused's statements were presumptively truthful due to
the circumstances under which they were given and since
they vrere also highly probative and relevant, as well as
voluntary, they should not be excluded with the attendant
ramifications of deterring police activity. However, to
place this significant reliance upon the element of trust-
worthiness in such a situation is to disregard the realities
of the trial arena and the abuses present even there. A
75
ready exzunple is the case of United States v. Harrison
where the defendant was being tried for the interstate
transportation of stolen money orders. Be testified during
the pretrial suppression hearing in an effort to preclude
the use at trial of a confession given during custodial
the testimony is no less voluntary, but is considered to
be the "fruit" of the underlying illegality. Jji^. at 392.
Jvtstice Black, dissenting in part, concedes the involuntari-
ness of such statements but asserts that they are adadssible
on the theory that the privilege against self-incrimination
had been waived irrespective of the choice involved. Id .
at 397-398.
^*Ii. at 398-399.




interrogation, specifically alleging that the confession
was involuntary because the interrogating agents threatened
to investigate and prosecute his ill sister if he did not
confess. During the course of cross-examination, the accused
was asked if the confession was true. Despite defense ob-
jection the defendant was ordered by the judge to answer
the prosecutor's question or face the alternative of either
a citation for contempt of court or denial of the notion.
In the throes of this dileona the defendant answered that
the confession was true. On appeal following conviction
petitioner's primary contention was that the judge's action
violated Harrison's privilege against self-incrimination.
Zn disposing of the case the appellate court quoted Simmons
for authority and distinguished it on the ground that,
whereas there the accused was forced to choose between his
Fourth Amendment privilege as respected the use of illegally
seized physical evidence and his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, in the instant case the accused
was contpelled to choose between two facets of the Fifth
Amendment privileges dismissal of his motion to suppress
the confession and the possibility that his admission would




while it did not b«liev« that such a practice as was in-
dulged in by the trial judge was "good practice « " subse-
quent action "in light of Siagaons , adequately protected
Harrison's Fifth Amendment rights by not allowing the tes-
77timony to be admitted against Harrison at trial." As
there was nothing to indicate from the record of trial
that Harrison's judicial admission was used against him,
either during the prosecution's case in chief or during
petitioner's cross-examination at trial, the i^pellate
court dismissed Harrison's assertion, based on ^rris ,
that he could be iiqpeached with the judicial admission, as
78
not being properly before it.
The lesson of Harrison should be clear. There, as
in Walder and Simmons , the accused's utterances were pre-
sunqptively trustworthy due to the circumstances under which
they were made. Unlike Walder and Simmons the underlying
"evidence" was the product not of an alleged illegal search
emd seizure but of an alleged unlawful custodial interroga-
tion. If the yardstick by %^ich such cases are measured
continues to be trustworthiness, there is nothing to pre-
vent an endless succession of cases like Harrison where
^^l^, at 1132 (footnote omitted).
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illegal police action, augmented by a prosecution-oriented
judiciary, operates to destroy carefully nuirtured consti-
tutional protections.
The danger, however, is not confined to cases where
the illegality which is sought to be challenged steaus from
custodial interrogation. An accused who would seek to sup-
press evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure is
equally vulnerable. The protection allegedly offered by
the decision in Simsons . specifically directed at such a
70 80
situation, is of doubtful vitality. Thus an accused
charged with a non-possessory offense might be forced to
face the same dilemma as that confronted by the defendant
81in Haurrison . Similarly, the emasculation of Mirand^ by
Harris does much to remove the protection afforded by cases
which have heretofore aiqplied the former's rule to Walder
^^390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
80Although the Oourt had no occasion to question the
soundness of Sinnons in a case decided three months after
Harris , it did specifically regard the former's underlying
"tension" rationale as being open to cjuestion. See
HcQautha v. California . 402 U.S. 183, 212 (1971).
81Presumably those charged with possessory offenses





situations thus a^cposing defendants to risks previously
avoided.
The decision in Hayris poses additional problems
which also reflect the possibility that an accused's privi-
lege against self-incrimination may be meaningless in the
face of police and prosecutorial practice. The holding in
Harris does not appear to go beyond situations where the
utterances of the accused are both trustworthy and neither
83involuntary nor coerced. Rejecting, as they implicitly
do, the proposition that custodial interrogation is per se
coercive, the majority in Harris leaves open the question
of whether or not statements obtained from the accused by
84
way of fraud, artifice, or deception could be utilized
85to attack the testimony of the accused at trial. Thus




See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
®*ln Rogers v. Richmond . 365 U.S. 534 (1961), Jus-
tice Frankfurter's majority opinion addressed the issue
raised by the admission into evidence at a trial for murder
of the confession of an accused which had been obtained by
police interrogators after telling the accused that if he
did not confess they would arrest his invalid wife and in-
terrogate her. The standard adc^ted by the Court was
"whether the behavior of the State's law enforcesMnt offi-
cials was such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist .
Id. at 544.m
85^
Whiie Rogers rejects the use of such statsisnts.

32
today any accused faced with a situation akin to that of
the accused in Rogers may well choose to give up his right
to present trial testinony after giving consideration to
the possibility that he may be confronted with his prior
admission or confession—hardly a situation which coo^wrts
with the principle of one being able "to speak in the un-
fettered exercise of his own will." In somewhat the same
vein an accused who has made a statement, otherwise inad-
missible in the prosecution's case in chief, in testifying
in his own behalf may limit his diirect testimony to facts
not contained in the prior statement. Here the accused's
dilemma turns on the scope of cross-examination permitted
87
in the trial jurisdiction since this will determine
whether or not the prosecutor will be able to accomplish
indirectly that which he is prevented from accomplishing
88directly. So too, an accused who indicates, in answering
a question posed on cross-examination, that he does not re-
member may find that the prosecutor will resort to an at-
the facts upon which the decision rests confines the pro-
hibition only to the prosecution's case in chief. Id . at
541.
86
Hallov V. Hoqan . 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
87
See notes 96-97 infra and accompanying text.




tempted utilization of the Illegally obtained statwnent in
89
an effort to refresh his recollection thereby making the
stat«nent*8 contents available for jury scrutiny.
Investigation of the various uniform and model codes
and rules of evidence reveals that, with limited exception,
they do not attwnpt to resolve the problems posed by the
Harris-Sinroons-Walder trilogy in a definitive manner. With-
out exception they adhere to the position adopted by the
90
majority of jurisdictions, in derogation of the common law,
that an accused is a competent witness in his own behalf.'^
Similcurly they acknowledge that an accused has a privilege
^
^See e.fl. , Inge v. United States . 356 P. 2d 345
(D.C. Cir. 1966)
.
90See note 16 supra .
91
ISie applicable provisions provide that all persons
are qualified as witnesses unless they are either incapable
of either being understood or incapable of understanding the
duty to tell the truth. Model Code of Evidence rule 9(a)
(1942) ; J^. rule 101 (1942) ; Uniform Rules of evidence rule
7 (1953); id. rule 17 (1953). The effect was to remove
existing disabilities thereby demonstrating a preference
for relevant evidence. Model Code of Bvidence rule 9, Com-
ment (1942); Uniform Rules of Bvidence rule 7, Conmissioner's
Hote (1953) . Both the Model Code and the Uniform Rules
leave the narrow grounds of disqualification to be deter-
mined by the trial judge. Model Code of Bvidence rule 101,
CoDBent (1942) ; Uniform Rules of Bvidence rule 17, Commis-
sioner's Mote (1953). The Federal Rules of Bvidence express
a broad grant of coa^Mtency without the above limitations.




not to be called as a witness and a privilege not to tes-
92tify. *• While an accused does have the right to testify in
his own behalf he may, for a variety of reasons, decide against
such an action. Under the older rules refusal to testify
placed the accused at the extreme disadvantage of having
both the prosecutor euid the trial judge able to comment on
his failure to take the witness stamd as well as being sub-
jected to a jury instruction which would allow the trier
of fact to draw all reasonable inferences fr(Mn his inac-
93tion ; however, the Federal Rules of Evidence would zib-
94
solutely prohibit such practices. Thus under the Federal
Rules an accused who elects not to testify, fearful of the
^^Model Code of Evidence rule 201(1) (1942) ; Uniform
Rules of Evidence rule 23 (1953) . The Federal Rules of
Evidence do not provide an express prohibition, most prob-
aOaly reflecting zm implicit recognition of the Fifth Amend-
ment proscription.
^^Model Code of Evidence rule 201(3) (1942); Uhi-
form Rules of Evidence rule 23(4) (1953). Admittedly a
minority position, the provisions of the Model Code are
predicated on a desire not to impede the evolution or de-
velopment of legal doctrine pursuzmt to pressure for refoirm
in this regard. Model Code of Evidence rule 201(3), Com-
ment (1942) . While the Uniform Rules specify only comment
by counsel, comment by the judge is strongly inferred.
Uniform Rules of Evidence rule 23(4), Commissioner's Note
(1953) .
^^Federal Rules of Evidence rule 513(a) (1972).
The basis of the rule lies in recognition of the decision
in Griffin v. California. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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use against him of illagally obtaiiMd •vid«nc«, is in a
superior position to that which he vrould have occupied
under both the Uhifozn Rules and the Model Code.^^ Utoder
all three formulations an accused %#ho testifies on the
merits will be subjected to the orthodox mile which permits
an unlimited scope of cross-examination and while the older
iMles retain the privilege against self-incrimination as to
facts %^ich merely affect credibility,^^ the Federal Rules
reject this proposition. ' Therefore, at least \inder these
latter rules, an accused will be tunable to prevent a prose-
cutor fron utilizing the illegally obtained evidence,
either after a line of questioning designed to elicit an
98inconsistency or subsequent to the witness's indication
99
that he does not remember the incident in question. Al-
though the Federal Rules and the Model Code are silent on the
^^The accused, if he desires to do so, may request
and is entitled to «m instruction %#hich would direct the
jury not to draw any adverse inference from his failure to
testify. Federal Rules of Evidence rule 513(b) (1972).
^^Model Code of Evidence rule 105 (1942) ; id. rule
208, Cosmient (1942) 7 Uniform Rules of Evidence rule 25(g),
Commissioner's Vote (1953).
^^Federal Rules of Evidence rule 611(b) (1972).
98See note 88 supra .
See note 89 suprf and accompanying text.
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subject, ftt least under the Uniform Rules an accused who is
free from the use against him in the prosecution's case in
chief of any statement made by him which was the product of
fraud, artific, or deception^^^ is siodlarly protected from
101
such use upon his cross-examination. Only the Model
Code and Federal Rules piravisions indicate that an accused
who testifies at a hearing on a pretrial motion does not
102
relinquish his privilege against self-incrimination.
Thus an accused being tried for a non-possessory offense
who wishes to contest the use of allegtKily illegally obtained
physical evidence or any accused seeking to challenge an
allegedly unlawfully obtained admission or confession may
do so without exposing himself to cross-examination generally.
He does so at his peril, however, in that none of the formu-
lations affirmatively preclude the use of such statements
103
against him at a later point in trial.
See notes 84-85 supra and accoopanying text.
^^^Uniform Rules of Evidence rule 63 (6) (1953).
Model Code of Evidence rule 505 (1942) is narrower in scope
and its application to a situation such as this is doubtful.
102
Model Code of Evidence rule 208, Comment (1942)
;
Federal Rules of Evidence rule 104(d) (1972).
Ihe Federal Rules are not addressed to this prob-
lem, the drafters conceding that the law in the area is un-
certain. Federal Rules of Evidence rule 104(d), Advisory
Committee's Vote (1972) citing Walder v. Dnited States. SiA'




STATEMENTS COMPELLED BY GRAND JURIES, ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES, AND LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES
The fact that an individual may be compelled by
illegal policy activity to utter statements which are in-
criminating and which may thereafter be used against him
does not place such an individual in a particularly unique
position. Other arms of the executive branch of the govern-
ment, as well as entities within the legislative and judi-
cial breinches, may accomplish the same thing by way of pro-
cedures which have been given full legal approval. As
early as 1807 it was recognized that the country has the
right to the testimony of every citizen but that such
right is limited by the countervailing privilege of the
104
witness not to accuse himself. Since that time that
privilege has been extended so as to apply to gr2md jury
proceedings and investigations conducted by administrative






agenciaa and legislative coamittees. However, the privi-
lege may well be abrogated by the granting of innunity
and the recalcitrant witness subjects hiaself to possible
civil and criminal contempt citations and associated penal-
107ties for his refusal to testify subsequent to such a grantt
Further, once an order is issued for the innunity grant to
take effect the witness is affirmatively prevented from
seeking judicial review of this decision since the order is
108
considered not to be final and thus nonappealable. Such
principles apply to witnesses appearing before both federal
and state investigating bodies and the extent of the nulli-
fication of the Fifth Amendment privilege depends upon the
respectively applicable legislation. It is to the first
of these that attention is now directed.
105
SSS. generally 8 Wigmore, Bvldence t 2252, at
325-326 (McHaughton rev. 1961) i 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses I 46
(1948); 98 C.J.S., Witnesses f 433 (1957); 38 C.J.S., Grand
Juries . I 42 (1957)
.
^^
^See generally 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses § 86 (1948)
i
98 C.J.S. , Witnesses I 439 (1957) . See ^Ifft Q^te 1 suora
and accompanying text.
^^^See e.g., 38 C.J.S. , Grand Juries I 41 (1957).
^°^Cobbledick v. United States . 309 U.S. 323 (1940))
In re Grand Jury Ifivestioation . 427 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1970).
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Recently Congress enacted broad legislation dealing
109
with witness imaunity. Clearly it is a departure from
other legislation previously enacted into law which dealt
with the subject of innunity and its provisions repealed the
authorization of ixnunity grants contained in over half a
110
hundred other federal statutes. It is sweeping in ap-
plication, by its terms encompassing proceedings before
courts, as well as executive and legislative entities.
Such legislative agencies include either House of Congress
112
and any coonxttee, subcomnittee, or joint ceomittee thereof.
Grand Juries are included, as are ancillary proceedings be-
113
fore federal coiirts. Witnesses before such bodies are
sxibject to having not only their testimony extracted but
their books, documents, records, recoipdings, and other ma-
terial as %iwll. The evidence thus oooqpelled may not be
withheld without penalty by the witness who asserts his
^°^18 U.S.C. II 6001-05 (1970); Act of Oct. 15,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 926.
^^^SJOL U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative
, 9l8t Cong., 2d Bess. (1970) at 4019.
^^^18 U.S.C. I 6001 (1970).
^^^18 U.S.C. I 6005(a) (1970).
^"l8 U.S.C. I 6003(a) (1970).
^"l8 U.S.C. I 6001(2) (1970).

40
115privilege against self-incrinination ; the witness who
coo^liee has exchanged his evidence for the assurance that
neither such evidence nor any infomation derived either
directly or indirectly from that evidence may be used against
him in any criminal case.
This imaxmity may be granted in a variety of ways
depending upon the proceedings involved. Where the witness
appezurs before a legislative body, after such witness has
refused to cooqply on the basis of the privilege against
self-incrimination, ionunity flows from the order of the
118
appropriate federal district court subject to a request
18 U.S.C. I 6002 (1970). If the witness does
not cosily he is subject to the sanction ef both civil con-
teaqpt, for which the penalty may not exceed iiqprisonment
for eighteen months, 28 U.S.C. I 1826 (a) (1970) , and for
criminal conten^t which will trigger a sentence which is
within the discretion of the sentencing judge. 18 U.S.C.
I 401(3) (1970).
^^^18 U.S.C. i 6002 (1970). The protection thus
formulated is hereinafter referred to as use and derivative
use Inmrunity.
^^^18 U.S.C. I 6005(a) (1970) . In such cases the
Imnunity grant hinges on the claim of the witness* privi-
lege. Such requirement is similar to that found in numer-
ous statutes repealed by the current statute . See £•£.
#
49 U.S.C. I 43(1970); 47 U.S.C. I 409(1970).
118
At first blush this requirement, that the founda-
tion of the grant of immunity, reposing in the judiciary,
would seem to eliminate any necessity for judicial review.
See note 108 supra and accompanying text. However, use of




from a duly authorized representative of such body, subse-
119quent to prelimxnary requirements. Where proceedings
before a court or grzmd jury are involved the immunity
grant is similarly extended by the federal judiciary sub-
120
sequent to a request by a United States Attorney, All
that is required is that this attorney be of the opinion
that the evidence sought to be obtained is necessary to the
public interest and that the witness either has refused or
is likely to refuse to comply based on his privilege against
self-incrimination. ^2 ^ Any administrative agency with
the approval of the Attorney General, may itself issue
119Where the proceeding involves either House of
Congress, such a request must be predicated upon a majority
vote of the members present; proceedings before a committee,
subcommittee, or joint committee require a two-thirds vote
of the membership; in all cases the Attorney General must
be served with a notice of intention ten days or more prior
to the date of the request.
'^^IS U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1970) . A request of this type
must be approved by the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney
General, or a designated Assistant Attorney General. 18 U.
S.C. i 6003(b) (1970)
.
^21i8 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1) -(2) (1970) . In such cases
the immunity grant does not necessarily depend upon the wit-
ness* claim of privilege 2md thus is somewhat automatic and
therefore similar to the operation of several statutes re-
pealed by the existing statute. See e.g., 15 U.S.C. 49
(1970); 29 U.S.C. i 209 (1970).
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the immunity grant provided these latter two requirements
122have been met.
Without question the use and derivative use immun-
ity available under the terms of the present federal stat-
ute is broader thtua. the protection afforded by a prior
enactment which formed the basis for the first successful
challenge of immunity grants as being unconstitutional.
123
In Counaelman v. Hitchcock the Supreme Court faced the
124issue of whether or not Congress, via statute* could
validly compel a witness appearing before a federal grand
jury to testify, notwithstanding the witness* reliance upon
the privilege against self-incrimination, by tendering im-
125
munity. Here the federal gremd jury was investigating
122
18 U.S.C. I 6004 (1970). No indication appears
of legislative intent for the provision which precludes ac-
tion by the judiciary in this particular instance other
th2m the anticipation that the Attorney General will insure
that "appropriate procedures" are followed by each agency.
SssL U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative Hews. 9l8t
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) at 4018. This portion of the stat-
ute is also of the claim-automatic type. Sff note 121
qupra.
123
142 U.S. 547 (1892).
^^*Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, I 12, 24 Stat. 379




The Act, as amended, provided that any evidence
so obtained would not be used against the witness in any
criminal proceeding or for the enforcoaent of any penalty
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certain alleged violations of federal regulations by vari-
ous railroad con:9>anies. After appearing pursuant to a duly
served sxibpoena the witness was sworn and testified in re-
sponse to certain questions relating to the grand jury's
mandated inquiry. However, he declined to answer other
questions on the grounds that to do so would be to incrimin-
ate himself. A second similar refusal followed a judicial
directive requiring con^liance whereupon the witness was
adjudged to be in contempt and ordered incarcerated until
such time as he amswered the grand jury's questions. The
case foxind its way to the Supreme Oourt after denial of a
126
request for a wrxt of habeas corpus .
The Court initially noted that since the grand
jury's investigation involved alleged violations of a
federal statute the matter was indeed a criminal one and
127
that the Fifth Amendment proscription applied. This
or forfeiture except perjury oomnitted while acting as a
witness. 142 U.S. 547, 560-561 (1892). Hie Protection
thus formulated is hereinafter referred to as use inmunity.
^^^It should be noted that here judicial review was
available in that the witness refused to testify, a situ-
ation quifce different from that where the witness seeks
judicial review after responding to the subpoena but before
refusing to testify. See note 108 supra and accooqpanying
text.
127
142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).

being so, the prlvilecfe enibodied in th« Anmndmmnt was "as
128broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.
"
To supplant the privilege lawfully the statutory ianunity
129had to be coextensive with it. Turning to the wording
of the statute the CXmrt observed that while the witness*
evidence could not be subsequently used against him, unpre-
vented was the use of such evidence to search out and un-
cover other evidence and witnesses which could be so util-
ized and which would not have been available but for such
130
witness' conpliance ; in short the statute did not speci-
fically grant derivative use iiomunity nor did it absolutely
preclude future prosecution of the witness for offenses
131
linked to the events to which his testimony related.
After reviewing the numerous state court decisions that
interpreted state statutes which sought to impinge upon
state constitutional provisions einbodying similar self-
incrimination clauses* the Coxirt unequivocally rejected
those cases which deeaed use and derivative use innunity
"®Id. at 563.
129^. at 564-565; ^d^ at 585.
"°ISL. at 564; id. at 586.
131





as being a valid svibatitute for tha privilaga. Instead,
it was annovmced that "a statutory enactnent, to be valid,
must a££ord absolute iimunity for the offense to which the
133question relates." Only in this way, reasoned the Coxirt,
could a statute supply that quantum of protection which would
adequately guard the witness against the entire spectrum
134
of evils Which the privilege was designed to prevent.
Thus, in a unanimous opinion, not only was the witness* con-
tempt conviction reversed but a precedent %nis bom.
Deferring to the Counselman decision Congress again
legislated with the intent to formulate an iamiunity standard
vAiich, when applied, could lawfully force witnesses to an-
135
swer incriminating questions. The new statute was stib-
jected to scrutiny by the Si^reme Court in the case of
136
Brown V. Walker . The facts here were identical with
those in Counselman except that a different grand jury juris-
diction was involved and the witness in Brown refused, on




^^^142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892).
133
Id., citing Bovd v. United states . 116 U.S. 616
142 U.S. 547, 585-586 (1892).
^^Act of Feb. 11, 1893, 27 Stat, at L. 443 (1893).
^^^161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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quastioas «t all. X*ik« its pr«d«c«aaor, th« roim daoislon
Inirolvad a datarminatlon of whathar or not tha atatutoxy
proviaiona Which aabracad tranaactional laanmity wara
aufflciant to diaplaca tha Fi£th Aaandnant'a prohibition.
Iba fiva-isan aiajority, ralying primarily on tha prior da-
138
ciaion in Counaalaan . uphald tha validity of tha atatuta
139
and tharafora tha tranaactional iaaranity atandasd. Iha
four-aum minority contandad to no avail that tha languaga
of tha Fifth Amandmant waa incapabla of baing dilutad in
»y 1.1.^:. by . ..>. «H: of C^.,,...."*" Altl».,h ».ith.r
oaa nor darivativa uaa iammity waa alludad to by tha thraa
opiniona in ££SSB, it ia bayond quaation that aithar and
both wara rajactad by all nina juaticaa.
137
Tha atatuta providad in partinant part that "no
paraon ahall ba proaacutad or subjactad to any panalty or
forfaitora for or on account of any tranaaction, mattar, or
thing coacaming which ha may taatify, or produca avidanca,
documantary or otharwiaa." 2A» *^ 5^* "^^ iamuni^ thua
ambediad waa automatic in that tha witaaaa could not rafuaa
to attand and taatify or produca avidanca, and, oaca ha did,
iamunity flowad aa a natural oonaaquanca. Id .
^^161 U.S. 591, 594-595 (1896). Kara tha Brown
majority infarrad that iamunity from proaacutioa waa auffl-
ciant to cancal out tha privilaga.
^^'l61 U.S. 591, 610 (1896).
^*®jtd. at 610 1 ii. at 630.
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Transactional iaanuity, thus judicially andorsad,
aubaaqaantly bacama tha undarlyiag standard for «sa in stata
anactaants aimad at prying loosa tastinony and othar avi-
danca from unwilling witnassas. In tha waka of tha Brown
dacision innunarabla aniltitudas of stata ianunity statutas
y^mrm spawnad which nimickad to tha point of punctuation
tha languaga of tha statuta thara uphald and which surviva
today aither as originally anactad or as vanarabla dascand-
ants. Piftaan such statutas ralata to grand jury invasti-
gations of any typa. Whila tha Majority of thasa xm-
quiras that the witnass firat dain his privilaga against
142
salf-incrimination, thraa statas provida autosuitic ianunity.
Two statas liaiit tha iaanunity grant whara tha grand jury is
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 13-1804 (Supp. 1972-1973);
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. i 154-1-18 (Supp. 1972); Dal. Coda
Ann. I 11-3508 (Supp. 1970); Pla. Stat. Ann. I 914.04 (1972);
Idaho Coda Ann. I 19-1115 (Supp. 1973) y Kan. Stat. Ann.
I 22-3102 (Supp. 1972); Ninn. Stat. Ann. • 3.14 (Supp. 1973);
H.H. Sav. Stat. Aim. I 516s34 (Supp. 1972); N.Y. Cria. Pro.
L. I 190.40 (NcKinnay 1971) ; V.D. Cant. Coda Ann. I 31-01-09
(Supp. 1973); Ore. Rav. Stat. Ann. II 139.190, 139.200 (1971);
Utah Coda Ann. I 54-7-4 (Supp. 1973) ; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
12, I 1664(a) (Supp. 1973); Wash. Rav. Coda Ann. I 10.27.130
(Supp. 1972); Wis. Stat. Ann. I 972.08 (1971).
^^^Kan. Stat. Ann. I 22-3102 (Supp. 1972); N.Y. Cria.
Pro. L. I 190.40 (McKinnay 1971); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12,
i 1664(a) (S\9p. 1973).
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investigating matters which relate to alcoholic beverages •'•*•'
;
two other states only provide for the gremt of immunity where
the subject of the grand jury's investigation is either
organized crime or racketeering. Statutes in two other
states not only provide for trzmsactional immunity but also
affirmatively state that such will be zm cO^solute bar to
prosecution. One state bars indictment as the price
146paxd by the state for the witness' testimony. Three
states, while allowing the court which exercises authority
over the gramd jury to grant immunity to witnesses, fails
to specify the nature of such immunity."^*' Only two states
provide for use 2md derivative use immunity for grand jury
l^^Ala. Recomp. Code Ann. tit, 29, §8 110, 111 (1958);
Iowa Code Ann. § 622.15 (4) (1950) (here another immunity stat-
ute has been incorporated by case law. See Koonck v. Cooney ,
244 la. 153, 55 N.W. 2d 269 (1952). Statutes in both states
provide automatic immunity.)
144
Cal. Pen. Code Ann. § 1324 (Deering 1971); Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 19, B 640.1 (Supp. 1973-1974). Under both
laws the witness must claim his privilege.
^^^111. Stat. Ann. ch. 38, 8B 106-1 to 2 (1970);
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 178.572, .574 (1967).
l^^Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1623 (1955).
147
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-916 (1964); Ohio Rev. Stat.






witn«c8«s. All thaae statutaa, save £lva, provida that
a oooparating wltnaaa aay ba punlahad for parjuxy or falaa
awaarlng
.
State atatutaa have also providad for tha granting
of Inmunity where tha witness testifies before the state
legislature or an associated connittee or subcoanittee.
However* in such cases the use of transactional iasninity
is not so prevalent. Of the twenty-one states which pro-
vide for any type of imunity in such cases only eleven
grant transactional ianuni^} in seven of these jurisdic-
tions the grant operates automatically while in the re-
151
mainder the witness aust first claia his privilege.
^^^La. Rev. Code Crim. Pro. art. 439. IC (Supp. 1973)}
Hew Jersey occupies a curious position in that it grants use
auEid derivative use inaninity to public enployees who testify,
H.J. Stat. Ann. I 2At81-17.2a2 (Supp. 1973-1974), While other
witnesses receive only use inounity. H.J.Stat. Ann. I 2At
81-17.3 (Si9)p. 1973-1974).
149 o
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-916 (1964); Kan Stat. Ann.
I 22-3102 (Supp. 1972); Mich. Coaip. L. Ann. • 767.19a (Supp.
1973-1974); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, I 640.1 (Supp. 1973-
1974) ; Tenn. Code Ann. I 40-1623 (1955)
.
^^Ariz. Rsv. Stat. Ann. I 41-1152 (1956); Cal. Gov't.
Code Ann. I 9410 (Deering 1973); Iowa Code Ann. I 622.16
(1950); Mass. Gen. L. Ann., ch. 3, I 28 (1966); Minn. Stat.
Ann. I 3.14(3) (Supp. 1973); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. I 43-405
(1947); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. I 101.44 (1969). Ohio denies
the iasninity to anyone who requests, in writing, to appear
and testify.
^^Alaska Stat. Ann. I 24.25.070 (1972); H.T. Crin.
Pro. L. It 50.10, .20 (NcKinney 1971); Tenn. Cede Ann. I 3-319
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Pour statas grant autcuBatlc use imnunity for tha coaipallad
152
taatimony or othar avidanca. Autonatic uaa and darlva-
tlva uaa immunity is provided for tastioMmy and othar avi-
153dance by two states, while two other states limit such
imnunity grants to testimony only. Two additional
states, while providing that witnesses do not have the
right to refuse giving testimony or evidence to the state
legislature or its coosnittees or subcomnittees , fail to
155
specify the nature of the immunity provided.
By far the largest nuinber of state statutory immun-
ity grants have been directed at witnesses appearing be-
156
fore hearings conducted by administrative agencies.
(1955) ; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5429f, I 13 (Supp.
1972-1973)
.
^^^Idaho Code Ann. I 67-411 (1973) ; 111. Stat. Ann.
ch. 63, I 6 (Supp. 1973-1974); W. Va. Code Ann. I 4-l-5a
(1966); Wis. Stat. Ann. I 13.35 (1972).
^^^Kan. Stat. Ann. I 46-109 (1964); V.J. Stat. Ann.
I 52il3-3 (1970).
^^*Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, I 411 (1960); Ore. Rev.
Stat. Ann. I 171.525 (1971-1972).
^^^Ala. Reconp. Code Ann. tit. 7 I 455 (1958);
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. I 2-47 (1969)
.
^^^Literally thousands of these statutes have been
enacted and thus no attempt will be made to include them
all in this work. The statutes which are hereinafter deline-
ated are considered by the writer te be fairly representa-
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Feurt««n stat^a have provided for transactional innunity
whara the witness testifies or produces evidence during an
investigation conducted by the state's public utility con-
Biission. Of these only three require that the privilege
be claimed by the witness for the iwovuiity to beoene ef-
fective ; the remainder provide for automatic iasiunity.
Similar commissions in two ether states have been given the
power to grant only use immunity.^ Mine states have con-
ferred the power to grant witness immunity to their re-
spective employment security commissions, all such being
transactional immunity predicated upon the witness' claim
of privilege. The securities regulation cemmissions of
tive of the overall individual state approach to the immun-
ity problem within the sphere of administrative agency op-
erations .
^^'^M.Y. Pub. Serv. L. I 20(2) (NcKinney Supp. 1973-
1974); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66. 1402 (1959); R.Z. Qen. L.
Ann. I 28-42-54 (1956).
^^^Ala. Recomp. Code Ann. tit. 48, • 67 (1958)
i
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 40-244 (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann.
I 73-225 (1957) ; Cal. Pub. Util. Code Ann. • 1795 (Deering
1970) ; Del. Code Ann. • 167 (1953) ; Nd. Code Ann. art. 78,
• 81(c) (1969); Mo. Stat. Ann. 386.470 (1949); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. I 4903.08 (1953); Utah Code Ann. 54-7-4(3) (1953);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, 1664(a) (Supp. 1973); wyo. Stat.
Ann. I 37-35 (1957).
^^^Pla. Stat. Ann. 350.60 (1968) (automatic) /Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. I 80.04.050 (1962) (claim)
.
^^lowa code Ann. I 96.11(10) (1972); Kan. Stat.
Ann. I 44-714(i) (1964); Minn. Stat. Ann. I 268.12(10) (1959);
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six states say grant transactional iooBunity and of thase,
thrae provide for automatic inmunity^^^ while the remain-
ing three condition the immunity grant on the witness'
162initial claim of privilege. Five other states have,
via statute, given the power to grant transactional innun-
ity to an alcoholic beverage commission* the majority of
which require that the privilege be initially claimed by
163
the witness. The oil and gas conservation commissions
of three states have similar transactional immunity powers,
but only one of these states provides that the immunity is
automatic. Insurance commissions of three other states
Miss. Cede Ann. I 71-5-141 (1972); Heb. Rev. Stat. Ann.
48-615 (1968) J M.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. I 96-4(j) (1963);
S.D. Camp, L. Ann. I 61-3-8 (1967); Tenn. Code Ann. • 50-
1342 (1955); Va. Code Ann. I 60.1-43 (1950).
^^^Ind. Stat. Aim. tit. 23, art. 2, ch. 1, I 16
(Bum's 1972); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, I 1082(10)
(1964) ; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. I 15-2019(2) (b) (1947)
.
162
La. Rev. Stat. Aim. 511 709C(4) (Supp. 1973);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, I 405 (1965) ; S.C. Code L. Ann.
I 62-307 (1962)
.
^^^H.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 176tl6 (1964); Ore. Rev.
Stat. Ann. I 471.770 (1971-1972); W. Va. Code Ann. 60-2-
18 (1966) . The privilege is automatic in the remaining two
states. 111. Stat. Ann. ch. 43 I 163d (Supp. 1973-1974);
Wis. Stat. Ann. • 139.20 (Supp. 1973).
^^N.M. Stat. Ann. 1 65-3-7 (1953). The other two
require that the witness claim his privilege. Colo. Rev.





have similar powers, ^^ as do the industrial comissions
of two other states.^^ Transactional innunity may also
be granted by various administrative agencies of three ad-
167ditional states. Apparently only one state has opted
for use innunity grants where administrative agencies are
concerned. ^6«
These state immunity statutes have gained added sig-
nificance in light of the more recent Supreme Court deci-
sions which have addressed questions which dealt with the
interrelationship between the proscription of the Fifth
169
Amendment and the concept of immunity. In Mallov v. Hogan
the petitioner had been called to testify before a state
investigatory body. Despite the fact that he was fully im-
mune from prosecution in state court he refused to answer
^^^Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 304.2-350(1) (1973) (claim)
t
Mich. Conp. L. Ann. I 500.2033 (1967) (automatic) ; Tex. Pen.
Code Ann. art. 598 (1952) (automatic)
.
^^^Idaho Stat. Ann. I 72-1340 (1973) (automatic)
;
M.O. Cent. Code Ann. I 38-08-12 (1972) (claim)
.
^^^Alaslca Code Ann. 1 06.05.020 (1962) (coimMrce com-
mission; claim); Mass. Gen. L. Ann. c. 93, I 7 (1972) (trade
conmission; automatic); N.J. Stat. Ann. lltl-lS (1960)
(civil service commission; automatic)
.
^^®Conn. Oen. Stat. Ann. I 12-2 (1972) (tax commis-
sion; automatic)
.
^^*378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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questions relating to guibling and other criminal activi-
ties, asserting that te answer would tend to incriminate
him. Subsequent to a contempt judgment and the concomi-
tant imposition of an indeterminate jail sentence the re-
calcitrant witness applied for a writ ef habeas corpus .
Denial of the application by the state's court of last re-
sort paved the way for a determination by the Supreme
Court. By a narrow majority the Court held that the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination was guar-
anteed to state witnesses by way of the provisions contained
in the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, while innunity per se
was involved, a determination of the scope of that immvutity
was not necessary te the decision in the case. Nonetheless,
the unfortunate seeds of precedent which were destined to
displace conqpletely the principle annovinced by the decision
in Ceunselman over sixty years before were inadvertently
sewn.
Writing for the five-man majority J\astice Brennan
placed heavy emphasis on the theretofore decided coerced
171
confession cases in an effort to justify the contention
that the hallmark of this country's system of criminal jus-
^^°Coun«elman v. Hitchcock , 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
^^^See e.g., 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964); i^. at 7-8.
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tics was that it is accusatorial rathar than inquisi-
172
torial, and that tharefora oaa should be protactad
against both state and federal invasions of the privilege
and "to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will . . . ."^"^^ Gtoing this
far and no further would not have done violence to the
Counselman holding; however, after it was determined that
the federal privilege was applicable in state proceedings*
the facts of the case demanded that the Court face the is-
sue of whether or not the availability of the privilege was
to be determined by different standards with respeot to
jurisdiction, itiese standards related to fear of prosecu-
tion, which, tuder cases involving federal prosecutions,
meant that to invoke the privilege lawfully the witness had
te have "reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct
answer." Further, whether or not this standard had been
met depended upon the inqplications of the question put to
the witness, the setting in which it was asked, and that
a responsive answer or explanation might threaten to force
(1951)
.
^^^378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
173
^^^Hoffman v. united States. 341 U.S. 479, 486
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th« witxMss into a disclosure which. •• to hia, would bo
175injurious. The najority in Mallov concliidod that the
standard should not differ between federal and state
176
cases and this in turn reqiiired a detemination of
whether or not the facts of the case at bar conported with
the federal standard.
It was at this juncture that the M^tllev majority
fatally undercut
'^^"nfti'iTfnn ^^ order to show that the
petitioner in Mallov stood in substantially the sane posi-
tion as the xmcooperative witness in Hoffs>an when they both
claiwed the privilege, the Majority asserted that the under-
lying facts and circuBstances of the proceeding in question,
to form a valid basis for the clai» « had to dononstrate not
only that the answers to the questions posed would theaselves
support a conviction but also that the answers "Vould fum-
177
nish a link in the chain needed to prosecute . . . .**"
That this proposition related to a predicate for the clain
of the privilege and not to the scope of that saow privi-
lege as embracing use and derivative use insmnity is evi-
dent from the facts of Hoffman . There the witness refused
^^^Id» *t 486-487.
^^*378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964)
.




to tttstify before a federal grand jury. The sole issue
was whether or not the questions, if answered or coenented
t^on, placed the witness in real and substantial danger of
178
incriisination. The Court, with one dissenter, rejected
the contention that to claim the privilege the witness had
179to allege facts to show why he had refused to speak,
holding instead that such could well be deterained by the
judge through "his personal perception of the peculiarities
180
of the case . " Mot one word of the opinion in Hoffman
is indicative of the fact that any mesiber of the Court con-
sidered that the scope of immunity was anything other than
that of the transactional immunity sanctioned by the full
Cexurt in Counselroan . To the contrary, the entire thrust of
the opinion in Hoffwaw was to enunciate a concern that the
privilege would be abrogated since, if the witness was "re-
quired to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is
usually required to be established in court, he would be
ceoqpelled to surrender the very protection which the privi-
181lege is designed to guarantee."






It was this Sana concam that aotlvatad tha majority
182
opinion In Mallov . Ohqueatloned was tha scopa of the
Innunlty Involved; the only real Issue was whether or not
the previously announced standards which would alloM the
witness validly to claim the privilege applied to state
proceedings and whether or not these standards had been
met. Of the fo\xr dissenters none rose to challenge the
concept of transactional Immunity. Rather they were pre-
occupied with other pursuits. Two of the Justices joined
In an opinion which evidenced that their only concern was
that the Fifth Amendment should not be applied to the states
183
via the vehicle of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the
proper Inquiry would have been whether the state proceed-
ings coofwrted with the concept of fundamental fairness
under the Due Process clause of the latter AmendsMnt. *^
By making the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states,
they reasoned, the majority placed an unwarranted reliance
upon the principle that both spheres within oxir federal
182378 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1964).





las8yst«B should be congruent and from this could only com*
a dilution of atate power and a dangerous corresponding
shift in eaphasis to federal power where primary respons-
186ibility for crisM prevention was concerned. The other
t»fo Justices, joining in yet another opinion in the case,
were just as far away from the scope of ionunity issue.
They took the position that the majority had fashioned a
rule which would allow any witness thereafter to invoke
the privilege while leaving the judge in a position where
he was powerless to do anything hut accept the witness'
187
claim. They made it clear that in their opinion if in-
vestigating bodies were to continue to be free to extract
necessary evidence from witnesses, while at the sane time
alla%iring the privilege to operate "as a protection against
cMapelled incriminating answers, the trial judge must be
permitted to make a meaningful determination of when an-
swers tend to incriminate."^®^ Patently, these jurists
were concerned only that the "reasonable apprehension"
^®^j;d. at 27.
^®^i^. at 28.
^®^378 O.S. 1, 33 (1964) (White and Stsfwart, JJ.,
dissenting) .
188




standard should be tasted by someone other than the wit-
ness^^^ lest the privilege be transformed into a shield
against "distasteful questions . "^^^
The same day that Mallov was decided the Supreme
Court handed doiwn its decision in Murphy v. Waterfront Cow-
mission of New Yorkr^"^ The petitioners in Murphv had boon
granted transactional innunity by a bistate body which was
investigating a work stoppage at various piers located in
one of the states. Although the statutory iaamunity extended
to both states within which the investigating agency exer-
cised authority, the witnesses refused to answer certain
questions contending that to do so would tend to incrimin-
ate them under federal law. Ihe issue thus faced by the
Court was whether a state could oonpel an immunized witness
to give testimony which could later be utilised to convict
him of a federal crime. However, the Ooort was quick to
point out that this issue was not dependent upon «^ich
sovereign compelled the testimony or which sovereign used
the testimony since the Fifth Amendment's prohibition re-




^^^78 U.S. 52 (1964).
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applicabl* to the statas.^^^ Initially tha Oaurt notad
that thare ware than in existence three judicially annaunced
rules which had a direct bearing on the case at bars
(1) federal entities could cooqpel a witness ta give testi-
193
•ny which might incriminate him under state law,
(2) state entities oould coaqpel a witness to give testimony
194
which might incriminate him under federal law, and
(3) state compelled evidence could be introduced into evi-
195dence in federal court. The solution of the problem
posed by the case at bar thus depended upon whether or not
196
these precedents had been abrogated by the Mallav deci-
sion.
After a review of the applicable case law the Court
concluded that the second of these precedents was estab-
lished in a case which refused to hold that the Fifth Amend-
192
^d . at 53 n. 1.
^^^United States v. Murdock . 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
^^Knapp v. Schweitger . 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
^^^
reldman v. United States . 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
^^
^Mallov V. Hoqan . 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
^^^Murphv V. Waterfrori\ r^^j'^i^fi^^ *>f «^ X^f^ 378




nant's prlvilag* against salf^incrlaination was applici^la
to tha statas~a coacapt rajactad by tha prasant Oaurt.^*®
Equally infirm was tha first pracadant which tha Court
charactarizad as baing groundad upon arronaous authority
199
and faulty rationale. Tha third pracadant was also con-
sidarad to be davoid of vitality in that tha underlying
rationale was predicated upon an analogous application of
the rule formulated to deal with the illegal search and
seizure cases to situations involving state grants of immun-
ity. In that the basic premise there was no longer valid
the question previously decided was considered to be an
201





In Feldman v. United States . 322 U.S. 487 (1944),
evidence compelled by a state grant of immunity was utilised
to convict the former witness of a federal offense. Since
the then existing law allowed evidence obtained by state
agents, by methods which would have constituted illegal
searches and seizures if conducted by federal officers, to
be turned over to federal prosecutors for the letter's use,
the Feldman majority reasoned that the sasM result should
obtain where the evidence flows from an immunity grant.
However, the "silver platter" doctrine respecting evidence
obtained pursuant to illegal searches and seizures was
subsequently expressly abandoned. See Blkins v. united
States . 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
^°^378 U.S. 52, 75 (1964).
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was the holding for which Hvurphv is most oftan citsd, that
being—^based on historical and policy considerations—that
the Fifth Afflendnent's privilege against self-incrimination
"protects a state witness against incrimination under
federal as well as state law and a federal witness against
incrimination under state as well as federal law. "^^^ Only
then did the CSourt looX to see how state legislation deal-
ing with immunity would be affected.
In this regard the Court considered the holding of
203Couns^lmsQ v. Hitchcock to be a valid one. That this
is so is dwBonstrated by the application of that holding
to the holding of the instant case that the privilege pro-
tects state witnesses from federal prosecutions* and the
recognition that the same standards m\ist be utilised to
determine if the witness* "'silence in either a federal or
State proceeding is justified.'"'"^ The result of that
application was not that the Court was changing the rule
205
of Counselman ; rather the effect was to add another rule.
202
1^. at 77-78.
^°^142 U.S. 547 (1892).
^°*378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) quoting Mallov v. Hooan .
378 U.S. 1« 11 (1964)
.
205
It should be well noted that Counselman 's hold-
ing, which announced the transactional immunity stax^dard.
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And it was hsr* that tktm 0»urt rttv«rt«d tm a practice en-
gagad in by its ancastor axactly twanty yaars bafora in
Faldwan v , Unitad Stataa .^Q^ In analogizing the problam
prasentad in the instant casa again to tha illagal saarch
and saizura casas tha Court hold that naithar tha stata>
coB^Mllad testimony nar its fruits could hanoaforth ba usad
207in fedaral prosecutions. This was required, said the Coxirt,
to acceonodata both federal and state interests as respected
investigating and prosecuting crine and tha effect of the
new constitutional rule would be the furthering of state
ability to obtain necessary information while leaving "the
witness and the Federal Oovemment in substantially the
same position M. il £^ ^J^t^J^gy ha^ cl»tiFf^ ]li£ MrJ.vi.Wqf
20Bin the absence of a state grant of jmnunitv . " But this
simply is not so. If no innunity statute were involved,
neither the state government nor the federal gavemment,
in light of the Mallov decision, could lawfully coaqpel a
was grounded upon a federal statute which, as viewed by
that Coxurt, provided insufficient protection freai feared
federal prosecution, nius only a single sovereignty prob-
lem was presented. In Murphv a state statute was involved
but what was feared by the witnesses was federal prosecu-
tion. As such, this raised a dual sovereignty problem.
2O6322 U.S. 487 (1944).





witiMss to spaaX if to do so would tond to incriainato
209
hijD. Obvloualy thm Court was awro concomod with tho
•tato and fodoral gevomiDants* ability not to oncroadh
upoa ono anothor'a sphoro of rosponsibility than individual
21.0
ri^ts secured under the Constitution. And it accoai-
plishod this result hy resorting to a rule which clearly
was intended to protect an accused froa constitutionally
iapermissible police practices, not one intended to pro-
alltoct a witness froa an unconstitutional inquisition.
Afqparontly all nine Justices were content to let
this hiyppen. Again, as in Mallov . three opinions were is-
sued in the case, with identical jurist distribution.
The main concern of Justices Harlan and Clark was the
natvure, rather than the effect, of the rule announced. To
then the basic result should have been achieved through
the use of an exclusionary rule grounded upon the Court's
supervisory authority over the administration of justice
209
See Counselman v. Hitchcock . 142 U.S. 547, 585-
586 (1892)
.
^^°See 378 U.S. 52. 79 (1964) i ^, at 101 (White
and Stewart, JJ., concurring).
^^^See 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) » j^. at 74-75; ii. at
103 (White and Stewart, JJ., concurring).
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in the federal court system rather than en a constitutional
212
rule. The approach which was taken, argued these Justices*
posed a viable threat to the concept of fedoralisa,^^ the
sasw observation made earlier that same day in Mallov .
However, in that the rule adopted was seen as both prohibit •>
ing federal use and derivative use of stato-coaqpellod tes-
tiaony and preserving federal prosecutorial options subse>
quent to state investigations, the operation of the rule
was viewed as an acceptable method of effectuation of vi-
215
able joint crime prevention programs. This same conclU"
216
sion was reached by Justices White and Stewart whose
major concern was that if the rule just formulated included
transactional immvmity the federal government would be the
sole sovereign which could grant immunity, since the states
^^^378 U.S. 52, 80-61 (1464) (Harlan and Clark, JJ.,




Mallov V. Began . 378 U.S. 1, U (1964) (Harlan
and Clark, JJ., concurring).
215
378 U.S. 52, 91-92 (1964) (Harlan and Clark, JJ.,
concurring) . In taking this position it was acknowledged
by these Justices that the question of whether federally
polled evidence could be used in state prosecutions was a
matter outside the scope of then present considerations.
Ijd . at 92 n. 8.






are pr«clud«d from granting federal ionunlty, thus
totally voiding all state isMunity statutes. ^^® Were this
to happen any state witness would be free, en the basis of
219Mallov , to thwart state investigatory efforts since
"invariably ansiters incriainating under state law can be
claimed to be incriminating under federal l«w."^^^ While
this might be a valid argiiaent where dual sovereignty prob-
lems arise, it has no bearing on cases involving the scope
of immunity in single sovereignty situations; henrever, less
than a decade later a single sovereignty problem reached
the Court and was resolved without regard for this distinc-
tion.
221
In Kastiqar v. Pnited states a witness had re-
fused to testify before a federal grand jury, despite a
federal grant of imonmity pursuant to the provisions of a
222
new statute, contending that he was not adequately pro-
^^'l^. at 93; i^. at 97.
^^®M. at 93.
^^
^Mallov V. Hoqan . 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
"°378 U.S. 52, 97 (1964) (White and Stewart, JJ.,
concurring)
.
"^406 U.S. 441 (1972).
^"l8 U.S.C. II 6001-6003 (1970).
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tected sines th« grant •xtanded only us* and d«rivatlv« usa
Imounity. On appaal, subsaquant to tha usual contaapt cita-
tion and associatad incarcaration, it waa urgad that no im-
munity statute affordad a constitutionally sound basis for
testimonial oonpulsion, or, in tha alternative, that the
then effective statute did not contain ianunity sufficiently
broad in scope to be extensive with, and thus siq;yplant, the
Fifth Amendment privilege. After sunaarily rejecting the
223 99Afirst contention, the five-member Bfiajority wont on
to consider the second claim. In so doing tha majority
considered the constitutional question to be Whether the
scope of the immunity under scrutiny was coextensive with
the privilege, for if it was, petitioner's claim must
225
fail. While it noted merely in passing that tha qpies-
tion posed in Murphv was not precisely the same as the one
226
which was presented by the case at bar the majority held.
^^"^Here the Court specifically refused to overrule
Brown v. WalXer , 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 406 U.S. 441, 448
(1972)
.
224in that neither Justice Brennan, one of the five
to join in one of tha opinions in Kurnhv v. Waterfront Cow-
mission of Wow York . 378 U.S. 52 (1964) , nor Justice Rehn-
quist participated, the Kastioar minority nuiibered only two.
(1972).




on language gleaned from the Murphy opinion, that use and
derivative use immiinity was coextensive with the scope of
the privilege and thus, once grsuited, such could be uti-
lized to compel witness testimony even in the face of a
claim by the witness of the privilege. This result was
accomplished by the adroit, but perceivable, use of judi-
cial legerdemain which was essentially a two-step process.
First, the majority relied upon Malloy^^° for the proposi-
tion that standards respecting the scope of the privilege
were the same in both federal amd state courts. This
ignored the fact that all of the Justices involved in that
decision tacitly had no real objective other than to deter-
mine whether or not federal stemdards were applicable to
state proceedings and whether those standards had been met
in order to conclude whether or not the state witness had
validly claimed his privilege; clearly in that case the
230
scope of the immunity was not involved. Second, since
227
Id . at 453.
^•^^Mallov v. Hoqan . 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
^^^Kastiqar v. United States , 406 U.S. 441, 458 n.
47 (1972).




Murphy dttcidttd that us« and d«riv«tiv« as« iiMunity
adequately prot«ct«d a stata wltnaas fro« fadaral proaacu-
232
torlal hazards, and Mallov hald that tha aane standarda
vara applicable to both federal and state witnesses as re-
spects the scope of the privilege » then clearly use and
derivative use insaunity was coextensive with the Fifth
Anendment privilege against self-incriadnation.^^^ Hew-
ever, this ignored the underlying premise of the Murphy
decision that the rule therein announced had to accoonodate
both federal and state interests in the ferretting out and
234
prosecution of criminal offenders —in shoict, a dual
sovereignty problem not presented in Kastiaar .
In attesting to bolster its decision the majority
baldly stated that transactional immunity was broader than
the protection afforded by the Fifth Aaendment*s privilege
and that the privilege had "never been construed to mean
235
that one who invoices it cannot subsequently be prosecuted."
23 lMurphv V. Waterfront Commission of Mew York, 378
U.S. 52 (1964).
^32p^.fciq^ V. United States , 406 U.S. 441. 458 (1972)
Id.
^^^See notes 203-208 supra and accompanying text.
^^^406 U.S. 441. 453 (1964).
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236This was to overlook not only the teachings of Oo^nselman
but the product o£ the efforts of legal scholars as well.
As respects the latter, both major coa9>llations in exist-
ence at the time Kastiaar was decided which dealt with the
subject of self-incrimination in an evidentiary sense spe-
237
cifically refuted such a suggestion. Further, even
Nigmore, who accepted use and derivative use immunity under
238limited circumstances, advocated the adoption of the
Model State Witness Immunity Act^^^ which, by its terns,
purports to grant transactional immunity. ^^^ Additionally,
^•^
^Counselman v. Hitchcock . 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
237
ThB drafters of the Model Code of Evidence con-
sidered the object of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion to be protection against punishment and that to be
valid an immunity statute had to grant the one from whom
the evidence was sought to be compelled immunity from prose-
cution. See Model Code of Bvidence r\ae 202, Comment (1942).
"Riey asserted that for the privilege to be properly dis-
placed ptmishment had to be made ia^wssible. j^[. This
sasw requirement of iagpossibility was recognized as being
essential by the authors of the Uniform Rules. See Uniform
Rules of Bvidence rule 24, Connissioner's Vote (1953).
^^®8 Wigmore, Bvidence I 2283, at 524-525 (Mc-
Haiighton rev. 1961) .
^^^Zd. I 2284, at 525-526 n. 1 and accompanying text.
240





the Kagtiqar majority contended that the statute under con-
sideration had been "drafted to meet what Congress judged
to be the qopceptxxaj. basis of Counselman . as elaborated in
subsequent decisions of the Court . . . ."^^-^ While this
may be true, it is clear from the cases relied on by vari-
ous menbers of Congress, in light of their less than com-
plete persuasiveness, that such conceptual basis was mis-
242
construed.
Both of the dissenters in Kastigar recognised that
the problem therein was separate and distinct from the dual
243
sovereignty situation presented by the Murpjhv fact pattern.
These Justices recognized that to expect that a ban on use
and derivative use iomuni^ could be enforced was to exer-
244
cise in futility. Only Justice Marshall went further.
241
^^^Kastiaar v. united states. 406 U.S. 441, 452-
453 (1972) (emphasis added)
.
242Compare remarks of Rep. Xastenmeier, majority
report. House Coomittee on the Judiciary, R.R. Rep. Ho. 91-
1188, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1970) with remarks of Rep.
I^an, minority report. Bouse Conaittee on the Judiciary,
1^ . at 41-42. See aJ.so U. S. Code Congressional and Ad-
ministrative Hews . 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) at 4017-4018.
243
^^'Kastjgar v. United States. 406 U.S. 441, 463-465
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)} j^. at 467-468 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
244^406 U.S. at 466-467 (Douglas, J., dissenting)?
id . at 469-470 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Wh«rtt«s tha majority had faahionad a procadural rula to
implmmnt Its oonatltutional ooa^^^ Juatica Narahall a«w
this to ba an inadaquate naasura of protaction "ia light
of tha inavitabla uacartaiatias of tha fact-finding pro-
cass . . . ."^^^ In this ragard tha witnass-accusad was
at tha laarcy of tha presacutorial authoritias sinca only
thay hdtd knowladga which would taad to rnhmt that avidanca
247
was in fact taintad. Tha majority couatarad this by tha
assartien that such was nagativad by tha prosacution's bur-
248dan to prova lack of taint. Tha fallacy of this posi-
tion is that thara is a thrasheld raquiramant that tha da-
fandant show that ha tastifiad« undar a grant of ianunity,
249to aattars ralatad to tha prosacution. ' Also tha imnunity
245
Iha rula %^ich tha majority foraulatad was that
in aach casa tha prosacution has an "affirmativa du^ to
prova that tha avidanca it proposas to usa is darivad from
a lagitimata sourca wholly indapandant of tha compallad
tastiaony." 406 U.S. at 460. At laast ona fadaral appal-
lata court has haId that this burdan cannot ba mat by a
mara prosacutorial assartion. Saa Ohitad Statas v. Saiffart .
463 F.2d 1089 (5th dr. 1972).





^Saa nota 245 sunra .
^^^406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
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itself depends upon the testlnony %^lch la actually given,
and, where use and derivative xise i —unity is involved,
250
such is often difficult to detemine with precision es-
251
pecially where no transcript is nade of the proceedings.
Further, even an even-handed prosecutor, assearted Justice
Marshall, could not be sure that evidence was oesqpletely
^^^St£ Murphv V. waterfront y^tmipTfiim ^t fV Y?r^
378 U.S. 52, 99 (1964) (White and Stewart, JJ., concurring)}
^. at 104.
Hrhile it is agreed that to transcribe the grand
jxixy proceedings would be the better practice there appears
neither constitutional nor federal statutory mandate for
such endeavor. Sjul United States v. Battisti. 486 r.2d 961
(6th Cir. 1973) (collecting cases) ; United States v. Arra-
dendo . 463 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1973) (collecting cases)}
Ohited States v. Harper. 432 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970). One
federal ^ipellate court tends to grant preindictaent re-
quests for recordatimi absent a governwsnt showing that a
legitimate and compelling governmental interest will be
served by a denial. Onited States v. Price . 474 F.2d 1223
(9th Cir. 1973) . Soow federal <x>urts have provided for
all-inclusive transcription by court rule. Sefi TOiited States
V. Aloisio . 440 F.2d 705, 708 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1971), cert .
denied . 404 U.S. 824 (1971). Others have utilized the law
of the case to reach the same result. s
,
ey united states v.
Gramolini . 301 F. Sopp. 39 (1969); cf. ttnited States v.
E^aa.' 335 F. Supp. 523, 553 (1971). Only a handful of
states, via statute, require that a transcript be made.
See Cal. Fen. Code Ann. I 938.1 (Deering, 1970) i Zowa Code
Ann. I 772.4 (1950); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 5.16 (Crim. R.
1969); Minn. Stat. Ann. I 628.04 (1947); Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 22, I 340 (1969) . One state apparently requires trans-
cription only upon the request of the prosecutor, fiee Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. I 2939.11 (1954).
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£r*« of taint. ^ Finally, it was arguad that tha majority's
analogy to the exclusionary rule, as used in coerced con-
fession-illegal search and seisure cases, was not well
founded, both because iamunity grants renere the privilege
coaqpletely and because they operate prior to the interroga-
tion which is itself conducted by legally tutored individu-
als operating in a cala and dispassionate environment} for
this reason alone, said Justice Marshall, the standard to
be applied to inaunity statutes should be more stringent
253
than that which the majority espoused.
But the damage had been done and in fact a much
less stringent standard prevailed. As far as the federal
criminal justice system was concerned transactional iamun-
ity was a dead issue. That in itself would have been a
cruel blow to individual liberty; however, the Berger Court
^^^406 U.S. 441, 469 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) . This would be especially true in a dual sovereignty
situation. Only recently a federal district court judge
dissdssed a conspiracy charge against one of those accused
in connection with the burglary at the office of Daniel
(Pentagon Papers) Bllsberg*s psychiatrist. Ihe judge
reasoned that since the accused had testified to the details
of the burglary pursuant to iosBunity granted in both
Florida and California it would be difficult for the prose-
cutors, despite their claim to the contrary, to prove that
the evidence was untainted. Sof The Miami Herald, May 22,
1974, I A, at 10, col. 1.




was not satisfi«d to leava a task only half coBq;>l«tad. On
the sams day that It dacidad Kastior a slnilarly divided
Court hald that a state statuta which grantad only use and
derivative use innunity was constitutionally acceptable as
a substitute for the Fifth Anendnent privilege against self-
254
incrimination claimed by state witnesses —and this hold-
ing was bottomed squarely » albeit precariously, vqpon the
Kaftiaar decision. The Burger majority had paved the way
for the result intended by the t%#o Justices who had taken
part in both the Murohv and Kastioar decisions and this
intent was not only that transactional innunity should not
apply to federal witnesses^ but that it also should not
apply to state witnesses. Given the decision in Zicarelli
256
V. Investigation Cowaission . which reached that very
result, the state statutes drafted to conform with the de-
257
cision in Counselmem v. Hitchcock are surely destined to
be repealed. With them will go the last assurance that a
254^




^See Murphv v. Waterfront Cosmission of «^ York.
378 U.S. 52, 92-93 (1964) (White and Stewart, JJ., concurring)
25^407 U.S. 472 (1972).
^^^142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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witness can be coapelled to testify before grand juries,
legislative committees, and administrative agencies without
being placed in criminal jeopeurdy. Even while they exist
danger lurXs in the guise of any would-be second sovereign.

CBAPTBR IV.
STATSMBHTS COMPBLUD BY CXX>PBKATIOH XH
MAMDATOiOr NBHTAL BXAMIIIATZOIIS
Perhaps the most insidious method of extracting
testia»nial disclosures from an accused is encountered on
those occasions when his nental condition is at issue.
Specifically, such condition may significantly bear upon
a defendant's ability to stand trial, ^^® affirmative de-
fenses raised by him to negative a finding of guilt re-
259
specting the crime charged, or specific acts alleged or
proven which bring him within the scope of statutes which
have as their purpose the unique isolation from society of
258Whether or not an accused has the mental ability
to be subjected to the criminal justice trial procedure is
most recognized as being a matter of competency and it is
in this context that the term will hereinafter be utilized.
259
Issues raised by the defendant's mental state at
the time of the alleged offense are resolved by evidence
relating to his mental respensibility and it is in this con-





certain classes of offenders. In all three situations
an accused, in most jurisdictions » will be required to sub-
mit to a court-ordered aiental examination, such being man-
dated either by statute er court decision. The danger to
the accused which inheres in these examinations is that he
must disclose to another that which may be the basis of
expert testimony against him later at trial.
At first blush the use of this information would
seem to be precluded by the physician-patient privilege.
However, the privilege is a creature of statute, being un-
261known to the coimnon law, and thus does not have universal
application. While numerous states have recognized the
262privilege azui the federal courts may be bound by a simi-
263lar one the general view appears to be that since the
260
These statutes have been referred to both as de-
fective delinquent and sexual psychopath legislation; the
latter will hereinafter be utilized.
^^HlcCormick, Evidence • 98 at 212 (2d ed. 1972) ; 58
Am. Jur. Witnesses • 401 at 232 (1948)
.
^^^See 8 wigmore, Evidence I 2286 (McMaughton rev.
Supp. 1972) (collecting statutes)
.
263
The federal courts, while not being bound by this
privilege, see e.g..
"TtJTffr ^i United States . 411 r.2d 30
(9th Cir. 1969) , cert , denied . 396 U.S. 965 (1969) , may soon
be required to take cognizance of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. See Federal Rules of Evidence rule 504 (1972).
This provision will not make professional conversations
privileged, however, where the judge orders an examination
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mental examination has been ordered by the court, the con-
sultation is for a purpose other than that of ultimate cura-
tive or alleviative treatment and thus these coonunications
fall outside the privilege, as do reports which are sub-
264
mitted subsequent thereto. Similarly, the two oldtuc
codifications of evidentiary rules refute any contention
that the privilege applies where the patient is urging his
265
mental condition as a defense to a criminal prosecution.
A much more cogent inquiry centers on the validity
of these compulsory mental examinations in light of an
accused's privilege against self-incrimination. While the
Federal Rules of Evidence are silent on this subject its
predecessors viewed the privilege as inapplicable to these
examinations, taking the view of the allegedly better con-
of the mental or emotional condition of the patient, id .
rule 504(d) (2), or where the patient relies upon the mental
or emotional condition as an element of his claim or defense,
id . rule 504(d) (3) . There apparently was indicated by the
common law a disposition to recognize the psychotherapist-
patient privilege. Federal Rules of Evidence rule 504,
Advisory Coonittee's Note (1972).
264
See 8 Wigmore, Evidence i 2382 at 835-836 (Hc-
Maughton rev. 1961); NcCormick, Evidence I 99 at 214 (2d ed.
1972) ; id. I 313 at 733; 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses I 418 at
239 (1948)
.
^^^Model Code of Evidence rule 223(3) (1942) ; Utai-




sidered cases. Irrespective of whether the individual
statute's or judicial pronouncenent * s mandate was the as-
certaining of an accused's competency or responsibility or
both, the requirement has formerly withstood attacks
267
directed at its unconstitutionality. Specifically, there
have been no less than seventeen states which have rejected
defendant's contentions that the compulsory procedure vio-
268lated their privilege against self-incrimination. As
shall presently be seen this position has been recently
retreated from somewhat in a few jurisdictions. Prior to
viewing these departures from the judicial norm, however,
a discussion of existing statutory requirements is in order.
The legislatures of forty states have seen fit to
provide for the initiation of mental examinations where for
some reason there arises, either at trial or prior thereto.
266
Model Code of Evidence rule 205 (a) (1942) j id.
rule 205, Comment (1942); Uniform Rules of Bvidence rule
25(b) (1953); id. rule 25(b), Commissioner's Note (1953).
267
See 8 Wigmore, Bvidence I 2265(10) at 399 (Nc-
Maughton rev. 1961) ; McCormick, Bvidence I 134 at 285-286
(2d ed. 1972) ; 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law I 365 at 389
(1965) .
^^^See Annot., 32 A.L.R. 2d 434, I 5 at 445 (1953)
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a question concerning the accused's competency to stand
269
trial. Although three states Ixmit the power of the
court to order a competency exzunination to those situa-
270tions where the accused is charged with a felony euid
six states condition the grauit of power to situations where
the accused has had an indictment or information filed
271
against him, the majority of jurisdictions permit the
ordering of the examination in conjunction with the trial
of any criminal case. Twenty states require that a com-
petency examination shall be ordered by the court where
there are reasonable groxinds to believe that the accused
is incompetent to proceed. ^'^ In fourteen other states an
^ ^The courts of two other states have indicated
that this may lawfully be required. See State v. Gaffney ,
237 la. 1399, 25 N.W. 2d 352 (1946); State v. Wheeler . 195
Kan. 184, 403 P. 2d 1015 (1965).
570
Ala. Code Ann. tit. 15, §§ 425-426 (1958); Miss.





-Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.2 (1973); Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 43-1301 (Supp. 1971); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 178.405 (1971);
N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 29-20-01 (Supp. 1973); Okla. Stat.
Ann. § 1162 (1958); S.D. Comp. L. Ann. § 23-38-2 (1967). In
one state the procedures apply if the defendamt has been in-
dicted or bound over by the court to await the action of the
grand jury. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 135:17 (Supp. 1972).
Two other states require that the accused be in custody be-
fore the statutory provisions become effective. N.J. Stat.
Arui. S 2A:163-2 (1971); R.I. Gen. L. Ann. 8 26-4-3 (Supp.
1972).
^^^Ala. Code Ann. tit. 15, 88 425-426 (1958); Ark.
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examination will be ordered merely if the issue is
273
raised. The examination will only be ordered in fotur
states if the accused interposes the defease of insanity
and in one state it appears that the accused first must
raise the issue of present insanity via written application
275
to the court. However, there is authority for the propo-
Stat. Ann. I 43-1301 (Supp. 1971) ; Cal. Pen. Code Ann. i 1368
(Peering, 1970); Colo. Code Crim. P. I 39-8-110(2) (a) (1972)
;
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(a) (1968) ; Idaho Code Ann. 18-211(1)
(Supp. 1973) ; Ind. Stat. Ann. • 9-1706a (Supp. 1973) ; Ky.
R. Crim. P. I 8.06 (1969); No. Stat. Ann. • 552.020.2
(Supp. 1973); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. i 95-505 (a) (1969) ; Mev.
Rev. Stat. Ann. i 178.405 (1971); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. I 29-
20-01 (Supp. 1973) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. I 1162 (1958) ; Ore.
Rev. Stat. Ann. I 136.150 (1971-1972); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit.
50, I 4408(a) (1969) ; S.D. Comp. L. Ann. I 23-38-2 (1967);
Tenn. Code Ann. I 33-701 (a) (Supp. 1972); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
13, I 4821(a) (Supp. 1973); Vk. Code Ann. • 19.1-229 (Supp.
1973); Wis. Stat. Ann. I 971.14(1) (1971)
.
273
111. Stat. Ann. I 1005-2-1 (b) (1973) ; Mass. Gen. L.
Ann. ch. 123, I 99 (1969); Mich. Conp. L. Ann. i 767.27(a)
(2) (1968); Miss. Code Ann. I 99-13-11 (1972); Meb. Rev.
Stat. Ann. i 29-1823 (Supp. 1969); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
I 135il7 (Supp. 1972); ».J. Stat. Ann. I 2Atl63-2 (1971);
H.M. Stat. Ann. I 41-13-3.1 (1972); M.Y. Crim. P. L. • 730.
30.1 (McKinney, 1971); N.C. Gen. Stat. I 122-91 (Supp. 1971);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. i 2945.40 (1954); R.I. Gen. L. Ann.
f 26-4-3 (Supp. 1972); S.C. Code L. Ann. I 32-969 (SYq>p.
1971) ; W.Va. Code Ann. I 62-3-9 (1966)
.
^^*La. Stat. Ann. art. 650 (1967) ; Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 15, I 101 (Supp. 1972-1973); Md. Code Ann. art.
59, I 25 (1957); Wyo. Stat. Ann. I 7-241(A) (Supp. 1973).




sitlon that such provisions are invalid in that they pre-
clude the court from exercising its discretion sua aponte
where the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to the de-
276fendant's competency to stand trial. In three states
applicable statutes provide that a competency examination
will be ordered i£ it appears that the accused, as a result
of mental disease or defect, either is unable to understand
277
the proceedings against him or assist in his own defense.
27ft
There is alaost unanimous agreement that the is-
sue of competency may properly be raised by any person who
279has an interest in the proceedings. Once such issue is
presented the trial court will be obliged to order the ac-
cused to be examined by one or more court-appointed medical
experts prior to holding a hearing where competency will be
determined. Almost one-half of those states which provide
^^^See Pate v. Robinson . 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
^^^Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.1 (1973); Alaska Stat. Ann.
I 12.45.100 (Supp. 1973); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. I 54-40(a)
(Supp. 1973) . This is the standard adopted by the Hodel




See notes 274-276 supra and accompanying text.
^^
^See e.g.. Alaska Stat. Aim. I 12.45.100 (Supp.
1973); 111. Stat. Ann. I 1005-2-l(b) (1973); Mich. Conp. L.




for these examinations allow the accused to be committed
to the appropriate state hospital for observation and
examination. Of these only two states require that the
examiner be a psychiatrist, °^ and one state makes the use
I 281
of a psychiatrist optional. Four states which prescribe
commitment do not specify the medical qualifications of the
282
examining physician and one state provides th* court
with the option of appointing one or more private physicians
in lieu of state employed ones. Whereas most states do
not specify the length of tine that em accused may be re>
tained in such state institution while undergoing mental
examinations aimed at determining facts bearing on compe-
284
tency, nine states do provide a maximum time limit which
may be extended by court order where deemed necessary by
280
Colo. Code Crim. P. ch. 44, § 39-8-106(1) (1972)
7
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. B 54-40(b) (Supp. 1973).
2®^ wyo. Stat. Ann. I 7-241 (A) (Supp. 1973).
^^^Cal. Pen. Code Ann. I 1370 (Deering, 1970); Mass.
Gen. L. Ann. ch. 123, i 99 (1969); S.C. Code L. Ann. I 32-
969 (Supp. 1971); Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 46.02, I 2(f)(1)
(S\q)p. 1972-1973) .
^^^Mo. Stat. Ann. I 552.020.2 (Supp. 1973).
^°^It would seem that such could, in no event, ex-
ceed a reasonable time; if indeed the period is deemed ex-
cessive the state will be forced to release the accused.




the judge. Slightly omre than half o£ the states which
require these examinations do not require, as a prerequisite*
that the defendant be committed. Of these, only seven
states require that the examination be made by a psychia-
286
trist ; two others make the use of a psychiatrist op-
287tional. Six states provide merely that the •xamination
285Sixty days has been set as a limit by seven of
these states. Idaho Code Ann. I 18-211 (Supp. 1973); Md.
Code Ann. art. 59, I 26 (1957) ; Mich. Comp. L. Ann. I 767.
27(a)(3) (1968); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. f 95.505(a) (1969);
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. I 122-91 (Supp. 1971) ; Okla. Stat. Ann.
I 1171 (Supp. 1972-1973); Wis. Stat. Ann. I 971.14(2) (1971).
This period is advocated by the Model Penal Code. See
Model Penal Code art. 4, §4.05(1) (Proposed Official Draft,
1962) . One state has prescribed a thirty-day period. Ark.
Stat. Ann. 1 43-1301 (Supp. 1971) , and <me state has taken
an intermediate position by prescribing a forty-five-day
period. Va. Code Ann. • 19.1-228 (Supp. 1973).
^^Slaska Stat. Ann. 1 12.45.100 (Supp. 1973) (one
psychiatrist) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, I 101 (Supp.
1972-1973) (one or more psychiatrists, psychologists, or
clinical psychologists) ; Miss. Code Ann. I 99-13-11 (1972)
(competent psychiatrist); Mev. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 178.415.1
(two physicians, one of whom is a psychiatrist); N.Y. Crim.
P.L. i 730.20.1 (McKinney, 1971) (two qualified psychia-
trists); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. I 2945.40 (1954) (1-3 physicians
specializing in mental diseases. One state allows both the
prosecution and defense to nominate three mental health ex-
perts and requires the judge to select one from each side.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.3 (1973). The Model Penal Code speci-
fies the use of at least one qualified psychiatrist. See
Model Penal Code art. 4, I 4.05(1) (Proposed Official Draft,
1962) .
287
N.J. Stat. Ann. I 2Ail63-2 (1971); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 13, I 4822 (Supp. 1973).

86
288be conducted by two or more physicians and four others
289
require an examination by one or more (qualified experts.
While four states do not specify the nature of the examina-
290
tion or the qualifications of the examiner three others
allow the appointment of a commission to provide the court
291
with information pertinent to the issue of conqpetency
.
During the course of the court-ordered mental examina-
tion the general rule is that only the accused and the ap-
pointed examiner are permitted to be present. This has been
ameliorated somewhat by provisions applicable in a few states
which allow an e)q>ert employed by the accused to take s<Mae
part in the court-ordered procedure. Two states limit the
participation of the defendant's expert to only observation
Ind. Stat. Ann. i 9-1706a (Supp. 1973) ; Meb, Rev.
Stat. Ann. I 29-1823 (Supp. 1969) ; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
i 135x17 (Supp. 1972); Tenn. Code Ann. i 33-604(a) (Supp.




111. Stat. Ann. I 1005-2-l(g) (1973); Pla. R.
Crim. P. 3.210(a) (1968); M.D. Cent. Code Ann. I 29-20-01
(Supp. 1973); Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 136.150 (1971-1972).
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Ky. R. Crim. P. I 8.06 (1969); H.M. Stat. Ann.
I 41-13-3.2 (1972); R.I. Oen. L. Ann. I 26-4-3 (Supp. 1972);
S.D. Comp. L. Ann. I 23-38.2 (1967).
29J-BX parte Moody . 41 Ala. App. 367, 132 So. 2d 758
(1961); La. Stat. Ann. art. 650 (1967); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit.




Of the examination conducted by the pre-selected examinert
In four other jurisdictions the expert employed by the ac-
cused may take a more active part in the examination pro-
293
cess. Only three states provide that the defendant's
attorney may be present during the mandatory mental exami-
294
nation. As a general rule, the defendant is compelled
to submit to the examination and to cooperate in its con-
duct; the penalty for his recalcitrance is the forfeiture
of his right to introduce his own expert testimony on the
295
subject of hxs conq)etency. And at least four state stat-
^^^Ark. Stat. Ann. i 43-1301 (Supp. 1971); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. I 54-40 (b) (Supp. 1973).
293
*
"^Idaho Code Ann. I 18-211(1) (Supp. 1973) ; Mo.
Stat. Ann. I 552.020.4 (Supp. 1973); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 971.
14(7) (1971); Wyo. Stat. Ann. I 7-241(A) (Supp. 1973). This
procedure is advocated by the Model Penal Code. See Model
Penal Code art. 4. S 4.05(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
The procedure is seen as both assuring the accused an op-
portunity for an adequate psychiatric examination by his
own expert and providing for a procedure which could minimize
expert differences of opinion later in court. See Model
Penal Code art. 4, I 4.05(1), Connent (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1956)
.
294See In re Spencer . 46 Cal. Reptr. 753, 406 P. 2d
33 (1965) ; Lee v. Coxintv Court of Brie County . 318 M.Y.S.
2d 705, 267 N.E. 2d 452 (1971); Coiwoonwealth ex rel.
McGvirrin v. Shovlin , 435 Pa. 474, 257 A. 2d 902 (1969).
^^^Sce e.g.. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.2, C<»fnment (1973);




utes provide that the written report siibmitted at the con-
clusion of the examination reflect the accused's noncoopera-
tion, if any, in order that such may be admitted as evidence
296
on the competency issue. Such reports are re<iuired in
all cases involving mandatory competency examinations. In
the vast majority of jurisdictions only the judge is privy
to their contents. The trend, however, seems to be that
legislatures and courts see merit in the information being
imparted to both counsel involved and, as a result, eleven
297jurisdictions adhere to this policy. statutes in three
Other states limit access to the defense counsel. The
^'^Colo. Code Crim. P. ch. 44 I 39-8-106(2) (1972)
;
Idaho Code Ann. I 18-211(3) (e) (Supp. 1973); Mont. Rev. Code
Ann. I 95-505 (c) (5) (1969) ; Tenn. Code Ann. • 33-604 (a) (Supp.
1972) . The same requirement is embodied in the Model Penal
Code. See Model Penal Code art. 4, i 4.05(3) (Proposed Of-
ficial Draft, 1962)
.
^^^Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.4 (1973); Colo. Code Crim.
P. ch. 44, I 39-8-106(4) (1972) ; Conn. Oen. Stat. Ann. I 54-
40(b) (Supp. 1973)7 Idaho Code Ann. I 18-211(3) (e) (Supp.
1973); La. Stat. Ann. art. 645 (1967); Mo. Stat. Ann. I 552.
020.2 (Supp. 1973); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, I 4823(b) (Supp.
1973); Va. Code Ann. I 19.1-228 (Supp. 1973); wyo. Stat. Ann.
I 7-241(A) (Supp. 1973); People v. Blank . 64 Misc. 2d 730,
315 N.Y.S. 2d 647 (1970); State v. Sauls . 224 La. 1063, 71
So. 2d 568 (1954) . Such is in accord with the provisions of
the Model Penal Code. See Model Penal Code art. 4, I 4.05
(3) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962)
.
^'®Mont. Rev. Code Ann. • 95-505 (c)(5) (1969); N.Y.




report assvunes greater significance in those eight minority
jurisdictions which allow the report itself to be admitted
299into evidence, a procedure designed to alleviate the
taking of expert testimony in court. ''^^ Such is especially
appropriate in that the vast majority of states provide
that the judge, rather than the jury, will determine the
issue of competency.
Mandatory mental examinations are also prescribed
where there is a question of the defendant's mental condi-
tion at the time of the alleged offense. Such are mandated
^^^See Ark. stat. Ann. I 43>1302 (Supp. 1971) 7 Colo.
Code Crim. P. ch. 44, § 39-8-106(2) (1972) ; Conn. Oen. Stat.
Ann. I 54-40 (b) (Supp. 1973); Idaho Code Ann. I 18-212(1)
(Supp. 1973); No. Stat. Ann. i 552.020.6 (Supp. 1973); Mich.
Coop. L. Ann. i 767.27a(4) (1968); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. I 95-
506(a) (1969); Mev. Rev. Stat. Ann. i 178.415.2 (1971).
This is the rationale behind the Model Penal Code
provision, which carves out an exception to the hearsay rule,
thus allowing the receipt into evidence of these documents.
See Model Penal Code, art. 4, I 4.06(1), Coenent (Tent.
Draft Ho. 4, 1956)
.
301
The majority adheres to the Model Penal Code rule.
See Model Penal Code art. 4, I 4.06(1) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962) . Three states, via statute or case law, allow
a separate jury to decide the issue of competency. See Cal.
Pen. Code Ann. I 1370 (Deering, 1970) ; S.D. Coop. L. Ann.
I 23-38-2 (1967); Zacherv v. Hale . 286 F. Supp. 237 (M.D.
Ala. 1968) . One state has provided that, where the issue
is raised prior to trial, a jury trial may be requested by
either the court or the prosecutor; if the issue is raised
after the start of trial the matter is to be resolved by the
court. 111. Stat. Ann. I 1005-2-l(d) (1973).
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by statuta in thirty-six states, the majority of which ap-
302ply regardless of the offense involved. Two states,
however, require that the accused be charged with a felony
and one state requires that the offense be capital be-
fore the statute will apply; eight other states limit the
305
operation of the applicable statute in indictable crimesT
Almost one-half of these states provide for the mandatory
examination only where the accused pleads "not guilty by
reason of insanity" or joins this plea with one or more
306
other pleas. One-third of the jurisdictions require the
302
In one additional state the procedure is a crea-
ture of case law. See People v. Hartip . 386 Mich. 407, 192
H.w. 2d 215 (1971), cert , denied . 408 U.S. 929 (1971), which
holds that the examination may be ordered if the accused
raises the plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity.
"
^°^Miss. Code Ann. I 99-13-11 (1972); M.C. Gen. Stat.
Ann. I 122-91 (Supp. 1971)
.
^°*Ala. Code Ann. tit. 15, I 425 (1958).
^°^Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.2 (1973); Ark. Stat. Ann.
I 43-1301 (Supp. 1971); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, I 101
(Supp. 1972-1973) ; Hev. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 178.405 (1971)
;
M.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Il35tl7 (Supp. 1972); N.J. Stat. Ann.
I 2Atl63-2 (1971) ; M.D. Cent. Code Ann. i 29-20-03 (1960)
;
Okla. Stat. Ann. I 1162 (1958)
.
Of the sixteen states in this category six require
that the accused file a written notice of his intent to enter
such a plea. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3. 210(b) (1968); Idaho Code
Ann. i 18-211(1) (Supp. 1973); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. I 95-
505(a) (1969); Utah Code Ann. I 77-24-17 (1953); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 13, I 4821 (Supp. 1973); Wis. Stat. Ann. I 971.16
(1) (1971) . This comports with the provisions of the Model
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examinations where there is reasonable ground to believe that
the defendant was not mentally responsible at the time of
the offense. ^' The exeunination will be ordered in nine
states where the issue of responsibility is raised in any
manner. After the issue has been raised, approximately
two-thirds of the states requiring mental examinations pro-
vide a statutory mechanism which enables the accused to be
committed for this purpose. Only eight of these jurisdic-
tions provide for one or more psychiatrists to perform the
Penal Code. See Model Penal Code, art. 4, S 4.03(2) (Pro-
posed Official Draft, 1962) . The other states have no such
requirement. See Cal. Pen. Code Ann. § 1026 (Deering 1970)
;
Colo. Code Crim. P. ch. 44, § 39-8-105 (1972); Ind. Stat.
Ann. § 9-1702 (1956); La. Stat. Ann. art. 650 (1967); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 101 (Supp. 1972-1973); Md. Code
Ann. art. 59, § 25 (1957); Mo. Stat. Ann. i 552.030.2 (Supp.
1973); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 135:17 (Supp. 1972); S.D. Comp.
L. Ann. § 23-37-2 (1967). See also note 302 supra .
3°^Ala. Code Ann. tit. 15, g 425 (1958); Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 43-1301 (Supp. 1971); Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 123 § 99
(1969); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 178.405 (1971); N.Y. Crim.
P.L. § 730.30.1 (McKinney 1971); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. 8 29-
20-03 (1960); Okla. Stat. Ann. § 1162 (1958); Ore. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 136.150(1) (1971-1972); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, § 4408
(a) (1969); Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-701(a) (Supp. 1972); Va.
Code Ann. § 19.1-229 (Supp. 1973); W.Va. Code Ann. 8 62-3-9
(1966) .
^O^Alaska Stat. Ann. § 12.45.087 (1962); Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 11.2 (1973); Miss. Code Ann. i 99-13-11 (1972);
N.J. Stat. Ann. 8 2A:163-2 (1971); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 122-91 (Supp. 1971); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 8 2945.40 (1954);
S.C. Code L. Ann. 8 32-969 (Supp. 1971); Tex, Code Crim. P.




examination. The remainder either merely require that
the examiner be a disinterested physician or other ex-
pert or do not specify the qualifications of the ex-
311
aminer. Of those jurisdictions where commitment is re-
312quired a few states prescribe no specific period while
the vast majority set a period of between one month and
sixty days. Where commitment is not specified only
314
seven states m2mdate a psychiatric examination.
^^^Alaska Stat. Ann. i 12.45.087 (1962); Idaho Code
Ann. I 18-211 (Supp. 1973); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15,
e 101 (Supp. 1972-1973); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. I 95-505 (a)
(1969); M.Y. Criffl. P.L. i 730.20.1 (McKinney, 1971); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. I 2945.40 (1954); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13,
a 4822(a) (Supp. 1973); Va. Code Ann. I 19.1-228 (Supp. 1973)
^^^See e.g.. La. Stat. Ann. art. 644 (1967); N.D.




311 See e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. i 135.17 (Supp.
^See e.g.. Mo. Stat. Ann. S 552.020.4 (Supp. 1973);
S.C. Code L. Ann. i 32-969 (Supp. 1971). Such period cannot
exceed a reasonable time, however. See note 284 supra and
accompanying text.
^^•^See e.g.. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. I 2945.40 (1954);
Va. Code Ann. I 19.1-228 (Supp. 1973); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit.
50, I 4408(c) (1969). The period prescribed by the Model
Penal Code is sixty days. Model Penal Code art. 4, I 4.05
(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962)
.
314
Ala. Code Ann. tit. 15, I 425 (1958); Cal. Pen.
Code Ann. S 1027 (Oeering, 1970) ; Colo. Code Crim. P. ch. 44,
i 39-8-106(1) (1972); Miss. Code Ann. I 99-13-11 (1972);
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. I 95-507 (b) (1969); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
I 178.415.1 (1971); N.J. Stat. Ann. I 2At 163-2 (1971).
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All that is required in the other eight jurisdictions is
that the examination be made by a physiciein or other ex-
pert.
As in the case of examinations ordered to estciblish
competency, where the accused is required to submit to an
examination for the purpose of gaining information relative
to mental responsibility the usual practice is to exclude
both medical experts secured by the defense as, well as the
defense attorney. However, one state allows a medical ex-
316pert employed by the defense to witness the examination
and five others do not exclude his active participation
317
therein. Two states allow both the defense counsel
and the prosecutor to be present, if they wish, at the
lift
examination. -^^ Again, the accused is generally required
both to submit to the examination and cooperate with the
medical expert who conducts it or else give up his right to in-
^l^See e.g., Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.3 (1973); W.Va.
Code Ann. § 62-3-9 (1966)
.
31^Ark. Stat. Ann. 8 43-1301 (Supp. 1971).
See note 293 supra . See also Alaska Stat. Ann.
8 12.45.087 (1962); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 95.505(a) (1969).
318pia^ R^ Crim. P. 3.210(b) (1968); Lee v. County





troduce his own expert testinony respecting the issue of
319
responsibility. The report of the examination, which
is required in all cases where an exsunination is conducted
to determine mental responsibility, is usually submitted
to aiMl subject to use by the court, but in thirteen juris-
dictions both the prosecutor and defense counsel receive
320
copies 7 three other jurisdictions limit this additional
321
access to defense counsel. While the report is usually
excluded from evidence at trial where mental responsibility
is at issue, one state affirmatively provides that it shall
322 323be so utilized, one state affirmatively bars such use.
319
See note 295 supra . One case suggests that al-
though an accused may be precluded from offering expert
testimony, he may nonetheless be permitted to introduce lay
testiiaony; however, in such a case the prosecution is en-
titled to jury instruction on this testimony with respect
to the presumption of sanity and on the accused's failure
to cooperate. See Lee v. County Court of Brie County. 318
H.Y.S. 2d 705, 713, 267 N.B. 2d 452 (1971).
320
See note 297, supra . See also Ala. Code Ann. tit.
15, I 425 (1958); Alaska Stat. Ann. I 12.45.087 (1962).
321See note 298 supra .
325
"Ark. Stat. Ann. I 43-1302 (Supp. 1971)
.
323




and tuifo other states allow its use in the cross-examination
Of the «p.rt witn... who pr.p«r«i it."*
The most obvious objection to memdatery mental ex-
aminations which seek to determine the defendant's cooqpe-
tency or responsibility or both is that the accused will
thereby be forced to reveal information which may later be
used against him in violation of his privilege against self-
incrimination. Where only conrpetency is at issue the initial
response to this is that the information cannot incriminate
because in all cases this issue is resolved prior to trial
325
on the merits by either the court or a separate jury.
niis response, however, does not take into consideration
other uses to which this informaticm may be put» either in
other criminal prosecutions or the same prosecution, should
the defendemt be found con^Mtent. If the only issue involves
responsibility, the most direct consequence is that, in a
unitaucy trial, the trier of fact will hear from the mouth
of the expert witness incriminating statements which, al-
though allegedly limited by instruction to the issue of
responsibility, are highly prejudicial to the accused.
324
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. I 2945 (1954); ££. Wis. Stat.
Ann. I 971.16(2) (1971).
325
See note 301 s\y)ra and acconqpanying text.
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Further, such information conpclled fron th« accused could
be utilized against him in other prosecutions irrespective
of whether or not he is found irresponsible as respects the
326
offense for which he is currently being tried. In an
effort to alleviate this problem sons states prohibit the
introduction of the accused's cooqpelled statements on the
327issue of guilt at the present proceedings. Another state,
while adhering to this procedure, permits these statements
to be vised to iaipeach or rebut the accused's testimony if
328he takes the stand dtiring the trial of the current case.
While also foreclosing the use of these statements during
the case at bar, another state prevents the prosecutor fron
utilizing them as investigatory leads to acquire other evi-
326
An accused could be found not to be responsible
and thus cooraitted to a state mental institution. However,
he could be free again imder state provisions which limit
such detention to two^thirds of what the maximum prison term
would have been. Just such a situation has recently come to
light involving New York. See Miami Herald, Dec. 12, 1973,
I A, at 15, col. 3. At the time of such release there may
well be viable charges still pending against him. This has
been demonstrated in the not-too-distant past by one Louisi-
ana case. See Miami Herald, Sept. 26, 1973, I A, at 1, col. 3<
327
See state v. Hathaway . 116 Me. 255, 211 A. 2d 558
(1965); Mich. Conp. L. Ann. • 767.27 (1968).
^^®Colo. Code Crim. P. Ch. 44, I 39-8-107 (1972).
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329dence of the crime charged. Three other states prohibit
the examiner from testifying at the present trial about
facts of any sort elicited from the accused during the ex-
330iunination. Five states track the wording of the Model
Penal Code and provide that any such statement compelled
from the accused may not be admitted against him in any
criminal action on any issue other than his mental condi-
tion unless such statement constitutes an admission of guilt
respecting the crime charged « since in that event it is in-
331
admissible for any purpose. "^ One state statute prevents
the use of the accused's statements in any criminal case
beth on the issue of guilt as well as for use limited to
332impeachment ; another attempts to bar the use of such




See Alaska Stat. Ann. I 12.45.100 (Supp. 1973);
Fla. R. crim. P. 3.210 (1968): 111. Stat. Ann. i 1005-2-1
(h) (1973).
•^^^.Y. Crim. P.L. f 730.20.1 (McKinney, 1971); Idaho
Code Ann. I 18-215 (Supp. 1973) ; Mont. Rev. Code Aim. I 95-
509 (1969); Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 46.02, I 2(f) (4) (Supp.
1972-1973); Wis. Stat. Ann. I 971.18 (1971). See Model Penal
Code, art. 4, I 4.09 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). It is
clear that the word "statement" refers to both confessions
and admissions. See id. , Conaent.
^32vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, I 4822(c) (Supp. 1973).
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stateownts on the issue of guilt in any criminal case, state
or federal.
Apparently the legislature of only one state ack-
knoinrledges appreciation for the broader probleas involved
where statements compelled by mandatory mental examinations
are concerned. Clearly noted are four ways by which an ac-
cused may incriminate himself while cooperating in a court-
ordered mental examinations (1) he may implicate himself
in the crime charged by his utterances; (2) he may implicate
himself in other crimes by his utterances; (3) whether or
not he relies on the conqpetency or responsibility issue at
trial, evidence of his mental condition may be used by the
prosecution to establish the mens rea element, thus building
a prima facie case; and (4) his compelled disclosxures may
well provide the prosecution with evidence to defeat any
claim at trial of either competency or responsibility.
In that an accused is coa^elled, in this jurisdiction, to
cooperate in mental examinations which seek evidence of com-
335petency and/or responsibility, safeguards in excess of
333||o. Stat. Ann. II 552.020, 552.030 (Supp. 1973).
See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.7, Comnent (1973).
335
See Ariz. R. Crim. P. il.2, Connent (1973).
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those specified in other jurisdictions are provided. First,
no statement so conqpelled or evidence resulting therefrom
concerning the acts upon which the current charges are based
is admissible on the issue of guilt or innocence in the
present trial or any subsequent trial involving the present
336
charges. Second, no statement so compelled or evidence
resulting therefrom concerning any other events or trans-
actions is admissible on the issue of guilt or innocence in
any other proceeding involving such events or transactions. '
While these provisions offer an accused a broader range of
protections than he might enjoy else«^ere, the "use and
derivative use" type of prohibition en^loyed is subject to
the same infirmities previously discussed regarding the im-
munity statutes.
The problem remains, however, in the vast majority
of jurisdictions which do not prohibit the medical expert
from testifying about those things disclosed to him by the
accused in the course of the coorpelled mental examination,
of how to prevent the highly prejudicial evidence from reach-
^•^^Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11. 7b (1) (1973) . The accused
may, however, waive this protection. Id .





Ing the jury. A number of states have attenpted to deal
with this problem through the device of a bifurcated trial.
Although at one time this procedure was available in five
339
States, this number has recently been reduced to three.'''"
In all of these jurisdictions a bifurcated trial is pre-
scribed by statute. California's procedure is to hold an
initial trial on the issue of guilt or innocence in all
cases where the accused enters a plea of "not guilty by
reason of insanity; and he joinn this plea with emother
plea or pleas. If the jury finds him guilty, he is then
tried on the responsibility issue before the same or a dif-
338Most af^>ellate courts do not consider this to be
a problem, insisting that juries can and do properly follow
the court's instructions where evidence is admitted for a
limited purpose. Se^ e.g.. State v. Whitlow , 45 N.J. 3, 210
A. 2d 763, 773 (1965)
.
339Arizona's former statute was declared unconsti-
tutional vmder the due process clauses of both the state
constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. See Shaw v.
State, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P. 2d 715 (1970), cert , denied ,
400 U.S. 1009 (1970). The statute provided for an initial
determination by the trier of fact of the guilt issue and
the court reasoned that one who is not mentally responsible
at the time of the offense cannot be found guilty of that
offense. Id. 471 P. 2d at 721. In Texas the legislature has
seen fit to abandon the statutory authority for a bifurcated
trial. See Tex. Code Grim. P. art. 46.02, I 1, Interpreta-
tive Comment (Supp. 1972-1973).
^^^Cal. Pen. Code Ann. i 1026 (Deering, 1970).
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ferent jury, at the court's discretion. Where the second
trial is heard by the sane jury the prejudicial effect of
the medical expert's testimony would seen to be no differ-
ent from situations where unitary trial procedures are
utilized; in both cases, in that the insanity issue is tried
at the outset, this appears to duplicate the fatal flaw ob-
342
served by the Arizona Suprene Court in its state statute,
although no California court has so ruled. In Colorado,
where the accused defends on the issue of mental responsib-
ility, this issue is decided at the outset by a different
jury from that which will hear the case respecting guilt
or i™.ocenc. in the .vnt th. accu..d ts fo^nd to be .«.?«
While this procedure does serve to insulate the defendant
at trial from the prejudicial use of his compelled utter-
ances, it inevitably produces added esqwnse and judicial
inefficiency. The procedure in Wisconsin, where the accused
joints the insanity plea with a plea of not guilty, is identi-
cal with the California approach except that the same jury
decides both issues. Thus it is subject to the saune faults
Id.
342
See note 339 supra .
^^^Colo. Code Crim. P. ch. 44, I 39-8-104 (1972).
There is no provision for joinder of pleas.
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as both the Colorado statutory prescription and the defunct
344
Arizona statute. Wisconsin, though, has an alternative
procedure which is not without merit. When an accused
raises only the insanity plea, without joining with it
another plea or pleas, he thereby is deemed to have admitted
all the essential elements of the offense charged, thus
345
effectively pleading guilty. The underlying rationale
is that it is believed that this approach will eliminate
needless trials on the issue of whether the accused did,
in fact, commit the offense, since, in nearly all cases
where an issue of mental responsibility is raised, there
is no dispute that the accused comnitted the act. Of
course the validity of this procedure would depend upon an
absence of a competency issue raised prior to or at trial.
If no such issue is involved, the court or a single jury
could decide the issue of mental responsibility without the
attendant prejudicial effect of the accused's cooqpelled
344
See note 339 supra . The Wisconsin Supreme Court
has rejected the rationale of the Arizona Sxipreme Court
enunciated in the Shaw case. See State v. Hebard . 50 Wis.
2d 408, 184 N.W. 2d 156 (1971).
See Wis. Stat. Ann. I 971.06 (1971).
^^
^See Wis. Stat. Aj\n. I 971.06, CcMmnent (1971).




utterances bearing on the issue of guilt. And such a pro-
cedure would square with the judicially approved concept
of allowing one to plead guilty, irrespective of guilt, in
348
order to mitigate punishment.
Thusfar only mental examinations compelled by state
authority have been considered. Of equal importance are
simileu: examinations mandated by federal law applicable to
both the federal district court system and trial courts in
the District of Columbia. Although there are two different
statutes involved, it is clear that, insofar as there is a
repugnancy or inconsistency between the two, the provisions
Of the United States Code will prevail. Under one statute
the issue of mental conditibn may be raised after arrest
and prior to the imposition of sentence or prior to the ex-
piration of any period of probation*^^^; the other statute
is predicated upon arrest, indictment, or the initiation
351
of any criminal charge. In either jurisdiction the issue
^*^Sae, e.a. , North Carolina v, Alford . 400 U.S. 25
(1970) .
^
^Uhited states v. Jordan . 109 F. Svq»p. 528 (D.D.
C. 1953), affjd, 207 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
^^^18 U.S.C. I 4244 (1970).




nay be raised by the prosecutor, defense counsel, or the
352judge according to a probable cause standard. While
both statutes a|^>ear on their face to apply only to a
detemination of cooqpetency, they have been j\idicially in-
terpreted to cover situations where responsibility is am
353
issue. Since there is no provision under federal law
whereby an accused is permitted to enter a plea of "not
guilty by reason of insanity" both the matter of competency
and responsibility are properly raised by appropriate no-
354
tion prior to trial. Once the issue has been raised,
the trial judge is einpowered to have the defendant committed
to a hospital for a reasonable period of time in order that
he may be examined by at least one qualified psychiatrist.
Although both statutes are phrased in such a way as to in-
dicate that an accused might be allowed to refuse to be ex-
352
See 18 U.S.C. S 4244 (1970); D.C. Code Ann. I 24-
301 (1967) . See also Winn v. United states . 270 F.2d 326
(D.C. Cir. 1959), cert, denied . 365 U.S. 848 (1960).
353
See e.a. , United states v. Iwidv . 462 F.2d 694




See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12; 18 U.S.C. I 4244 (1970).
^^^18 U.S.C. i 4244 (1970); D.C. Code Ann. I 24-301
(1967) . It has been held that the power to commit is not




amined, there is authority for the proposition that hm must
coolly with the judicial order. And by submitting there
is no violation of his constitutional right against self-
357incrimination. Even though such an accused has no ab-
solute right to be examined by a psychiatrist of his own
356
choice, as well as by the court-appointed one, this
359
should be allowed even to the extent of furnishing an
indigent accused with a free psychiatric examination on the
basis of the provisions of another federal statute.
While the general rule is that neither the accused's psy-
chiatrist nor the defense attorney is permitted to be present
^^^See united States v. Weiser . 428 F.2d 932 (2d Cir,
1969), cert , denied . 402 U.S. 949 (1971); United States v.
Muncaster . 345 P. Svqpp. 970 (M.D. Ala. 1972) ; Battle v.
Cameron . 260 F. Supp. 804 (D.D.C. 1966).
357
See e.g.. United States v. Huncaster . 345 F. Supp.
970 (M.D. Ala. 1972) 7 Battle v. Cameron . 260 F. Supp. 804
(D.D.C. 1966) . Both cases proceed upon the theory that this
is an examination of the body emd thus non-testinonial in
nature, thereby making the privilege inapplicable.
358
Perry v. United States . 347 F.2d 813 (D.C. Cir.
1964), cert, denied, 383 U.S. 959 (1965).
1965)
.
359Qreen v. United states . 349 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir.
See e.c[. , United states v. schappel . 445 F.2d 716
(D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Taylor . 437 F.2d 371 (4th
Cir. 1971). Both cases rely upon the language of 18 U.S.C.
I 3006A (1970). See also Davis v. United States . 413 F.2d




36Xduring the course of the court-ordered examination,
there is authority holding that this should be allowed, at
least where the examining government psychiatrist voices
362
no objection. Both statutes require the submission of
a written report subsequent to the conclusion of the mental
examination, such report being open to inspection and copy-
ing by both the prosecutor and defense counsel ; however,
the report is not admissible as evidence during the ensuing
judicial proceedings.
Once the mental examination has been completed and
the psychiatrist's report submitted, the procedure to be
followed depends upon whether the vmderlying issue relates
361
See e.g., Uhited States v. Fletcher . 329 F. Svii^.
160 (D.D.C. 1971)
.
^^^See e.g., Otaited States v. Albright . 388 F.2d 719
(4th Cir. 1968); Uhited States v. Bohle. 445 F.2d 54 (7th
Cir. 1971) . But see Uhited States ex rel. wax v. Pate . 409
F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1969) holding that a psychiatric examina-
tion was not a "critical stage" within the meaning of quited
States V. Wade . 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and therefore the pres-
ence of counsel is not required. See also United States v.
Smith . 436 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1971), cert , denied . 402 U.S.
976 (1971).
^^•^See In Re Harmon . 425 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1970);
United States v. Carr . 437 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert ,
denied, 401 U.S. 920 (1971); Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2), (c)
.
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to competency or responsibility. If the former is involved,
under the provisions of both statutes this issue is decided
365
by the court at a pre-trial hearing. Where the issue
of responsibility requires resolution the usual practice
is to submit the issue to the jury in a unitcuey trial in
366
conjvinction with the issue of guilt or ixmocence. In
such a case the same problems arise as were seen to exist
with similar statutes on the state level. The statute
which is applicable to the federal district court system
provides that no statement c(»npelled from the accused dur-
ing the course of a mandatory mental examination is admis-
sible against him in evidence on the issue of guilt in «my
367
criminal proceeding and this provision has been held to
368
apply to the District of Coluinbia. Where a unitary trial
is held, the prejudice to the accused, despite limiting jury
See 18 U.S.C. i 4244 (1970) j D.C. Code Ann. I 24-
301 (1967) . Under the provisions of the D.C. Code if the
psychiatrist's report indicates that the accused is incom-
petent and neither the prosecutor nor the defense attorney
objects, the judge may rule on the basis of the contents of
the report; if an objection is made, the judge decides the
matter at a pre-trial hearing.
See , e.a. , Mcintosh v. Pescor . 175 F.2d 95 (6th
Cir. 1949) ; Harried v. United States . 389 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir,
1967) .
^^^18 U.S.C. I 4244 (1970).
368




instructions, of the psychiatric testimony given on the
369
responsibility issue is well recognized. To remedy this
situation federal appellate courts have created the pos-
sibility of a bifurcated trial, at least where there is an
initial claim by the attorney representing the accused that
there exist in the case possible defenses other than lack
370
of mental responsibility. The proper procedure to be
followed in this event is for the defense attorney to move
the court for bifurcation at the outset of the trial; if
gremted via judicial discretion, the coxirse to be taken
would require that the issue of guilt be adjudicated first,
followed by the issue of responsibility, which would be
371
determined by the same jury. However, this ignores the
the due process argument vAiich militates against the legal-
ity of a finding of guilty as respects acts comnitted while
the actor was not mentally responsible,^'^ although the ac-
cused will be protected from undue prejudice unless the psy-
^
^See e.g.. Holmes v. United states , 363 P. 2d 281,
282 (O.C. Cir. 1966)
.
370




See e.g.. Holmes v. United states . 363 F.2d 281,
283 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
372See note 339 supra .
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chiatrist's testimony is admitt«d during the "guilt" phase
because it is viewed by the court as relating to the accused's
intent as well as, or instead of, his mental responsibil-
373
ity. Whatever resolution obtains with respect to these
issues it is clear that, once conpelled to speak, the ac-
cused has no protection £ron the use against him of his own
statements and evidence derived therefrom either at the same
trial by the prosecution for rebuttal or in^Machment, or
similar use at a later trial of the same case, or use, at
another trial involving different crimes, of these state-
ments as well as evidence derived therefrom.
These dangers lie hidden in yet another separate
and distinct, although similar, set of statutory provisions.
Such provisions apply to the so-called sexually psycho-
375pathxc offender and exist in twenty-five states and the
District of Columbia. There appear to be two underlying
purposes for such enactments, both predicated upon the pub-
lic good and the need to cope, on an individual basis, with
'^•^See e.g. , Holmes v. United States . 363 P. 2d 281,
283 n. 7 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
374
Cf . notes 334-337 supra and accompanying text.
375See note 260 supra .
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the person who is mentally lilt first, the protection of
society via the method of individual detention so as to al-
leviate the danger Which he poses, and second, the enunci-
ated goal of treatment and ultimate rehabilitation of the
376
offender. Almost one-half of these statutes apply to
individuals who have been convicted of a sex offense regard-
377less of their past or present mental state. Slightly
less than one-third condition their operation on the in-
dividual being charged with or convicted of a sexual of-
fense and presently thought to have a mental disorder,
short of making him criminally irresponsible, such mental
disorder being coupled with criminal propensities to commit
378
sex offenses. Two other states add to this the require-
376See 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Incompetent Persons If 49-54
(1968); Annot., 34 A.L.R. 3d 652, I 2 at 661 (1970).
•177
"^"colo. Code Crim. P. ch. 44, I 39-13-202(3) (1972) ;
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. I 17-244 (a) (1958) ; Md. Code Ann. art.
31B, I 5 (1957); N.J. Stat. Ann. I 2Atl64-3 (1971); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. I 2947.25 (Supp. 1972); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19,
I 1166 (1964) ; Tenn. Code Ann. I 33-1301 (Supp. 1972) ; Utah
Code Ann. I 77-49-1 (Supp. 1973) ; W.Va. Code Ann. • 27-6A-1
(1971); Wis. Stat. Ann. 975.01 (1971); wyo. Stat. Ann. f 7-
348(a) (Supp. 1973).
37fl
Ala. Code Ann. tit. 15, I 434 (Supp. 1971); Cal.
Wei. U Inst. Code Ann. I 6300 (Deering, 1969) ; Ind. Acts ch.
3.1, 1 (P.L. No. 452, 1971); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 29-2901
(Supp. 1971); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 11 173-At2, 31 (Supp. 1973);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, II 8501(a), 8504 (Supp. 1973); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. II 71.06.020, .030 (Supp. 1972).
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ment that the mental disorder shall be thought to have
existed for a fixed period of time. '^ Three states merely
require that there is a criminal charge pending and that
there is coupled with an apparent mental disorder a pro-
380pensity to commit sex offenses. Three other jurisdic-
tions provide that the respective statute applies to one
who is not presently mentally ill and who, by a course of
repeated misconduct in sexual matters, has evidenced such
lack of power to control his sexual impulses as to be dan-
381gerous to others. In all these jurisdictions any rights
regarding self-incrimination which the subject individual
may have depends directly upon the characterization of the
statutory provisions. Eight state statutes have been judi-
cially denominated as civil, thus foreclosing the self-
382incrimination issue. Two others, on their face, are
^^^Fla. Stat. Ann. § 917.14 (1972); Iowa Code Ann.
I 225A.1 (1969)
.
^®°I11. Stat. Ann. II 105-1.01, -3 (1970); Mass. Gen.
L. Ann. ch. 123 A, SI 1, 3 (1969); Mo. Stat. Ann. SI 202.700,
.710.1 (1972).
381
D.C. Code Ann. I 22-3503 (1967); Minn. Stat. Ann.
8 526.09 (1969); Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 426.510 (1971-1972).
A similar statute has been upheld as not being so vague emd
indefinite so as to be unconstitutional. See Pearson v.
Probate Court . 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
382*See state ex rel. Haskett v. Marion County Crimi-




civil in nature. Three statutes provide for contempt
sanctions against uncooperative individuals who are sub-
ject to their terms. °^ Judicial interpretation has
385directly held in one state and inqpliedly held in
386
another that the respective statute was criminal in nat-
ure and thus the privilege against self-incrimination here
387is applicable to sexual psychopaths proceedings. The
Supreme Court has been less than helpful as respects a de-
finitive resolution of this problem. Specifically, it has
393 U.S. 888 (1968) ; State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green. 360
Mo. 1249, 232 S.W. 2d 897 (1950); People v. Lopez . 1 Cal.
3d 672, 82 Cal. Reptr. 121 (1969); State ex rel. Fulton v.
Sheetz, 166 N.w. 2d 874 (Iowa, 1969) ; Wood v. Director of
Patuxent Inst .. 243 Md. 731, 223 A. 2d 175 (1966); Meola v.
Fitzpatrick . 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971); State v.
Labor . 128 Vt. 597, 270 A. 2d 154 (1970); Sevionv v. Bums .
108 N.H. 95, 227 A. 2d 775 (1967).
383
Fla. Stat. Ann. I 917.24 (1972); 111. Stat. Ann.
I 105-3.01 (1970).
^®^D.C. Code Ann. I 22-3506 (a) (1967) ; Fla. Stat. Ann.
I 917.17 (1972); Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 426.610(1) (1971-1972)
385
Commonwealth v, Doolev . 209 Pa. Super. 519, 232
A. 2d 45 (1967)
.




It is also applicable in two states where, al-
though they deemed the statute civil in nature, the respec-
tive courts held the privilege to apply. See People v. Eng-
lish . 31 111. App. 2d 301, 201 N.B. 2d 455 (1964); Sevionv
V. Burns. 108 N.H. 95, 227 A. 2d 775 (1967).
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backed away from answering the question of whether or not
this type of procedure gives rise to the privilege as well
388
as the right to coxinsel. The Court also side-stepped
the issue of whether a patient rightfully withheld, on
Fifth Amendment grounds, cooperation in a court-ordered
psychiatric examination to determine a disposition other
389
than sentencing for a criminal conviction. However, the
Court has held that whether such sexual psychopath proceed-
ings are classified as civil or criminal they are subject
390to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. It has
also held that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth
391Amendment. Ergo, the result should be obvious. And this
result would be consistent with other decisions where simi-
lar protections were seen as being necessary in non-criminal
392proceedings
.
388see Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court , 407
U.S. 355 (1972) where the Court dismissed the writ of cer-
tiorari as being improvidently granted.
389
See McNeil v. Director of Patuxent Inst. . 407 U.S.
245 (1972).
^^^Specht V. Patterson . 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967).
^^^Mallov V. Hoqan . 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
"'^^Seo e.c[. , Mathis v. United States . 391 U.S. 1 (1968)





However, the fact remains that individuals are still
compelled to speak to court-appointed psychiatrists when the
issue of sexual psychopathy is raised. This b«coroas more
significant when it is realized that almost anyone can set
the statutory machinery in motion. In the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions the prosecutor, as well as the
court, may initiate action involving a mandatory medical
exzunination where it appears that the individual is a sexual
393psychopath. Any responsible person may accon^lish the
same thing in two other states. Once this has been done,
the usual procedure is to have the individual c<Miinitted for
395
examination by one or more psychiatrists for periods vary-
396ing between thirty imd ninety days. Upon ccHopletion of
this examination a written report is universally mandated.
In over half the jurisdictions the only requirement is that
^^•^See e.g., D.C. Code Ann. 1 22-3504(a) (1967); Pla.
Stat. Ann. i 917.14 (1972); Cal. Wei. & Inst. Code Aim.
i 6302 (1969)
.
See Iowa Code Ann. i 225A.2 (1969); Mo. Stat. Ann.
202.710.2 (1972).
^^^See e.g. . Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. I 17-244 (1958);
Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 123A, 4 (1969); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
I 173-Ax3I (Supp. 1973).
^^^See e.g.. Colo. Code Crim. P. ch. 44, I 39-13-207
(3) (1972); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. I 2947.25 (Supp. 1972); Wis.
Stat. Ann. I 975.04 (1971).
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the report be filed with the court^^'; in the remaining
states the defense counsel is affirmatively granted access
398
to this document. Such access is Indeed necessary in
light of the fact that in only two states can the defense
counsel or the psychiatrist of the patient's choice be
399present during the psychiatric examination. The report
is admissible in evidence on the sole issue of sexual psy-
chopathy in three states, ^ inadmissible for this purpose
401in two others, and inadmissible in one state in any
criminal proceeding other than the one to determine sexual
psychopathy unless it is requested for use by the defense4^^
^^^See e.g.. Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. i 29-2902(4)
(Supp. 1971) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, I 1167 (1964) ; Utah
Code Ann. i 77-49-3 (1953).
^^^See e.g.. D.C. Code Ann. I 22-3506(b) (1967); 111.
Stat. Ann. I 105-4 (1970); Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 426.610(3)
(1971-1972) . One state apparently affirmatively precludes
access by defense counsel. See Fla. Stat. Ann. I 917.22 (1972)
^^^See Ind. Acts. ch. 3.1, I 7 (P.L. Ho. 452, 1971)
(defense counsel); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 29-2902(6) (Supp.
1971) .
*°°Colo. Code Crim. P. ch. 44, I 39-13-210(6) (1972);
Fla. Stat. Ann. i 917.17 (1972); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. • 173-
A:4I (Supp. 1973).
^^^lowa Code Ann. I 225A.10 (1969); Mo. Stat. Ann.
I 202.720.4 (1972).
*°2ind. Acts. ch. 3.1, I 9 (P.L. Mo. 452, 1971).
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This latter minimal protection is broadened in only two
jurisdictions, both of which include the additional prohi-
bition that no evidence resulting from the personal exam-
ination of the patient shall be admissible against him in
any judicial proceedings other than ones to determine the
403issue of sexual psychopathy. Conspicuously absent in
the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions are provisions
aimed at protecting the patient from the use of his testi-
mony and evidence derived therefrom for any purpose at any
404
subsequent trial for any offense.
Such provisions probably would be necessary even
if all jurisdictions would follow the lead of those few
states which have seen fit to depart from the traditional
view that the privilege against self-incrimination does not
apply to mandatory mental examinations. New Jersey coiarts
have indicated that the privilege is fully applicable where
sexual psychopathy is at issue*°^ and where, although he may
raise the issue of either competency or responsibility, he
does not attenqpt to offer his own psychiatric evidence to
403
^''''d.C. code Ann. I 22-3506(b) (1967); Ore. Rev.
Stat. Ann. I 426.610(3) (1971-1972).
404Cf . note 374 supra and accoii^>anying text.





support his position. Peimsylvamia has held the privi-
lege applicable to all three classes of mental exaaina-
407tions. Courts in three states have held the privilege
to apply where either or both competency and responsibility
408
foinn the focal point of the examination ; two others
limit the applicability of the privilege to sexual psycho-
409pathy situations. However, even if the privilege were
universally accepted as being applicable in all situations
involving mandatory mental exeuninations , nothing substantial
would seem to stand in the way of the various legislative
bodies ' efforts to circumvent the exercise of that privilege
by passing laws similar to the immvinity statutes previously
410
considered. In fact, three such statutes are already in
411
existence. Thus, whether deprived of the privilege
^^^State V. Obstein . 52 N.J. 516, 247 A. 2d 5 (1968)
.
407Commonwealth v. Doolev . 209 Pa. Super. 519, 232




French v. District Court . 153 Colo. 10, 384 P. 2d
268 (1963) ; State. v. Olson . 274 Minn. 225, 143 N.W. 2d 69
(1966) ; Shepard v. Bowe . 250 Ore. 288, 442 P. 2d 238 (1968)
.
409
People V. English . 31 111. App. 2d 301, 201 N.E.
2d 455 (1964): Sevignv v. Bums . 108 H.H. 95, 227 A. 2d 775
(1967) .
410
See Kastiqar v. United States . 406 U.S. 441 (1972);
Zicarelli v. United states . 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
411
Ariz. R. Grim. P. 11.7 (1973); D.C. Code Ann.
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entirely or allowed to claim a severely emasculated one,
an individual forced to undergo a maiwiatory mental examina-
tion stands in much the same position as his counterpart
who faces an inquisition conducted by a grand jury, legis-
lative committee, or administrative agency, or trial on a
412
criminal charge subsequent to illegal police activity.
And again testimony is c<Hapelled with the speaker being the
only one required to pay the price.




See Harris v. Mew York . 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
j
Simmons v. United states . 390 U.S. 377 (1968); McGautha v.
California . 402 U.S. 183 (1971).

CHAPTER V.
STATEMENTS COMPELLED BY MANDATORY
DISCLOSURE STATUTES
Thusfar, statutes which impose em obligation to
speak, under threat of the enforcement of a penalty for
noncompliance, upon certain individuals have been discussed.
A related consideration involves situations wherein the
statutory law of a particular jurisdiction requires that
in specific instances envunerated reports, declarations,
applications, and registration fozrms be submitted to one
or more governmental agencies. The significemce of these
disclosure requirements is enhanced with the realization
that, once in control of the government, the informa-
tion divulged is, as a general rule, admissible against
413the mcLker in criminal prosecutions . While such disclosure
413
See 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law i 654 (1961). See
also 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses §§ 72-74 (1948); 98 C.J.S. Wit-





is most aptly deemed to be testimonial in nature^^^ pos-
sible collisions with the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion have, in the main, been avoided by way of the judicial
fictions of unprivileged public documents, public property
interest, or implied waiver, all of which have been se-
415
verely criticized. The requirements have been viewed as
being valid and lawfully extending to anyone who engages
in euny activity, occupation, profession or calling which is
governed by legislation regulating the vindertaking and re-
quiring disclosure, either oral or written.*^" Over the
years some areas of endeavor have, to a much larger degree
them others, attracted legislative attention and the result
has been the attendant promulgation of laws which require
the revelation of information which is likely to form the
basis of a criminal indictment or prosecutorial information.
These include the submission of data respecting individual
earned income, wagering activities, pursuits involving fire-
*^*See Mccormick, Evidence § 142 at 300 (2d ed. 1972)
,
*^^See 8 Wigmore, Evidence i 2259<c) at 364-365 (Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961)
.
^•'^Model Code of Evidence rule 207(1) (1942) ; Uniform
Rules of Evidence rule 25(e) (1953). The underlying rationale
is attributed to the alleged trend of modern authorities.





arms and alcoholic beverages, and the operation of motor
vehicles. In that the income-related statutes are perhaps
the best known zmd susceptible of the widest application
they will be subjected to initial analysis.
The federal income tax legislation is broad in
scope emd possessed of characteristics which combine annu-
ally to cast em expemsive net to ensnare millions of in-
dividuals. I^ere exists the requirement that an income tax
return be filed by every individual having a gross income
417
of $750.00 or more for the teucable year. By gross in-
418
come is meant all income from whatever source derived.
The power of the federal government to levy such t20ce8 is
419beyond question and since the tax is not a sanction
against wrongdoing, it does not concern itself with the
420
nature of the income which it taxes. In addition to the
basic annual filing requirement, every individual is re-
quired to file a declaration of estimated tax for the next
*^^26 U.S.C. I 6012 (1970). Certain higher limits
are set for unmarried taxpayers and married individuals who
occupy the same residence at the close of the taxable year.
Id.
**''26 U.S.C. I 61 (1970).
419




See e.a. , C.I.R. v. Tellier . 383 U.S. 687 (1966).

122
succeeding taucable year if such taxpayer comes within cer-
tain gross income pareuneters and receives gross income
from sources other than wages which exceeds $500.00; how-
ever this declaration need not be filed if the estimated
tax can reasonably be expected to be less thcux $40.00. ^•'•
Rates of taocation vary between 14 and 70 per cent accord-
ing to a graduated scale.^^^ No one whose gross income
exceeds the statutory zunount is exempt from the filing
requirement emd penalties are prescribed for those who
either fail to file a return, keep income records, sup-
ply information, or pay the tax which is due. Addi-
tional penalties attach, as well as the imposition of
interest due, where there has been a failure to file a tax
return, a failure to pay the tatx,^^^ or a failure to
pay the estimated tax. 426 Further, inspection of federal
income teix returns, including declarations of estimated
42126 U.S.C. § 6015 (1970).
42226 U.S.C. g 1 (1970).
42326 U.S.C. g 7203 (1970).
42426 U.S.C. 8 6651 (1970).
42526 U.S.C. g 6653 (1970).
"^2^26 U.S.C. B 6654 (1970).
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teix, is permitted by zmy official, body, or conunission law-
fully charged with the administration of any state teuc
427law. This is bound to have far-reaching rsuxiifications
when it is realized that the legislatures of forty states
have seen fit to impose em income tcoc on their respective citi-
428
zens. Many of these taxation statutes provide a filing
^2^26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1970). These records are also
available upon request to the Committee on Ways and Means
of the House, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, the
Joint Committee or a select committee of the Senate or
House specifically authorized to investigate returns by a
resolution of the Senate or House or by both, concurrently.
^°Ala. Code Ann. tit. 51, § 394 (1958); Alaska
Stat. Ann. § 43.20.030 (1962); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-
101 (Supp. 1973-1974); Ark. Stat, Ann. § 84-2003 (Supp.
1971); Cal. Rev. & Taoc. Code Ann. 8 18401 (Deering, Supp.
1973); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 138-1-2 (1964); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 30, § 1101 (1953) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 92-3101 (Supp.
1972) ; Ha. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 235-4 (Supp. 1972) ; Idaho Code
Ann. § 63-3024 (Supp. 1973); 111. Stat. Ann. ch. 120, 8 2-
201 (Supp. 1973-1974) ; Ind. Stat. Ann. tit. 6, Art. 2, § 1-1
(Burn's 1972); Iowa Code Ann. 8 422.4 (1971); Kan. Stat.
Ann. S 79-3220 (Supp. 1972); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141.180
(1969); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 47:31 (1970); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 36, i 5111 (Supp. 1973) ; Md. Code Ann. art. 81,
e 288 (1957); Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 62, 8 22 (Supp. 1973);
Minn. Stat. Ann. 8 290.03 (1962); Miss. Code Ann. 8 27-7-5
(1972); Mo. Stat. Ann. 8 143.011 (Supp. 1973); Mont. Rev.
Code Ann. 8 84-4902 (Supp. 1973); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 77-
2715 (1943); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 77:3 (1964); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 72-15-1 (1953); N.Y. Cons. Tax. L. 8 367 (McKinney,
1966); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 105-136 (1971); N.D. Cent.
Code Ann. 8 57-38-02 (1972); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 8 5747.02
(1973); Okla. Stat. Ann. 8 2355 (Supp. 1973-1974); Ore. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 316.037 (1971-1972); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72,
8 7302 (Supp. 1973-1974); R.I. Gen. L. Ann. 44-30-51 (Supp,




requirement where gross income exceeds a stated amount ;
others merely provide for filing in each case where the
individual is required to file a federal income tax re-
430
turn. Some provide for the taxation of non-residents
431
where income is derived from the taxing state. Rates
of taxation are predicated upon either a graduated scale ^
433
or a flat percentage. All of these statutes have pro-
visions for the imposition of interest and penalties for
434for failure to file a return or pay the tax. Many ex-
pressly provide for the exchange of info]nnation either with
§ 59-14-16 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, S 5822 (1970);
Va. Code Ann. f 58-101 (1950) ; W. Va. Code Ann. I 11-21-3
(1966); Wis. Stat. Ann. I 71.01 (1969).
^^^See e.q.» Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, S 1101 (1953);
Idaho Code Ann. I 63-3024 (Supp. 1973); Mass. Gen. L. Ann.
ch. 62, S 22 (Supp. 1973).
*^°See e.c[., Alaska Stat. Ann. § 43.20.030 (1962).
^^^See e.g.. Miss. Code Ann. I 27-7-5 (1972); S.C.
Code L. Ann. I 65-221 (1962); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, I 5822
(1970) .
432See e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 43-101 (Supp.
1973-1974) ; Oa. Code Ann. I 92-3101 (Supp. 1972) ; Md. Code
Ann. art. 81, I 288 (1957)
.
433See e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. i 290.03 (1962); Mont.




See e.g.. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 138-1-37 (1964);
Iowa Code Ann. I 422.25 (1971); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36,




435the federal government, or the govemmente o£ other
436
states on a reciprocal basis, under such a profusion
of Interrelated legislation most taxpayers siirvive a life-
time free of all hazards save the relinquishment of tax
dollars. Others have found themselves on the horns of a
dilemma precipitated by the manner In which they obtained
the Income upon which the tax Is based. Inevitably, these
Individuals could not comply with income tax reporting re-
quirements for fear of revealing conduct deemed to be crimi-
nal under other federal and state law. When this occurs,
the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment often
seems a likely refuge.
The Supreme Oourt faced just such an issue over
437twenty years ago in United States v. Kahrjqer . There
the appellee was convicted in federal court for his alleged
willful failure to register as a person engaged in the busi-
ness of accepting wagers and his failure to pay an occupa-
tional tax in violation of applicable provisions of federal
Income tax law. He subsequently leveled a two-pronged at-
tack on the legislation: (1) Congress, under the guise of
^^^See e.£. Mass Gen. L. Ann. ch. 62, f 58 (1969)
^^^See e.g.. V.N. Stat. Ann. • 72-15-1 (1953).
*^^345 U.S. 22 (1953).
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its taxing power, in essence sought to regulate intrastate
gambling activities thereby infringing the police power
reserved to the states, and (2) the registration provisions
violated his privilege against self-incrimination. The
five-man majority opinion dispatched the initial contention
by indicating that the tax involved applied to all engaged
in the business of receiving wagers irrespective of whether
such activity violated state law, smy suggested legislative
history alluding to the suppression of gambling activities
was not determinative, and, that since the primary purpose
of the statutes in question was the constitutionally valid
exercise of Congress to inclement procedures to raise reve-
nue, the fact that this produced an auicillary regulatory
438
effect on certain activity was immaterial. Further, the
opinion found the registration requirements, which included
the filing of names, addresses, and places of business, to
be nothing more than that required under other taxing pro-
visions and merely served to further the government's abil-
439ity to collect the tax. The Court's approach to the
second contention took even less effort. Questioning the
appellee's ability to raise the self-incrimination issue in




light of the fact that he failed to register as required,
but assuming that he could nonetheless do so, the majority
noted that privilege related only to past, not future,
440
acts and therefore the privilege simply did not apply.
Two dissenting opinions were filed in the case. The first
noted that the required information, if supplied, could
serve as the basis for a federal gambling conviction and
that its alternative effect would be to provide a founda-
tion for a state gambling conviction. As such the statute
mandates a type of coercion which is iitcompatible with the
441Fifth Amendment. The second indicated that Ccmgress had
intruded into an area specifically reserved for state ac-
tion, for the thrust of the legislation was not, as averred
by the majority, the raising of revenues but rather the sup-
442pression of illegal state gambling practices. Perhaps
the key to this decision lies in the sole conciurring opin-
ion. Indicating that he would side with the minority if
they could render a disposition which would not undercut
**°Id. at 32-33.
^^345 U.S. 22, 36-37 (1953) (Black and Douglas, JJ.,
dissenting)
.




Congress' proper use of the taxing power. Justice Jackson
viewed the applicability of the privilege against self-
incrimination to this type of legislation as opening the
door to innumerable instances of taxpayer evasion of re-
porting requirements; rather, he was confidant that remed-
ial legislation would evolve which would more properly be
corrective of the then present situation than a (juestion-
ea>le precedent established by judicial fiat.^"^ Evidently,
this respected jurist had misjudged congressional interest
and inertia.
Two years later the nucleus Kahriaer majority faced
a similau: issue in Lewis v. United States .^^ The provi-
sions of the same federal statute were attacked, this time,
however, on the groxmd that to have registered as a gambler
and paid the special tax alleged to be due would have in-
criminated appellant under federal law which prohibited
gaonbling. Relying entirely on the Kahriqer decision, the
majority found the attempted state-federal differentiation
unpersuasive, teJcing pains to indicate that if the petitioner
*^^345 U.S. 22, 34-36 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)
348 U.S. 419 (1955). At the time Lewis was de-
cided Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Jackson no longer sat
with the Court; the former was replaced by Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Harlan had yet to be sworn as a member.
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chose to follow an illegal calling this wa* voluntary, as
was his ability to elect or refuse to make the required
disclosures and thus any coercive element giving rise to a
445
violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege was absent.
Similarly treated was the argximent presented by the appel-
lant that to display the required tax stamp indicating that
the applicable taxes had been paid would have been sai invita-
tion to federal agents' intent on arresting him for gambling
violations; the majority's short retort was that since the
appellamt had not purchased such a stamp he lacked standing
to assert his claim. The three Kaihriger dissenters re-
mained unconvinced. One indicated that the case at bar
merely brought into sharp focus the objectionable qualities
previously found to be present in the legislation. The
others took the position that now the protection of the
Fifth Amendment was weakened to yet a greater degree, for
here the very government which required disclosure had the
power to utilize the information thereby revealed to con-
vict appellant £md others similarly situated of felonious
^^^48 U.S. 419, 422-423 (1955).
**^Id. at 423.
^^348 U.S. 419, 425 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
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offenses.*^® For them a more flagrant affront to the privi-
lege was beyond the pale of comprehension.^^^ But for the
ensuing dozen years and more the status quo remained.
When the Supreme Court chose to hear the case of
450Marchetti v. United States there was in existence, as
there still are, federal statutes which iiiq;>ose disclosure
and related requirements which are strikingly similar to
those receiving judicial attention in Kahriger and Lewis .
Specifically, a special annual tax is payable by persons
451
engaged in the business of accepting wagers. Each per-
son who is required to pay this special tax is required to
file forms which reflect not only his name, places of resi-
dence, and business addresses but also those of each person
who is engaged in receiving wagers for him or on his behalf.
This registration requirement, once fulfilled, and the pay-
ment of the tax, entitles the registrant to a federal wager-
ing stamp which must be placed «md kept conspicuously in his
dissenting)
.
44834Q U.S. 419, 424-425 (Black and Douglas, JJ.,
**^id. at 425.
*^°390 U.S. 39 (1968).
*^^26 U.S.C. I 4411 (1970).
*^^26 U.S.C. I 4412 (1970).
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453business establishment, upon pain of penalty for non-
compliance. Additionally, there is imposed upon such
individuals a 10 percent excise tax on all wagers placed
455
with them. Ostensibly to facilitate the collection of
this excise tax, persons accepting wagers are required to
456keep daily records of all such transactions, the same
being liable to federal inspection as frequently as is
457deemed necessary. Compliance with these requirements
neither makes lawful the activity where otherwise pro-
hibited by federal, state, or municipal law nor precludes
punishment for such activity or the imposition of addi-
tional t2uces by the various states and their respective
political subdivisions relative to the wagering activity^^^
459This, of course, brings into play myriad state statutes
45326 U.S.C. I 6808 (1970).
^^^26 U.S.C. § 7273 (1970).
*^^26 U.S.C. i 4401 (1970).
^^^26 U.S.C. § 4403 (1970).
45726 U.S.C. e 4423 (1970).
^5826 U.S.C. i 4906 (1970); 26 U.S.C. I 4422 (1970).





as well as federal statutes^^^ aimed at the eradication of
gambling enterprises.
All of this did not escape judicial scrutiny in
Marchetti. There the petitioner was convicted of willful
failures to register as a taker of wagers emd to pay the
special annual wagering tax, and conspiracy to avoid pay-
ment of this tax, all in violation of federal tax law. He
contended throughout the course of litigation that the
registration and tax payment provisions violated his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, and this neces-
sitated a reexamination of the Kahriger and Lewis decisions.
Initially, the majority opinion traced the overall scheme
of taxation of the special class of taxpayers involved, in-
cluding the relationship between these provisions and the
federal zmd state prohibitions respecting wagering activ-
461
xty. The conclusion reached was that, under such a broad
See 18 U.S.C. f 1952 (1970) (travel in interstate
coninerce with the intent to distribute gambling proceeds) ;
18 U.S.C. g 1953 (1970) (interstate transportation of wager-
ing paraphernalia); 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1970) (knowing use of
a wire communication facility for interstate transmission
of wagering information); 18 U.S.C. i 1955 (1970) (numerous
gambling activities prohibited) ; 18 U.S.C. I 1511 (conspir-
acy to obstruct state laws with intent to facilitate geuiibl-
ing) ; 18 U.S.C. i 1301 (interstate transportation of lot-
tery tickets.
461
390 U.S. 39, 42-46 (1968).
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interlocking statutory scheme, petitioner could not avoid
being svibjected to federal and state prosecution if he
complied with the challenged requirements. Of special
significance in this regard was the fact that at the time
of appellant's conviction amother federal statute required
the appropriate federal officials to furnish a list of
those who had registered and paid the special tax to both
state 2md federal prosecutors. The Court noted that
this information, in conjxinction with the federal require-
ment pertaining to the conspicuous display of the wagering
tax stamp, virtually assured conviction of a gambling-
464
related offense, especially in light of acknowledged co-
operation between federal revenue officers and prosecutorial
*^2^. at 47.
^^-^This provision has been subsequently repealed.
See Act of Oct. 22, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1235.
464390 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1968). Hiis result is facili-
tated by statutes in various states which make possession of
the federal gambling tax stamp prima facie evidence of illi-
cit state gambling activities. See e.g. . Ala. Code Ann.
tit. 14, I 302(8) (1958); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 15t31
(Supp. 1973) . One state continues to require that pur-
chasers of the federal stanp file similar registration
forms with state officials. See 111. Stat. Ann. ch. 38,
S 28-4 (Supp. 1973-1974) . Apparently, the courts of only
one state have found the evidentiary provision Invalid on a
constitutional basis. See Scaglicw v. United States . 396





officials aimed at the suppression of gambling endeavorsT
The net effect of compliance with the federal registration
requirement, the Court observed, would be to furnish a con-
crete connection between the registrant emd illegal activ-
ity; under such circumstances the application of the self-
incrimination privilege was compelling. And this was
so despite the decisions in Kahriaer auid Lewis . The former
467
was grounded upon a prior opinion which held the privi-
lege inapplicable where the appellamt was convicted for
failure to file an income tax return because to have held
otherwise would have been to expand inappropriately the
scope of the privilege thereby enabling the claimant to be
the sole judge of the privilege's applicability.^^^ The
Marchetti Court found such rationale misplaced in the case
469
at bar. similarly, the majority refused to follow the
rationale of Lewis , asserting that the question was not
whether appellant had a constitutional right to engage in
465390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968).
*^^Id. at 48-49.
^^"^United States v. Sullivan . 274 U.S. 259 (1926).
*^®Cf. Hoffmam v. United states . 341 U.S. 479 (1951)
"^^^390 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1968).
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gambling pursuits, but rather whether once so engaged he
had a valid claim of privilege.^'^ In this regard, rea-
soned the Court, it was no answer for the government to
claim that entering upon a course of illegal conduct waived
the privilege or that the privilege applied only to past
activities and not to prospective ones, which would be dis-
closed by registration, since the petitioner faced substem-
tial hazards of prosecution for past, present, cind future
offenses if he complied with the statutes' connnsmds.*'^
Therefore, on the facts of the instemt case, petitioner was
viewed as having validly asserted the privilege and to the
extent that Kcihriqer and Lewis conflicted with this position
472they were no longer valid. But this was not dispositive
of the full result reached in Marchetti since the govern-
ment urged two further issues on the Court. First, it was
argued that any claim of privilege was nullified by the so-
called "required records" doctrine amnounced in yet emother
case. That doctrine was held not to apply to the Mar-
470Td^ at 51.
^"^^Id. at 51-53.
^^^Id. at 54. It should be noted that the court
stopped short of a full blown renunciation of both cases.
Id.
473
Shapiro v. United States . 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
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chetti factual pattern sine* all three of the elements of
474that doctrine were absent in the instant situation.
Second, a use and derivative use restriction was suggested
as a device to supplant the protection afforded by the
privilege, thus obviating the necessity to condemn the
legislative provisions. This the Court declined to do,
both because of the attendant frustration of an avowed
legislative intent to make the required information avail-
able to federal emd state prosecutors and because of the
resulting hardship of requiring state authorities to prove
the untaintedness of their trial evidence in cases where
state prosecution followed federal registration. ^ In-
stead, the Court siiqply ruled that petitioner's claim of
privilege was a complete defense to a federal prosecution
for failure to register and pay the tax, while hinting that
^'^Specifically, there was no requirement to keep or
preserve records of the sane kind ordinarily kept; the rec-
ords at issue were not imbued with any public aspects; and
the requirements of the statutes were directed at a group
"inherently suspect of criminal activities," rather than at
areas of regulatory amd non-criminal activity. 390 U.S. 39,
56-57 (1948) . At this juncture the Court removed any doubt
that the disclosures would have been testimonial in nature.
Id . at 57. See note 414 supra emd accompanying text. Cf .
note 9 supra .
^'^Cf . Murphv V. Waterfront Commission of New York ,
378 U.S. 52 (1964)
.
476390 U.S. 39, 58-59 (1968).
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Congress might alter the respective statutes to provide
477immunity in return for con^lieuice.
The seume day that it decided Marchetti the Supreme
Court cuinounced its holding in a companion case, Grosso v.
United States . ^^^ The petitioner there, \inlike his pre-
decessor, contended only that payment of the federal excise
tax imposed on incone derived from wagering activity vio-
lated his right against self-incrimination. After alluding
to the comprehensive scheme involving state and federal
efforts which both taxed and prohibited wagering endeavors,
the majority also observed that in the case of the federal
excise tax under consideration there was also required the
filing of a return which called for the production of in-
formation similar to that required by the registration form
in Marchetti . Further, while there was not a clear legisla-
tive command that the information contained in the tax re-
turn be submitted to federal and state prosecutors, this
procedure was not explicitly barred from such use. Again,
the majority concluded that the appellamt faced a real and
substantial risk of self-incrimination and under these cir-
^^^Id. at 60. Cf. 8 Wigmore, Evidence I 2259(c) at
367 n. 15 (McNaughton rev. 1961)
.
4^^390 U.S. 62 (1968).
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cuinstsmces he had raised a valid privilege claim. Such
claim could not be defeated by the rationale in Kahrigcr
or Lewis, " nor by the "required records" doctrine which,
as in Marchetti, was found to be inapplicable. The
proper remedy, said the Oourt, was the raising of an abso-
lute bcir to any federal conviction grounded upon the fail-
482
ure to pay the federal excise tax. Only one Justice saw
483the fallacy in these otherwise sound decisions. He en-
visaged that, by failing to declare these federal statutes
invalid on constitutional grounds and suggesting that cor-
rectional legislation be enacted such as would grant im-
munity from prosecution in return for the submission of
desired information, the Court was opening the door to an
entire abrogation of the privilege. ^^^ As will be seen,
this apprehension has nearly been proven to be well founded.




*®^Id. at 69 n. 7.
The concurring opinion filed by Justice Brennan
applied to both Marchetti and Qrosso . See 390 U.S. 39, 61
(1968) .
484




Statutes similar to those of federal and state
origin which apply to teucation and prohibition of gsuhbling
activity may be found where the enterprise centers on the
memufacture , distribution, and sale of alcoholic beverages.
In this regard, while attaching criminal penalties for non-
compliemce, federal statutes promulgate numerous reporting
and associated requirements. Records are required to be
kept and returns made by every person disposing of any sub-
stemce of the character used in the manufacture of dis-
tilled spirits or the disposing of denatured distilled
spirits or the articles from which distilled spirits may
be recovered, such records to be made available to any fed-
485
eral revenue officer during business hours. Persons hav-
ing possession, custody, or control of any distilling appara-
tus must file a written statement disclosing the location,
kind, capacity, £md owner of such device, as well as his
residence and the purpose for which the apparatus has been
486
or IS intended to be used. All distilled spirits must
487bear federal alcohol tax stsunps. Individuals engaged in
distilling, bonded warehousing, rectifying, or bottling dis-
'*^^26 U.S.C. i 5291 (1970).
*®^26 U.S.C. 8 5179 (1970).
487
26 U.S.C. %% 5205, 5604 (1970).
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tilled spirits must conspicuously place a sign outside their
place of business indicating the name of the owner and the
488business in which engaged ; further, they must keep such
records and submit such reports as are required by the
Secretary of the Treasury, these records and reports being
subject to inspection by any federal revenue agent during
489business hours. Similar requirements are imposed upon
wholesale dealers in liquor. Retail dealers must keep
a record, in book form located in their business establish-
ment, of all receipts of alcoholic beverages together with
the respective dates, quamtities, and names of suppliers
thereof, such record to be made available to emy internal
491
revenue officer. As respects all of these requirements
there can be no doubt that the legislative purpose is
grounded in a desire to facilitate the collection of revenue
492due to the federal government.
'^^^26 U.S.C. 8 5180 (1970).
^®^26 U.S.C. 8 5207 (1970).
'*^°26 U.S.C. 88 5115, 5114 (1970).
^^^26 U.S.C. 88 5124, 5146 (1970).
"^^^See 26 U.S.C. 8 5061 (1970).
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A similar motive may have prompted parallel state
legislation which exists universally. However, the states
have demonstrated a less than uniform approach to the class
of individuals from whom information is sought. Some have
made the reporting requirement applicable to virtually any-
one associated in any way with income attributable to al-
493
coholic beverages. Others merely require records and
494
reports from manufacturers, distributors, and e3q>orter8.
Three others designate manufacturers, importers, amd retail
495
sellers as those from whom reports are due. In two
states reports are required from those who mzmufacture,
496
sell, or store such beverages. Four states linit report-
ing requirements to manufacturers amd wholesalers^^'; two
*^^Ala. Code Ann. tit. 29, tB 55-56 (1958); Ga. Code
Ann. § 58-1022 (1968); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 139.11 (1967).
4^Fla. Stat. Ann. 1 561.55 (Supp. 1973); 111. Stat.
Ann. ch. 43, i 125 (Supp. 1973-1974); Md. Code Ann. art. 2B,
e 144 (1957) .
^^^Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 4-222 (Supp. 1973); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 4, B 718 (Supp. 1970) ; Mass. Gen. L. Ann.
ch. 138, B 21 (Supp. 1973).
^^^Miss. Code Ann. 8 67-1-37 (1972); W. Vfc. Code
Ann. 8 60-4-16 (1966).
^^'^La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 26:149 (1969); Mo. Stat.
Ann. § 311.550 (Supp. 1973); N.M. Stat. Ann. 8 46-5-21
(1953); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 53-164.01 (1943).

142
others single out wholesalers amd retailers.*^® Whole-
salers are the only ones required to make reports in four
states while only retailers are similarly treated in
emother.^^ Most states have seen fit to simply convey a
broad gramt of power to their respective state administra-
tive agencies enabling those entities to prescribe what-
ever rules and regulations as are deemed appropriate to
the implementation of the states' liquor laws.
^^%.Y. Alco. & Rev. Contr. L. Ann. §§ 104, 105
(McKinney, 1970); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. i 5-03-08 (1959).
499conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. i 12-437 (1972) ; Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 243.850 (1969); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 369.480
(1967); S.C. Code L. Ann. 8 4-75 (1962).
500^6. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, g 351 (Supp. 1973-
1974) .
^°^Alaska Stat. Ann. § 04.05.040(8) (1962); Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 48-203i (1964); Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann.
e 324-52 (Deering, 1958) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. i 75-2-6
(1963); Idaho Code Ann. § 23-207 (Supp. 1972); Ind. Stat.
Ann. tit. 7.1, art. 2, I 3-3 (Burn's Supp. 1973); Iowa Code
Ann. 8 123.21 (Supp. 1973); Hawaii Rev. Stat. Ann. i 281-17
(1968); Kan. Stat. Ann. 8 41-210 (Supp. 1972); Mich. Comp.
L. Ann. 8 436.7a (1967); Minn. Stat. Ann. S 340.51 (1972);
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. i 4-113 (1947); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 176:12 (1964); N.J. Stat. Ann. 8 33:1-39 (Supp. 1973-1974);
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 8 18A-15 (Supp. 1971) ; Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. 8 4301.10 (Supp. 1972); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 37, i 552
(1951); Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 471.785 (1971-1972); Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 72, 8 727 (1949); R.I. Gen. L. Ann. 8 3-2-2 (Supp.
1972); S.D. Comp. L. Ann. 8 35-10-1 (1967); Tenn. Code Ann.
8 57-109 (1968); Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 666-6 (1952);
Utah Code Ann. 8 32-1-6 (Supp. 1973); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 7,
8 108 (1972) ; Va. Code Ann. 8 4-11 (1950) ; Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. 8 66.08.030 (Supp. 1972); Wyo. Stat. Ann. 8 12-39 (1957)

1*3
The result o£ the promulgation of these federal and
state statutes is the creation of an interlocking system
of laws such as was found to exist in the Marchetti-Grosso
situation. This analogy was so compelling that it prompted
numerous appeals of convictions for alcohol-related of-
fenses based upon the holdings in those cases. These at-
502tempts, however, proved uniformly unsuccessful. The
case of United States v. Hunt is fairly representatxve
of the judicial approach to the problem. There the appel-
lee was convicted of various offenses including his fail-
ure to comply with federal liquor registration, bonding,
2md posting requirements. He contended, at trial emd on
appeal, that compliemce would have violated his privilege
against self-incrimination and that, in reliance upon
Marchetti-Grosso , the courts should declare the privilege
to be a complete bar to prosecution for his omissions.
Only by distinguishing those cases could the appellate
court uphold the conviction, and this is what it set out to
do. Initially, it noted that Marchetti-Grosso were decided
^Q^See e
.a- . United States v. Walden. 411 F.2d 1109
(4th Cir. 1969) ; Brown v. United States . 401 F.2d 769 (5th
Cir. 1968); United States v. Whitehead . 424 F.2d 446 (6th
Cir. 1970).





against a background scheme of comprehensive state and
federal statutes which were directed at a specific group
and which proscribed certain activity; that there was a
dual legislative purpose in each case—the generating of
income and the exchange of information needed to suppress
the activity through state cind federal prosecutions; and
that these combined to produce a real and appreciable risk
504
of self-xncrxmxnation. The court found the fxrst ele-
ment missing in the instant case because, despite a recog-
nition that the field of activity in question was permeated
with <"riminal statutes, nonetheless, the statutes at issue
were not directed at a select group, but rather at everyone
505
engaged m the business. Further, here was a clearly
regulatory statute which was not intended to be suppressive
irrespective of the statutory authority for the exchange
of revenue information between tetx officials and prosecu-
507tors. Most importcuitly, the court observed that in the
precedents relied upon by appellee the activity involved was
unlawful, whereas appellee was engaged in "a lawful activ-
504id. at 2.
505id. at 3.
^°^26 U.S.C. a 6107 (1970).




ity which was done in an iinlawful inanner . "^08 ip^ make such
a distinction is to miss the basic point made by the Court
in Marchetti . that being that the question was not whether
the recalcitrant registrant has a right to engage in un-
lawful activity but rather whether once embarked upon that
509
unlawful activity he is protected by the privilege. In
this regard the appellate court surely erred to the pre-
judice of the appellee.
Registration and reporting requirements instituted
by federal emd state statutes extend to yet another area
which has been explored by the Supreme Court. Concur-
rently with Marchetti emd Grosso came the decision in
Haynes v. United States . The issue there was what rela-
tion, if any, the privilege against self-incrimination had
to the offense of the knowing possession of a firearm which
had not been registered in accordance with the provisions
of a federal statute. At the time that this case arose
there existed both federal and state statutes, surviving to
the present, which pervaded this area of law enforcement
^Q^Id. at 2-3 (emphasis original)
.
509See notes 470-471 supra and accompanying text.
Cf. California v. Bvers . 402 U.S. 424, 470 (1971) (Brennan,
Douglas, cmd Marshall, JJ., dissenting).




concern. Federal law prohibits all persons except licensed
importers, m2mufacturers , or dealers from engaging in the
business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in specific
classes of firearms or eunmunition, or shipping, triuisport-
ing, or receiving these items in interstate or foreign com-
merce. These individuals are required to register an-
nually in their respective revenue districts, supplying
their names emd addresses. ^ A special tax is levied upon
513
such activity and those subject to the tax are required
to maintain records respecting the memufacture, receipt,
sale, or other disposition of the specified items, ^^^ such
records being subject to inspection by any revenue offi-
cer. Additionally, all possessors of firearms of a speci<
fied class were subject to a registration requirement which
included furnishing the neune and address of the person en-
titled to possession, an identification of the firearm, and
^^^18 U.S.C. g 922(a)(1) (1970).
^^^28 U.S.C. g 5802 (1970).
5^326 U.S.C. g 5801 (1970).
^^^26 U.S.C. g 5843 (1970).
515i8 U.S.C. g 923(g) (1970).
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the date of registration. Similar provisions exist
under statutes in thirty-five states. ' Mere possession
of a firearm is sufficient to require registration in four
states. ^^^ Four other states provide a similar require-
ment for the purchase of any type of firearm. In one-
fourth of these jurisdictions the sale of any weapon cap-
able of being concealed upon the person is conditioned upon
520
reporting requirements. The duty to provide information
concerning the sale of pistols and revolvers is imposed by
statute in fourteen states. ^^^ Over one-third of the states
^^^26 U.S.C. g 5841 (1967). This provision has sub-
sequently be^en repealed. See Act of Oct. 22, 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1227.
One state specifically prohibits registration
and reporting requirements with respect to firearms. See
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-918 (1956).
51ft
Ha. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 134-2 (Supp. 1972); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1783 (1965); Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 140,
§ 129B (Supp. 1973); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-404 (1969).
^^^Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 455 (1964); Mich.
Comp. L. Ann. S 750.232 (1968); S.D. Comp. L. Ann. B 23-7-10
(1967); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-243 (1957).
^^^Ala. Code Ann. tit. 51, t 572 (1958); Cal. Pen.
Code Ann. § 12076 (Deering Supp. 1973) ; Del. Code Ann. tit.
24, § 904 (1953); Ga. Code Ann. B 92A-901 (1972); 111. Stat.
Ann. ch. 38, § 24-4 (Supp. 1973-1974); Iowa Code Ann. 8 695.
21 (1946); Md. Code Ann. art. 27, § 442 (Supp. 1973); Mo.




Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. i 29-33 (Supp. 1973); Ind.
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with fireaxnns legislation provide provisions relating to
coo
machine guns; some prohibit their possession entirely
while others specify a reporting requirement which includes
the provision that possession absent registration is pre-
sumptive evidence of possession with intent of use for an
offensive or aggressive purpose. Registration data in
all cases extends to the name and address of the purchaser
or possessor and may include the latter 's occupation as well
as a full description of the weapon or device.^^ To this
some states add a requirement for an indication of the
C015
registrant's occupation and address thereof ; others man-
Stat. Ann. tit. 35, art. 23, § 4.1-7 (Bums, 1972); Miss.
Code Ann. § 45-9-5 (1972); N.H. Rev, Stat. Ann. g 159:7
(1964); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:151-35 (1969); N.Y. Pen. L.
Ann. § 400.00 (McKinney Supp. 1973- 1974); N.D. Cent. Code
Ann. § 62-01-09 (1960) ; R.I. Gen. L. Ann. 8 11-47-35 (1956)
;
S.C. Code L. Ann. § 16-129.4 (Supp. 1971); Tenn. Code Ann.
i 39-4904 (Supp. 1973); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-519 (1953);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 4006 (1958); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 9.41.110 (Supp. 1972); W, Va. Code Ann. § 61-7-9 (1966).
522ggg e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. S 790.221 (Supp. 1973);
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. i 28-1010 (1943)
.
^^^See e.g.. Ark. Stat. Ann. i 41-4514 (1964); Wis.
Stat. Ann. g 164.01 (1957).
^^^See e.g.. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. g 29-33 (Supp.
1973); Miss. Code Ann. g 45-9-5 (1972).
^^^ See e.g.. La. Rov. Stat. Ann. g 40:1783 (1965);
Mich. Comp. L. Ann. g 750.232 (1968).

149
date a full description of the applicant or possessor-'-*"
which may include the taking of photographs and finger-
527
prints. Most states with these statutory registration
and recording requirements provide for initial local law-
enforcement and/or prosecutorial officials ' access to the
528information submitted as well as inspection of records
529
on akix individual basxs at any time.
Again the Supreme Court was faced with a compre-
hensive statutory scheme aimed at those who engaged in a
particular activity and it reacted in what was by then a
predictcOsle manner. Specifically, the petitioner in Havnes
had been convicted of a federal offense which he claimed
was brought about by fear of a state prosecution which
would have resulted had the weapon he possessed been regis-
tered in accordcuice with the provisions of the federal stat-
ute. However « because the appellant had not bean convicted
^^^See e.g., Ind. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, art. 23, i 4.1-
7 (Burns, 1972); R.I. Gen. L. Ann. 8 11-47-35 (1956).
527
See e.£. , N.Y. Pen. L. Ann. § 400.00 (McKinney
Supp. 1973-1974)
.
^^^See e.g.. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 8 29-33 (Supp.
1973); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 159(7 (1964); R.Z. Gen. L. Ann.
8 11-47-35 (1956)
.
^^^See e.g.. Ala. Code Ann. tit. 51, 8 572 (1958);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 24, B 904 (1953); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.




of having failed to register the weapon, the Court was re-
quired to determine whether the elements of the possessory
offense differed from those of the offense of failure to
register. After concluding that Congress intended the
registration provision to incorporate the possession re-
quirement, thereby making the elements of both offenses
530identical, the opinion went on to consider whether a
compulsion to register violated the petitioner's privilege
against self-incrimination. As in Marchetti-Grosso the
Court found that the statute was directed at persons who
531
were inherently suspect of criminal activity, that these
individuals faced a real and appreciable hazard of self-
532incrimination, smd that neither the presence of a regu-
latory purpose nor the application of the "public records"
doctrine would serve to undermine the validity of the claim
533
of privilege. Once more the Court refused to impose re-
strictions on the use of information compelled by the stat-
ute, opting instead to make the invocation of the privilege
^






a complete defense to crimes arising from the registration
requirements. For the third time in a single day the
hint was given to Congress that inanunity-oriented legisla-
535tion might be m order.
At this juncture it would be well to review what
the Marchetti-Grosso-Havnes trilogy did not do. First, it
did not impair Congress ' power to tax unlawful activities
nor did it invalidate the federal statutes requiring regis-
tration of geunblers and those who have some interest in cer-
tain classes of firearms. Second, it did not prohibit
federal requirements for the filing of income tax returns
nor prohibit^ the use of information compelled by amy federal
regulatory reporting requirement in a criminal case where
the information obtained is considered to be imbued with
"public" qualities. Third, it did not prohibit the use of
information federally compelled in prosecutions of other
federal offenses or emy state offenses. Finally, it did
not set out em immunity standard which would suffice to re-
place the privilege against self-incrimination in the event







Four years after the Haynea decision the Supreme
Court chose to hear another case involving a failure to
file information relating to the possession of firearms.
However, in the interim between Haynes and United States v,
536
Freed Congress had amended the applicable legislation
in two respects. Instead of the transferee or poasessor
of the fireamms having to comply with the requirements of
registration, this burden now rested squarely on the
537
shoulders of the transferor. ' Additionally, the amended
statute prohibited the use of information or evidence ob-
tained via compliance with the registration requirements
either directly or indirectly in a criminal proceeding. °
In Freed , despite appellee's fears that registration would
lead to a state prosecution, the Oourt found that the risks
were "merely trifling or imaginary" due to representations
by the Solicitor General that no information obtained via
^^^401 U.S. 601 (1971)
.
^^^See 26 U.S.C. i 5812 (1970). The transferee does
not escape being identified; in order to fulfill registra-
tion requirements the transferor must svQxnit a written ap-
plication for transfer which includes a description of the
firearm, the name eind address of the tremsferor, and the
name, address, photograph and fingerprints of the trans-
feree. Id.
^^®See 26 U.S.C. § 5848 (1970).
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539filing was disclosed to any law enforcement authority
and, in ciny event, the information was compelled from the
transferor thereby eliminating the ability of the trans-
540
feree to raise the self-incrimxnatxon issue. Further,
it could not be said that the furnishing by the transferee
of his photograph and fingerprints tended to incriminate
him because such information could not be used against him
in a federal criminal prosecution nor was it made available
541
to state agencies. All these factors comibined to sug-
gest to the Court that under the statutory scheme the self-
incrimination hazards to the appellees were not real and
thus there was no need to reach the question of the validity
542
of the scope of the immunity granted.
The implications of Freed are clear when viewed in
conjunction with seemingly unrelated cases. Individuals may
be forced to submit a variety of information to federal
agencies if access to such infozrmation is considered to be
necessary for the accomplishment of a valid governmental
^^^401 U.S. 601, 604 (1971).
^^°ld. at 606.
541id.
^'*24oi U.S. 601, 606 n. 11 (1971).
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purpose. This information cannot be withheld if, despite
its incriminatory nature, it is deemed to be possessed of
544
"public" qualities. The claim of privilege is only a
valid bar to prosecution where the object of the statutory
provisions aimed at is a group inherently suspect of crimi-
545
nal activity. Even those in such a group are not pro-
tected if Congress has provided a statutoiry scheme which
makes alleged hazards of self-incrimination "trifling" or
"imaginary. "^*^ Such a statutory scheme is valid if it
gremts use and derivative use immunity.^*' Similiur state
548
statutes are likewise valid, with the result being that
information can be compelled by one state jurisdiction and
^^^Cf . United States v. Sullivan . 274 U.S. 259 (1926)
^*^Cf. Shapiro v. Uhited States . 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
^*^Cf. Marchetti v. United States . 390 U.S. 39
(1968) . It is worthy of note that this bar to prosecution,
grounded as it was on the Court's reluctance to impose use-
restrictions on the compelled information due to the burden
which would thereby be placed on local law enforcement ag^i-
cies, has probably seen its final days. Compare 390 U.S. 39,
59 (1968) with Kastigar v. United States . 406 U.S. 441, 460
(1972)
.
^^^See United States v. Freed , 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
^*^Cf. Kastigar v. United states . 406 U.S. 441 (1972)





utilized in the prosecution's case in chief in emother
state jurisdiction, as well as in a prosecution in the com-
pelling state or in a federal prosecution, for rebuttal or
549impeachment purposes. Additionally, any compelling
jurisdiction may be able to use the information extracted
for rebuttal or impeachment purposes in the trial of other
offenses or as part of its case in chief for the same or
other offenses if the accused is unable to successfully
challenge prosecution representations that the evidence has
been arrived at from an untainted source, ^^^ Thus the
governmental quest for information, in^leroented by legisla-
tion, may indeed lead to the incrimination of any individual
irrespective of the activity in which he is engaged. One
need not look long and hard to find a perfect example.
549
Cf . Harris v. New York . 401 U.S. 222 (1971);
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York . 378 U.S. 52
(1964)
.
^Cf . Mackey v. United States . 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
Here the Court, while refusing to apply Marchetti-Grosso
retroactively, indicated that information compelled respect-
ing the payment of wagering excise taxes could not be used
by the prosecution in its case in chief on charges of in-
come tax evasion.
^^^Cf. Kastiqar v. United States . 406 U.S. 441, 467-
471 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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552When it decided the case of California v. Bvers
the Supreme Court was involved with a factual context com-
mon to millions of citizens—the operation of a motor ve-
hicle. There the respondent was convicted in a state court
of having failed to stop at the scene of an accident emd
concurrently disclosing his ncune and address. Such stat-
utes were, and are, in force in every state. While one
state requires that the driver of a motor vehicle furnish
his name, address, and vehicle registration nximber only
where his vehicle is involved in an accident which results
553
xn xnjury or death, fully one-half of the states also
require this to be done where the accident results in damage
554to cuiy vehicle. Most of these also requxre that the
^^^402 U.S. 424 (1971).
^^^Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, i 4150 (1953).
^^^Ala. Code Ann. tit. 36, I 128 (1958); Alaska
Stat. Ann. 8 28.35.060 (1962); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 28-
663 (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann. I 75-903 (1957); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 68-1620 (1967); Idaho Code Ann. I 49-1003 (1949); 111.
Stat. Ann. ch. 95*5, 8 11-403 (1971); Ind. Stat. Ann. tit. 9,
art. 4, 8 1-42 (Bums, 1972); Iowa Code Ann. 8 321.263 (1966);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 29, 8 896 (1964); Mich. Comp. L.
Ann. 8 257.619 (1967); Minn. Stat. Ann. i 169.09 (1960);
Miss. Code Ann. 8 63-3-405 (1972); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. • 32-
1204 (1947); N.M. Stat. Ann. 8 64-17-3 (1953); N.D. Cent.
Code Ann. 8 39-08-06 (1972); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, 8 10-
104 (1962); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 75, 8 1027 (1971); S.C. Code
L. Ann. 8 46-323 (1962) ; Tenn. Code Ann. 8 59-1003 (1968)
;
Utah Code Ann. 8 41-6-31 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23,
8 1128 (Supp. 1973); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 8 46.52.020 (1970);

157
driver of the vehicle exhibit, upon request euid if avail-
able, his driver's license, ^^^ and one state predicates the
giving of all such information upon a request. ^^° In thir-
teen states similar information is required where the acci-
dent results in injury, death, or property damage of any
557
kind. Under these latter circumstzmces one state com-
pels the production of the driver's insuremce identification
card^^^; emother state conditions this disclosure of informa-
tion on a request having been made. Five other states
Wis. Stat. Aiui. i 346.67 (1971); Wyo. Stat. Ann. 8 31-220
(1957).
^^^E.a.» Ark. Stat. Ann. i 75-903 (1957); Miss. Code
Ann. § 63-3-405 (1972); W.Va. Code Ann. 8 17C-4-3 (1966).
^^^R.I. Gen. L. Ann. 8 31-26-3 (Supp. 1972).
557conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 8 14-224 (1970) ; Cal. Veh.
Code Ann. §8 2002, 2003 (Deering, 1972); Fla. Stat. Ann.
8 316.062 (Supp. 1973); Kan. Stat. Ann. 8 8-520 (Supp. 1972);
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 14:100 (Supp. 1973); Md. Code Ann.
art. 66is, § 10-104 (1957); Mass. Gen, L. Ann. ch. 90, i 24(2)
(a) (Supp. 1973); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 39-762 (1943); Nev.
Rev, Stat. Ann. 8 484.223 (1967); N.J. Stat. Ann. 8 39:4-129
(1973); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 8 20-166 (1965); S.D. Comp. L.
Ann. 8 32-34-3 (Supp. 1973); Va. Code Ann. I 46.1-176 (1950).
^^%.Y. Veh. & Traff . L. Ann. 8 600 (McKinney Supp.
1973-1974)
.
^^^Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 8 4549.021 (Supp. 1972).

158
expand these disclosure requirements to include the names
and addresses of all occupzmts of the motor vehicle. "^
All states make provisions for the imposition of both fines
and incarceration for non-compliance and most states
provide for the mandatory revocation of driver's licenses
562
as am ancillary penalty. While the Court acknowledged
in Bvers that criminal penalties do exist where the comnauids
of the applicable statute are not met, °^ it proceeded to
decide the case by placing reliamce upon other factors.
Noting that all compelled disclosure situations center upon
the state's need for information, the plurality opinion as-
serted that, the proper solution in each case was arrived at
by balemcing this need against the individual's claim of
^^^Ha. Rev. Code Ann. § 291-2 (1968); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 262-A:67 (Supp. 1972); Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 483.602
(1971-1972) . Of the two states which also impose this re-
quirement one makes the disclosure memdatory but limits the
number of passengers involved to five. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 189.580 (1969) . The other, while also providing this
numerical limit conditions disclosure upon a request. Tex.
Pen. Code Ann. art. 1150 (1961).
^^^See e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann. i 28.35.060 (1962);
Ha. Rev, Stat. Ann. § 291-2 (1968) ; La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
I 14:100 (Supp. 1973)
.
^^^See e.g., Ala. Code Ann. tit. 36, B 128 (1958);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 4150 (1953); Ga. Code Ann. S 92A-
608 (1967)
.
^^^402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
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the privilege against self-incrimination.^^ Here it ap-
peared to these four Justices that, like Sullivan, °^ the
statute at the root of the case at bar was regulatory in
nature, rather than one aimed at a selective group inher-
ently suspect of criminal activities. ^^" Further, the
nature of the information compelled was viewed as being
567
non-testimonial and arising frcnn "an essentially neutral
ego
act. "^^° As such, any disclosure required under these or
similar circumstances could simply not be said to involve
a "substcuitial risk of incrimination, " °^ and consequently
^^^^Id. at 427.
^^^United States v. Sullivan . 474 U.S. 259 (1926).
^^^402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). However, the effect
of the statute's operation was clearly considered by four
other Justices to be criminally oriented. See id . at 443
(Harlsm, J., concurring); id. at 461 (Black, Douglas, and
Brennem, JJ. dissenting)
.
^^^402 U.S. 424, 431, 433 (1971). This characteri-
zation was decried by four Justices. See id. at 462-463
(Black, Douglas, and Brennem, JJ., dissenting); ^. at 472-
473 (Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
^^®402 U.S. 424, 430, 432 (1971). Biree Justices
were less thzm eager to embrace this position. See id. at
473 (Brennan, Douglas, and Maurshall, JJ., dissenting).
^^^402 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Justices Brennan,
Douglas, emd Marshall eschewed this contention as well. See
id. at 470. Totally ignored by the plurality opinion on this
point was the fact that the respondent had embarked upon a
course of conduct that was unlawful. Cf. Marchetti v. United
States , 390 U.S. 39, 51-53 (1968).
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the use-restrictions placed upon the disclosure by the
state supreme court prior to the federal greuit of certiorari
simply was unnecessary.^'®
All of this sexn^ed merely to ciunouflage the real
impetus of the decision. What the plurality was clearly
interested in was preserving to the government the power
to promulgate and enforce self-reporting schemes which
could not possibly be fully effective if allo^i^ed to remain
in the shadow of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination. In reaching the decision that it
did the Court evidenced a preference to relegate the privi-
lege to second place where the existence of the privilege
poses a threat to governmental capacity to respond to what
572
may be denominated as "societal needs, " as well as eui
utter disregard of authoritative state pronounc^nents of
how such needs could best be met. '^ The decision should
570see 402 U.S. 424, 427 n. 3 (1971).
^^^See 402 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); cf. id. at 428-429;
see id. at 451-452 (Harlan, J., concurring).
^"^
2See 402 U.S. 424, 452 (1968) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) . To facilitate this result Justice Harlan would "ex-
plicitly limit" the Marchetti-Gyosso line of cases. See id,
at 453.
^^^Cf. 402 U.S. 424, 474-476 (1968) (Brennan, Douglas,
amd Meurshall, JJ., dissenting).
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serve as a warning that the Court, as presently constituted,
has added another weapon to its arsenal of devices which
it will not hesitate to employ to further emasculate the
privilege against self-incrimination. That weapon is as-
sembled by fitting a non-testimonial disclosure, stemming
from an essentially neutral personal act, to a legislative
regulatory act. Once assembled, the weapon may be utilized
in a zone of combat which is free of the pitfalls of im-
574
munity gremts. There can be no doubt that such a weapon
has the potential for not only producing cracks in the
armor of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment but foj: the complete destruction of the privilege as
well.





STATEMENTS MADE BY THE ACCUSED IN A PRIOR
JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING
No analysis of the area of testimonial self-
incrimination would be complete without an investigation
of those instances in which, despite the absence of com-
pulsion per se, an individual has made statements which
have the potential for serious consequences once that in-
dividual has beccMoe a defendant in a criminal case. While
the proceedings in which these utterances are elicited in-
evitably 2u:e judicial in nature, to so restrict a considera-
tion of em accused's vulnerability respecting future prose-
cutorial hazards would be erroneous. In that verbal dis-
closures originating in quasi-judicial proceedings may pose
an equally substantial threat to personal liberty, they can-
not be safely ignored. Their significance, though, is best
illustrated subsequent to a synopsis of the law pertaining
to proceedings wholly judicial in character.
As a general rule, if the person who is now the ac-




legal matter of any nature and in emy capacity (witness or
party) such testimony will be admissible, despite objection
on self-incrimination grounds, at the present trial. ^'^
Specifically, absent statutoiry direction to the contraj^^,
the voluntary testimony of the defendcint, as a defendant,
in a prior trial of the same criminal case may be used
against him in a second trial of the same case, either s\ib-
stamtively or for impeachment purposes, in both state and
federal court. ^^ Such testimony may be used in both state
'see 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses § 100 (1948); 22A
C.J.S. Criminal Law i 655 (1961). In this regaurd, mere
deference to the service of a subpoena or a claim of ig-
norance of the privilege against self-incrimination will
not vitiate what would otherwise be considered a voluntary
statement. Id. Admissibility obtains despite any conten-
tion of hearsay and comports with the position teiken by all
major authorities. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1370 (3d ed.
1940) ; Mccormick, Evidence § 254 (2d ed. 1972) ; Uniform
Rules of Evidence rule 63(3) (1953). Model Code of Evid-
ence rule 503 (1942); Federal Rules of Evidence rule 804(b)
(1) (1972).
^^^See e.g.. Edmonds v. United States , 273 F.2d 108
(D.C. Cir. 1959); Warde v. United States . 158 F.2d 651 (D.
C. Cir. 1946) ; Cadv v. State . 198 Ga. 99, 31 S.E. 2d 38
(1944), cert, denied . 323 U.S. 676 (1944); State v. Tellay ,
100 Utah 25, 110 P. 2d 342 (1941). This is limited by the
rule which prohibits substzuitive use of such testimony in
the succeeding trial where the accused's testimony in the
first trial was prompted by the prosecution's use of an il-
legally obtained confession. See e.g., Harrison v. United
States , 392 U.S. 219 (1968).
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emd federal court in the second trial of the same criminal
case even though the defendemt does not take the witness
stand in his own behalf in the later proceeding. ^^^ This
is so where the former criminal case was fo\inded xipon the
same or a different act or transaction cuid, if the saune
act or transaction was involved, irrespective of whether
the former charge was identical to the one alleged in the
subsequent case. '° The vast majority of jurisdictions
have held that the rule does not change where the defendemt
in the present criminal case testified as a mere witness
in a prior criminal trial. ^^^ There appears to be no altera-
tion in this basic rule in those cases, in both federal emd
577see e .£. , Heller v. United States . 57 F.2d 627
(7th Cir. 1932), cert , denied . 286 U.S. 567 (1932); United
States V. Bohle . 475 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1973); State v. King .
102 Kan. 155, 169 P. 557 (1917); Scherpjg v. State . 112
Tex. Crim. 61, 13 S.W. 2d 872 (1929).
578See e
.3. , Crow v. Evmatn , 459 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.
1972), cert , denied . 409 U.S. 867 (1972), reh'g denied , 409
U.S. 1029 (1972); State v. Simpson . 133 N.C. 676, 45 S.E.
567 (1903) ; Commonwealth v. Benedict . 113 Pa. 504, 173 A.
853 (1934)
.
^^^See e.a.. , United States v. Block . 88 F.2d 618
(2d Cir. 1937), cert , denied . 301 U.S. 690 (1937); Odiorne
V. State . 249 Ala. 375, 31 S.W. 2d 132 (1947); State v.
Grosnickle . 189 Wis. 17, 206 N.W. 895 (1926). Contra ,
Po/ell v. State . 23 So. 266 (Miss. 1898); State v. Harkness .
1 Wash. 2d 530, 96 P. 2d 460 (1939).
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state court, where the defendemt in the present criminal
case had previously testified either as a party or a mere
witness in the course of a prior civil case.^®°
Similar results are reached where the accused in
the present criminal action gave testimony as a deponent
in a prior civil or criminal proceeding, regardless of
whether such deposition was taken in connection with a
federal or state case, if the deponent was not considered
to be a criminal suspect at the time of the taking of such
581deposition. And even where the civil deponent was con-
sidered to be a possible criminal defendant, portions of the
deposition may be utilized to establish a nexus between the
individual accused and the civil corporate defendant.
580see 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1066 (3d ed. 1940) ; 8
id. § 2276 (McNaughton rev. 1961) . See also Perlman v.
United States . 247 U.S. 7 (1918); Hale v. United States .
406 F.2d 476 (10th Cir. 1969), cert, denied . 395 U.S. 977
(1969); Harrison v. State . 112 Ohio 429, 147 N.E. 650 (1925),
aff 'd per curiam . 270 U.S. 632 (1926) ; Choate v. State . 12
Okla. 560, 160 P. 34 (1916). The underlying rationale is
that such statements are in the nature of admissions. See
e.3^, , Pope V. Allis , 115 U.S. 363 (1885); Taylor v. United
States . 327 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1964).
^®^See 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law I 655 (1961). See
also United States v. Bottone . 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert , denied . 385 U.S. 974 (1966) ; United States v. Wolfson .
294 F. Supp. 267 (D. Del. 1968); Owens v. Commonwealth . 181
Ky. 378, 205 S.W. 398 (1918).
582





Again, the contents of such deposition may be utilized
583
either substantively or for irapeachment purposes, even
584
where the deponent responds to written interrogatories.
However, if the scune act or transaction may possibly form
the basis for both civil cmd criminal samctions against a
defendeuit he is not powerless to thwart prosecutorial ef-
forts directed at obtaining deunaging information by way of
otherwise normal civil discovery procedures. In a proper
case the prosecution is required both to apprise the po-
tential criminal defendzmt of his status and to act in good
faith respecting its request for discovery; once this has
been done the defendamt's ctbility to prevent disclosure
rests entirely on his privilege against self-incrimination,
2md of course this protection may be waived by the failure
585to assert it in a timely meuiner. The most obvious reason
for such a waiver would be the deponent's apprehension of
the possibility of the rendering of a large civil judgment
against him stemming from the widely recognized rule that
where a party to a civil action refuses discovery the op-
^®^See 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1401 (3d ed. 1940);
Mccormick, Evidence § 253 (2d ed. 1972) ; Fed. R. Crim. P.
15(e); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a).
^^^See e.g. , 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses § 100 (Supp. 1973).
585
See e.g.. United States v. Kordal . 397 U.S. 1 (1970)
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posing party prevails. This dileinina is not necessarily
resolved even where the deponent has been acquitted of a
related criminal charge since he still may validly claim
the privilege so long as the requested answers would leave
587him vulnerable to prosecutions for other crimes. Some
relief is possible, however, at least for defendants facing
civil-criminal actions in federal court. The alternative
suggested by the Supreme Court, which rejected the concept
of coercion in such a situation, was that the deponent seek
588
a protective order under the appropriate federal rule to
postpone civil discovery pending termination of the criminal
589
action. ^Deponents similarly situated in state court pro-
ceedings can do naught but zmalogize with reference to the
federal solution in those instances where the state con-
cerned embraces a comparable rule of civil procedure. These
I
586See e
.a. , Kisting v. Westchester Fire Insurance
Company
. 290 F. Supp. 141 (W.D, Wis. 1968), affjd, 416 F.2d
967 (7th Cir. 1969); Franklin v. Franklin . 365 Mo. 442, 283
S.W. 2d 483 (1955); Stockham v. Stockham . 168 So. 2d 320
(Fla. 1963).
587See e.a. , United States v. Second National Bank
of Nashua. N.H. . 48 F.R.D. 268 (D.N.H. 1969).
^®^Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b).
^^^United States v. Kordel . 397 U.S. 1 (1970). See
also Securities emd Exchange Commission v. Stewart , 476 F.





principles, at least tacitly, are premised upon the presence
of em informed accused who is in a position to make educated
decisions. Unfortunately, in most quasi-judicial proceed-
ings the accused does not enjoy this advsmtage and he there-
fore suffers accordingly. Of this there is perhaps no bet-
ter example than the liberated prisoner who faces revoca-
tion of parole.
The decision to return to society one who has been
incarcerated for the commission of a crime rests solely with
the parole board which has absolute authority in this area.
Conceptually, parole is deemed to be a matter of grace,
rather than a right, and therefore the parole board, acting
within the prescribed legislative pareuneters, has wide dis-
590
cretion concerning all facets of this status. In this
respect the keystone feature of parole, once gr2mted, is
the establishment of conditions with which the parolee has
a duty to comply regardless of a formal declaration of consent
591thereto on the part of such parolee. Violation of these
conditions is sufficient to trigger reincarceration despite
the fact that the underlying act or omission does not con-
590See e
.£. , She 1ton v. United States Board of Parole .
388 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
591See e






stitute a crime under the laws of any jurisdiction. In
the overwhelming majority of states the respective legis-
latures have given broad grants of power to their parole
boards to esteOslish, in each case, parole conditions which
593
meet the needs of both the parolee and socxety. Of
^^^See e.g.. United States v. Chzunbers . 429 F.2d
410 (3d Cir. 1970)
.
Alaska Stat. Ann. i 33.15.100 (Supp. 1973); Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 43-2804 (Supp. 1973) ; Cal. Pen. Code Aim.
i 3053 (Deering 1970); Colo. Rev. Stat. Arui. I 39-18-1(3) (a)
(1963); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-124b (Supp. 1973); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4346(d) (Supp. 1971-1972); Ha. Rev.
Stat. Ann. i 353-65 (Supp. 1972) ; Idaho Code Ann. I 20-223
(Supp. 1973); Ind. Stat. Ann. § 13-1609 (Supp. 1973); Iowa
Code Ann. § 247.6 (1969); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 20-2302 (1964);
Ky. Rev. Stai. Ann. § 439.330(c) (1969); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 34, I 1671 (Supp. 1973); Md. Code Ann. art. 41, S 111
(Supp. 1973); Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 27, S 5 (1973); Mich.
Comp. L. Ann. § 791.233 (1968); Minn. Stat. Ann. 8 243.12
(1972); Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-17 (Supp. 1973); Mo. Stat.
Ann. I 549.261 (Supp. 1974); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. 8 95-3214
(Supp. 1974); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 213.110 (1971); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 607:31 (Supp. 1971); N.M. Stat. Ann. 8 41-
17-24 (1955) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 8 148-57 (1974) ; N.D.
Cent. Code Ann. 8 12-59-15 (Supp. 1973) ; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
8 2967.01 (Supp. 1972); Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 144, 8 144.
075 (Supp. 1973-1974) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, 8 331.23
(1964); R.I. Gen. L. Ann. 8 13-8-16 (1956); S.C. Code L. Ann.
8 55-578 (1962); Tenn. Code Ann. 8 40-3612 (Supp. 1973); Tex.
Code Crim. P. art. 42.12(c) 15 (Supp. 1974); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 28, 8 1051 (1970); Va. Code Ann. 8 53-238 (1950); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. i 9.95.110 (1961); W.Va. Code Ann. 8 62-12-17
(1966); Wis. Stat. Ann. 8 57.06 (Supp. 1973); wyo. Stat. Ann.
8 7-325 (Supp. 1973). One state has incorporated a similar
provision in its state constitution. See Okla. Const, art. 6,
8 10. Another has reached the same result via judicial pro-
nouncement. See Sheppeurd v. state ex rel. Evntan . 18 Ariz.
App. 108, 500 P. 2d 639 (1972).
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these, most require that the parolee remain within the
594
state, unless he receives permission to leave, and make
595periodic reports to his parole officer. A few add spe-
cific mandates such as requiring the parolees to suhmit to
596psychiatric exeuninations or medical examinations where
597
the offense committed related to drug possession, or to
further his education and training by taking occupational
598training courses or general education courses. Five
states impose, as minimum requirements, that the parolee
obtain the consent of the parole board prior to leaving
the state, support his dependents, make reparation emd
restitution ^or his crime, cOxuidon all evil associates and
ways, and carry out the Instructions of his parole officer. ^
594see e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann. i 33.15.180 (Supp.
1973); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 243.05 (1972); W.Va. Code Ann.
§ 62-12-15 (1966)
.
^^^See e.g.. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 8 54-124b (Supp.
1973); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. I 607 }44 (1955); Wis. Stat. Aim.
B 57.06 (Supp. 1973)
.
^^^Kan. Stat. Ann. 8 22-3712 (Supp. 1973); Md. Code
Aiui. art. 41, § 111 (Supp. 1973); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. 8 12-
59-14 (Supp. 1973)
.
^^"'Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 213.123 (1971).
^^®Ha. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 353-67 (Supp. 1972).
^^^See Ala. Code Ann. tit. 42, i 9 (1958); Fla. Stat.
Ann. 8 947.20 (1972); Qa. Code Ann. 8 77-517 (1973); N.J.





Other states have been more ambitious and have provided
comprehensive legislative schemes pertaining to parole.
Three of these specify that the parolee shall: (1) meet
his fcunily responsibilities, (2) devote himself to approved
employment or occupation, (3) remain in a definite geogra-
phic locale unless given permission to leave these limits,
(4) report to his parole officer initially upon being re-
leased euid thereafter at such times and places as may be re-
quired, (5) reside at the address listed on his parole cer-
tificate and notify his parole officer of any change of ad-
dress or occupation, (6) not have in his possession any fire-
arms or other deuigerous weapon unless gr€mted written per-
mission, (7) submit to available medical or psychiatric
treatment if so required, (8) refrain from associating with
persons known to be engaged in criminal activities or who
have been convicted of a crime, and (9) satisfy such other
conditions as the parole board may impose. ^^ One state
goes even further, requiring the parolee to obtain prior
600
See 111. Stat. Ann. ch. 38, S 1003-3-7 (1973)
y
La. Stat. Ann. 8 15:574.4 (Supp. 1974); Neb. Rev, Stat. Ann.
ii 83-1116, -1117 (Supp. 1969) . These provisions have their
genesis in the Model Penal Code. See Model Penal Code art.
305, a 305.13 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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approval in order to marry, or purchase real smd personal
property, and indicating that restrictions may include
the prohibition of the use of intoxicating liquors or the
frequenting of establishments where such beverages are sold,
similar prohibitions respecting gambling, emd the abstain-
ing from criminal, vicious, lewd, or unworthy associations
while so paroled.
Parole within the federal sector has the attributes
of the majority of state jurisdictions. A broad gremt of
power enables federal parole authorities to prescribe those
conditions under which the released prisoner may maintain
his freedom ^ These conditions include restrictions upon
the location of the parolee's residence and travels and
periodic reports by the parolee to his parole officer.^
Other prohibitions may include the engaging in lawless ac-
tivities, refraining from acting as an informer or special
^°^S.D. Comp. L. Ann. % 23-58-9 (1967).
^^^S.D. Comp. L, Ann. 8 23-60-17 (1967).
^^^See 18 U.S.C. i 4203 (1970); D.C. Code Ann. I 24-
204(a) (1967).
^°^See 18 U.S.C. 8 4203(a) (1970); 28 C.F.R. 8 2.28
(1973) .
(1973).
^O^See 18 U.S.C. 4203(a) (1970); 28 C.F.R. 8 2.29
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agent for any law enforcement agency, refraining from the
use of alcoholic beverages to excess, and the possession
or use of any narcotic or other habit-forming or demgerous
drug, refraining from associations with persons engaged in
criminal activity or who have a criminal record, and pos-
session of fireaunns or other dangerous weapons without
written permission.
Once a violation of a parole condition is alleged
the parolee's continued liberty hinges on a decision made
by the select group of individuals which comprise the pa-
role board. Approximately one-third of the states, as well
as the District of Columbia, have opted for a three-member
607board, while slightly more thcui one-half have chosen to
place parole responsibility in a body consisting of five
members. Five states provide for a board which numbers
seven members emd two others specify that the board must
See United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick ,
426 F.2d 1161, 1166-1167 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1970).
^^^See e.g., D.C. Code Ann. S 24-201a (1967); Iowa
Code Ann. 8 247.1 (1969); Mo. Stat. Ann. i 549.205 (Supp.
1974); W. Va. Code Ann. § 62-12-12 (1966).
^^^See e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 77-501 (1973); Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 22-3707 (Supp. 1973); Miss. Code Ann. 8 47-7-5
(1972).
^^^Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. i 39-18-1 (1963); Md. Code
Ann. art. 41 8 108 (1957); Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 27, i 4
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have nine members. The remainder of the states provide
for parole boards with membership which exceeds this limit. ^
Twenty-three states and the federal statute predicate mem-
bership upon appointment by the appropriate chief executive
subject to legislative approval^^^; in fifteen jurisdic-
613
tions the latter requirement is not imposed. Selection
is based upon previous committee or commission recommenda-
tion in almost one-fourth of the states. ^^^ Menibership is
(1973); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 8 5149.10 (Supp. 1972); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. S 9.95.003 (Supp. 1973).
^^°Cal. Pen. Code Ann. i 5075 (Deering 1970); Wis.
Stat. Ann. i 46.012 (1957). The federal parole statute
takes an intermediate position by providing for eight mem-
bers. See 18 U.S.C. § 4201 (1970). Such is consistent with
the preference of the Model Penal Code for parole boards con-
sisting of between three and nine members. See Model Penal
Code art. 402, § 402.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
^^^See 111. Stat. Ann. ch. 38, % 1003-3-1 (Supp. 1974)
(ten members) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-124a (Supp. 1973)
(eleven members) ; N.Y. Corr. L. Ann. § 6 (McKinney Supp. 1973-
1974) (twelve members); S.C. Code L. Ann. § 55-551 (1962) (one
member for each state congressional district)
.
^^^See e.g., 18 U.S.C. 8 4201 (1970); Ha. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 353-61 (1968); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. 8 95-3204 (Supp.
1973); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, 8 1021 (1970).
613See e.g. , Alaska Stat. Ann. 8 33.15.010 (Supp.
1973); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. i 213.108 (1971); Tenn. Code Ann.
8 40-3601 (Supp. 1973)
.
^^
^See e.g., Ala. Code Ann. tit. 42, 8 1 (1958); Fla.





apportioned between the affiliates of political parties in
sonve states^^^ while in others there is a clear legislative
coirancuid which specifies that parole board members be ap-
pointed without regard to political persuasion."*" Only
one state requires that board membership include female emd
minority group representation. The states are split
about evenly between those in which parole board members
are required to perform full-time duties""*"" and those where
such activity is on a part-time basis. ^'•^ In five jurisdic-
tions at least one of the members is expected to devote all
620
of his efforts toward the business of the board. Al-
^^^See e.g., Idaho Code Ann. % 20-210 (Supp. 1973);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 42-9-7 (1953); Wyo. Stat. Ann. i 9-194.3
(Supp. 1973)
.
^^^See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. i 439.320 (1969) ; Md.
Code Ann. eurt. 41, § 109 (1957); Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-5
(1972); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 46.012 (1957).
^^^See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 241.045 (Supp. 1974).
°^^See e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-401 (Supp.
1973-1974); La. Stat. Ann. 8 15:574.2 (Supp. 1974); Tex.
Code Crim. P. art. 42.12(c) (13) (1966). The Model Penal
Code meUces use of a similar requirement. See Model Penal
Code art. 402, 8 402.1(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
See e.g.. Ark. Stat. Ann. 8 43-2802.1 (Supp. 1973);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 34, 8 1551 (Supp. 1973); R.I. Gen.
L. Ann. 8 13-8-3 (1956).
^^°See D.C. Code Ann. 8 24-201a (1967) ; Conn. Gen.
Stat. Aim. 8 54-124a (Supp. 1973) ; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11,
i 4344 (Supp. 1971-1972); Miss. Code Ann. 8 47-7-5 (1972);
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though fully one-half of the states impose no professional
qualifications as a prerequisite to board membership"^^
seventeen states require that those appointed to the board
have some degree of feuniliarity with penology emd related
social sciences. Fotur states specifically provide that
at least one -board member be a physician who is either a
623
qualified psychiatrist, neurologist, or psychologist ;
two of these states emd two others require that board roem-
624bership include am attorney. One state statute precludes
625
more than one member from the saune professional discipline
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 83-191 (Supp. 1969).
^^•*
-See e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 607:31 (Supp.
1971); Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 144, i 144.005 (Supp. 1973-
1974); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, § 331.2 (Supp. 1973-1974).
^^^See e.g.. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-18-1 (1963);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-123.1 (1964); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 28,
§ 1021 (1970)
.
^^^See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, i 4341 (Supp. 1971-
1972); Kan. Stat. Ann. S 22-3707 (Supp. 1973); Mass. Gen. L.
Ann. ch. 27, i 4 (1973); R.I. Gen. L. Ann. S 13-8-2 (Supp.
1973) .
^^
^See Iowa Code Ann. § 247.1 (1969); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 22-3707 (Supp. 1973) ; N.D. Cent. Code Ann. i 12-59-01
(Supp. 1973); R.I. Gen. L. Ann. § 13-8-2 (Supp. 1973). The
Model Penal Code is in accord. See Model Penal Code art.
402, § 402.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
^^^Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. t 31-401 (Supp. 1973-1974).
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and only two states require a specific experience level.
The decision of these parole boards respecting the
ultimate disposition of alleged parole violators is most
often made under conditions which are, at the very least,
adverse to the individual peurolee. All jurisdictions pro-
vide a procedure whereby a warrant may be issued where
there is probable cause to believe that the parolee has
627
violated one or more conditions of his parole. Addi-
tionally, the parolee may be arrested even in the absence
of such warrant where his or any other parole officer has
probable cause to believe that a violation has occurred.
In either event, the parolee is subject to subsequent re-
incarceration once such arrest is effected, usually in the
saune institution from which he was paroled, ^^^ The same
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, g 4341 (Supp. 1971-1972)
(5 years, chairman only) ; Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 27, i 4
(1973) (5 years, all members)
.
See e.£., 18 U.S.C. g 4205 (1970); D.C. Code Ann.
i 24-205 (1967); 28 C.F.R. § 2.35 (1973); Idaho Code Ann.
g 20.228 (Supp. 1973) ; Mich. Comp. L. Ann. 8 791.238 (Supp.
1973-1974); Miss. Code Ann. g 47-7-27 (1972).
^^^See e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann. g 33.15.210 (1962);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, g 332.12 (1969); Va. Code Ann. g 53-
259 (1950)
.
^^See e.g., Iowa Code Ann. g 247.9 (1969); N.C. Gen.




result obtains in a significant minority of jurisdictions
where a parole officer may arrest without a weurrzmt where
it appears that the parolee has lapsed or is about to lapse
into criminal ways or company or is zQiout to violate a con-
dition of his parole. Where the parolee has been arrested
without a warrant, only two states prescribe a time limit
for incarceration pending issuemce, by the appropriate
631
authority, of an arrest warrant. And five jurisdictions
have imposed time limits irrespective of whether or not such
632detention stemmed from an arrest without a warrant. Only
^^^See e.g.. Ala. Code Ann. tit. 42, § 10 (1958);
Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 127, 149A (Supp. 1973); Tenn. Code
Ann. e 40-3617 (Supp. 1973). The Model Penal Code provi-
sions limit such arrests to those situations where the
parolee has violated or is about to violate a condition of
parole smd am emergency exists whereby application for a
warrant would create undue risk to the public or the parolee.
See Model Penal Code art. 305, i 305.16(2) (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft, 1962)
.
^^^Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 34, 8 1675 (Supp. 1973)
(end of next business day) ; N.Y. Corr. L. Ann. i 216
(McKinney 1968) (24 hours)
.
^^^See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-17-4 (1963) (12
days); Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 127, § 149A (Supp. 1973) (15
days); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8 213.150 (1971) (15 days); Ore.
Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 144, § 144.370 (Supp. 1973-1974) (15 days);
N.J. Stat. Ann. 8 30:4-123.22 (1964) (30 days). One addi-
tional state specifies a reasonable time. See N.C. Gen.
Stat. Arm. 8 148.61.1 (1974). The Model Penal Code provides
for a limit of 60 days. See Model Penal Code art. 305,
9 305.15 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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one-fifth of the jurisdictions give the parole board the
option of either issuing an arrest warrant or a notice to
appear to answer charges where there has been an allegation
633
of a parole violation. The parolee has the possibility
of regaining his freedcxn in four jurisdictions by way of
statutory provisions which allow bail under these circum-
stcmces^-^^; however, most jurisdictions' statutes are
silent on this subject amd two states expressly prohibit
635bail for retaken parolees. Thus it appears that the
vast majority of federal and state parolees who face revoca-
tion of their legislatively created conditional liberty do
so with the^ concurrent disability of being precluded, via
mandatory incarceration, from actively assisting in the
preparation of amy defense to the allegations which might
be raised.
See e.g.. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-28-10 (Supp. 1973);
Mo. Stat. Ann. § 549.265 (Supp. 1974) ; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
28, I 1081 (1970)
.
^^*See Ga. Code Ann. § 77-518 (1973); N.J. Stat. Ann.
i 30:4-132.32 (1964); S.C. Code L. Ann. § 55-616 (Supp. 1973);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. S 9.95.120 (Supp. 1973).
^•^^See Fla. Stat. Ann. g 949.12 (1972); W.Va. Code
Ann. § 62-12-19 (1966)
.
It could cogently be argued that, at least in
those situations where the violation does not constitute a
crime or where only alleged misdemeanors are involved, the
policies underlying the Bail Reform Act of 1966 should be
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This alone would substantially operate to the
parolee's prejudice; however, an additional factor must be
considered. While it is ostensibly in the parolee's best
interests to have the new allegation vis-a-vis the parole
status resolved without undue delay, if the allegation
forms the basis for a new criminal charge the parolee is in
much the same position as one from whom civil discovery
is required while criminal charges are pending or contem-
637
plated. The singular dissimilarity is that in the case
of the parolee revocation of parole is the price to be paid
for the alleged offender's silence. In such a situation
it would be- advemtageous from the parolee ' s point of view
to have the revocation issue held in abeysmce pending the
outcome of the criminal proceeding. This procedure could
not prejudice the government's ability to prosecute since
the continuation of parole status is not deemed to be a
waiver of prosecutorial rights. Further, a prior judi-
applied to the parole context. See 18 U.S.C. I 3146 et. seg .
(1970). Cf. Wright v. United States . 262 A. 2d 350 (D.C. App.
Ct. 1970). But see In re Law . 109 Cal. Rptr. 573, 513 P. 2d
621 (1973)
.
637See notes 585-590 supra auid accompanying text.
63R
See e.g . , United States ex rel. Lucia v. C
Donovan . 107 F. Supp. 347 (N.D. 111. 1952)
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cial determination of the factual issues involved may well
preclude prolongated parole board consideration. And
this approach would be consistent with the rule formulated
to suspend administrative revocation of occupational
licenses where there is an attendemt allegation of crimi-
640
nality. Yet, only a handful of jurisdictions concede
that the parole board has discretion to take such action
641pursuant to an appropriate request by the parolee and
nowhere is this made mandatory. Instead, both federal and
state governments have shown a preference for a prompt
642
resolution of the parole violation issue, 2uid this has
undoubtedly been at the core of those judicial decisions
which have rejected the concept of required suspension where
^^^Cf. Baxter v. Davis . 405 F.2d 459 (1st Cir. 1971),
cert , denied . 405 U.S. 999 (1972); In re Law . 109 Cal.
Reptr. 573, 513 P. 2d 621 (1973).
See e.g.. Silver v. McCamev . 221 F.2d 873 (D.C,
Cir. 1955)
.
641See Savage v. United States Board of Parole . 422
F.2d 1248 (6th Cir. 1970); Allard v. Nelson . 423 F.2d 1216
(9th Cir. 1970) ; Small v. United States Board of Parole , 421
F.2d 1388 (10th Cir. 1970), cert , denied, 397 U.S. 1079 (1970);
Rose V. Nickeson , 29 Conn. Sup. 102, 273 A. 2d 290 (1970); Bax-
ter V. Commonwealth . 268 N.E. 2d 670 (Mass. 1971); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 9.95.120 (Supp. 1973).
642
See e.g.. 28 C.F.R. § 2.40 (1973); Alaska Stat.
Ann. § 33.15.220 (1962); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-17-28 (1955);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 1081 (1970).
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the parolee inteirposes a claim of potential self-incrimina-
tion.
The case of Melson v. Sard serves as an illuminat-
ing excunple. After initially backing away from deciding
the issue of whether or not the privilege against self-
incrimination could be claimed in order to forestall a
parole board resolution of an alleged violation until com-
644pletion of crajtimal proceedings, the court chose to come
to grips with the problem. In Melson a parolee had been
arrested on a charge of murder. Attempting to have any
decision respecting the revocation of his parole held in
abeyance, he made a dual contention in his petition for
declaratory and injunctive relief: first, disclosures made
by him in an effort to avoid revocation could be used against
him later at trial in violation of his Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination, and, second, that such pre-
liminary disclosures would uncover his possible trial tac-
tics thereby weakening his defense. Although the court
was not oblivious to the parolee's dilemma, it placed pri-
mary import upon insuring that the parole revocation issue
^•^402 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
644
The scune court chose to treat the issue as moot




was resolved promptly so as to fully afford the parolee
an opportxinity to effectively counter arguments favoring
645
revocation. The court's per curiam opinion found no
merit in the parolee's second contention but the claim of
self-incrimination forced the court to pause long enough
to consider the possibility of a solution which would ac-
commodate both that interest and the interest which, in its
view, inhered in a prompt decision on the alleged viola-
tion. Drawing an analogy between the case at beur and those
cases involving pre-trial motions to suppress illegally
obtained evidence, the court went on to fashion emother
exclusionary rule. That rule prohibited the affirmative
^^^402 F.2d 653, 654 (1968). Here the court
stressed that prompt resolution was essential in light of
the parolee's need for witnesses and evidence, the fact
that most alleged parole violators are incapable of self-
help due to meuidatory incarceration has already been em-
phasized. See notes 627-636 supra and accompanying text.
When to this is added the fact that counsel need not be
provided for all alleged parole violators, see text infra ,
the court's reliance upon these factors to defeat a request
for a delay in the parole revocation matter seems at best
to be misplaced.
^^^^402 F.2d 653, 655 (1968) citing Simmons v. United
States , 390 U.S. 377 (1968). The Melson court was fully in
accord with the proposition that a parolee facing both
revocation eind prosecution was subjected to the type of
coercion which would meUce his disclosures involuntary. See
402 F.2d 653, 655 (1968).
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use against the parolee in any subsequent criminal prose-
cution of any statements made while contesting parole re-
647
vocation. However, while this might have provided the
parolee with a sufficient measure of protection in bygone
days the renunciation by the Supreme Court of trjuisactional
immunity euid the "tension doctrine "^^ has opened the
door to real hazards which confront any parolee who today
650
is faced with revocation of his parole.
These hazards are best perceived by em cmalysis of
those federal and state provisions which form the basis for
parole revocation hearings. At one time it was generally
believed that, in absence of statutory direction to the
contrary, there was no absolute right to a hearing to
determine whether or not parole should be revoked. °^-'- This
647402 F.2d 653, 655 (1968).
6^^See Kastiqar v. United States . 406 U.S. 441
(1972); Zicarelli v. United States . 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
At the time Melson was decided it would have been unthink-
able for the court there to have imposed any steuidard short
of transactional immunity.
^^See McGautha v. California . 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
This was undoubtedly recognized by three of the
dissenting Justices in McGautha who quoted from Melson with
approval. See McGautha v. California , 402 U.S. 183, 239
(1971) (Douglas, Brennem, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
6^^See e.g. . Rose v. Raskins , 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.
1968), cert , denied . 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Brown v. Depart-
ment of Welfare . 351 S.W. 2d 183 (Ky. 1961).
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rule was abrogated by the Supreme Court when it decided
652
the case of Morrissev v. Brewer . There the petitioner
had alleged that his parole had been revoked without the
benefit of a hearing and that this was violative of due
process. In agreeing with this contention the Court laid
down six requirements as the predicate for a valid parole
revocation. These included: (1) written notice of the
alleged violations, (2) disclosure to the parolee of the
evidence against him, (3) an opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses eind other evidence, (4) the
right to confront euid cross-examine adverse witnesses,
(5) a hearirtg body which was both neutral and detached but
not necessarily composed of lawyers or jurists, emd (6) a
written statement by the factfinders of the evidence relied
upon and the reasons for the revocation of parole. In
all cases a hearing of this nature must be held within a
reasonable time after the parolee has been taken into cus-
^^^408 U.S. 471 (1972)
.
^^^Id. at 489. The Court expressly limited the
right of cross-examination euid confrontation to those situ-
ations where the hearing officer does not have good cause
for disallowing the same. Id.
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654tody. While xmposxng these requxrements the Court made
it obvious that they did not apply where the parolee admitted
the violation or where he had been convicted o£ another
655
crime. Further, there was no intentxon on the part of
the Court to treat the hearing as if it were a criminal
proceeding with the attendant benefits of the latter, such
as a right to counsel. And this was so even in the face
of smother Supreme Court decision which held that one who
is subject to a probation revocation proceeding roust have
legal representation. ' Even a casual reading of Morrissey
suggests that it raised more questions than it answered.
In this regard it should come as no surprise that the vari-
ous federal and state jurisdictions have struggled to for-
The Court noted that a sixty-day period would not
be unreasonable. See 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972). The Model
Penal Code contains a similar requirement. See Model Penal
Code art. 305, g 305.15 (1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
^^^408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). In this respect the
Court certainly had not taken a position adverse to holding
the revocation hearing in abeyance pending a judicial deter-
mination. See notes 637-639 supra and accompanying text.
^^^See 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
^^^See Mempa v. Rhay , 389 U.S. 128 (1967) where the
Court concluded that such proceedings were a "critical stage"
of trial. Id. at 134.
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mulate procedures which would serve their own needs while
meeting Morrissev's mandate. As usually occurs in such
endeavors the results have been far from uniform despite
universal statutory treatment.
Clearly, under the Morrissey formulation, all
65fiparolees who face revocation are entitled to present
witnesses and evidence in their own behalf. This of itself
does not provide any mechanism to secure whatever witnesses
cind evidence as are necessary to enable the parolee to
adequately meet the allegations against him. While most
states make statutory provision for the grant to their
respective parole boards of the power to compel, via svib-
poena, the attendemce of witnesses and the production of
books, papers, euid other documents , ^^^ and two extend this
power to encompass depositions, nowhere is there an
658It should be noted that although Morrissey dealt
with state paroles a lesser standard could not be thought
to govern federal parolees. Cf. Boiling v, Sharpe . 347
U.S. 497, 500 (1954)
.
659
See e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. i 439.390 (1969);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 34, i 1552 (Supp. 1973); S.D. Comp.
L. Ann. i 23-58-8 (1967) . These are apparently in defer-
ence to the position taken by the Model Penal Code. See




See 111. Stat. Ann. ch. 38, i 1003-3-2 (1973);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. S 5149.11 (1970).
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affirmative requirement that this power be exercised for
the benefit of the parolee. Although fundamental fairness
would dictate that such be done if the parole bozucd utilizes
this power to secure testimony or evidence which is adverse
to the parolee, most often resort to this method by the
board is unnecessary since its witnesses usually appear
willingly or, due to the fact that the rules of evidence
do not apply, this adverse matter may be obtained through
resort to hearsay statements. With federal parolees
the problem is particularly acute since, by regulation,
the parolee is required to make arremgements for the attend-
ance of his own witnesses. Because the parolee is most
probcibly incarcerated and because he has no way of
obtaining evidence in the possession of one or more in-
dividuals who may be unwilling to come forward voluntarily,
when he is confronted by adverse evidence which he knows
he must rebut or risk revocation by default, his urge to
^^^See e.g.. N.M. Stat. Ann. 8 20-4-1101 (Supp.
1973) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, 8 331.22 (1964). See also
Riqqins V. Rhav . 75 Wash. 2d 271, 450 P. 2d 806 (1969).
^^^See 28 C.F.R. § 2.41 (1973).
663
See notes 627-636 supra and accompzinying text.
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speak becomes Irresistible. It is precisely these condi-
tions which give rise to the need for an attorney and it
was this invalueible aid that the Court in Morrissey chose
to acknowledge but otherwise ignore." *
Federal parolees and those in three states are
entitled, under either the provisions of a statute or regu-
lation, to counsel for representation at parole revocation
665hearings xf such counsel xs engaged by the parolee.
Four other states have reached the seune result by way of
judicial pronouncement . °°° Statutes in two other states
also permit persons other than counsel to appear before the
^^^See 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
^^^See 28 C.F.R. § 2.41 (1973); D.C. Code Ann. S 24-
206 (1967); Ala. Code Ann. tit. 42, § 12 (1958); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 947.23 (1972); La. Stat. Ann. § 574.9 (Supp. 1974).
This conforms to requirements embodied in the Model Penal
Code which also provides that the parole staff shall render
reasoncible aid to the parolee in preparation for the hearing,
See Model Penal Code art. 305, § 305.15 (1) (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft, 1962) . Only one state incorporates this latter
provision. See La. Stat. Ann. i 574.9 (Supp. 1974).
^^^State V. Boqqs , 49 Del. 277, 114 A. 2d 663 (1955);
Warren v. Michigam Parole Board . 23 Mich. App. 754, 179
N.W. 2d 664 (1970); People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden , 27
N.Y. 2d 376, 267 N.E. 2d 238 (1971); Commonwealth v. Tinaon .
433 Pa. 328, 249 A. 2d 549 (1969).
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667board on the parolee's behalf. Appearances before the
board by persons other than the parolee are expressly pro-
668hibited by statute in two states. Courts in seven
jurisdictions have adhered to this position."^ The same
divergence of opinion is evident where the right of in-
digent parolees to appointed counsel is concerned. Only
in the federal sphere of influence and two states is such
a possibility recognized under statutory authority. The
federal statute makes the appointment of counsel discre-
670tionary depending upon the interests of justice ; one of
^^''s.C. Code L. Ann. § 55-555 (1962); Vt. Stat. Ann,
tit. 28, § 1055 (1970)
.
^^®See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-3619 (Supp. 1973).
Montana occupies the unique position of granting a prisoner
the right to retained covinsel for representation at a hear-
ing to determine the initial parole question but denying
this right where parole revocation is concerned. Compare
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. S 95-3217 (Supp. 1973) with Mont. Rev.
Code Ann. i 95-3220 (Supp. 1973)
.
^^^See Pope v. Superior Court . 88 Cal. Reptr. 483,
9 Cal. 3d 636 (1970); People ex rel. Harris v. Ragen . 81
F. Supp. 608 (N.D. 111. 1949), aff 'd , 117 F.2d 303 (7th
Cir. 1949); Wingo v. Lyons . 432 S.W. 2d 821 (Ky. 1968);
State v. Morales . 120 N.J. Sup. 197, 293 A. 2d 672 (1972);
Robinson v. Cox . 77 M.Mex. 55, 419 P. 2d 253 (1966); John
V. State . 160 N.W. 2d 37 (N.D. 1968) ; Chase v. Page . 456
P. 2d 590 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969).
670
18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970).
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the state statutes conditions the right to appointed counsel
671
upon sufficient fxmds being available, while the other
672statute merely requires proof of indigency. of the four
states which have squarely faced the issue in the absence
of statutory authority two require that counsel be pro-
vided for indigent parolees and two do not. However,
vmder limited circumsteuices indigent peurolees may succeed
in having counsel appointed especially where counsel is
availcible to those who cem afford it.
This is particularly true in the federal system.
Since a basic right to counsel exists for federal parolees
67S
who appear eit revocation hearings, and indigents are at
676least entitled to counsel on a discretionary basis, it
^^^See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. i 9.95.122 (Supp. 1973).
^^^See W.Va. Code Ann. § 62-12-22 (Supp. 1973).
^^•^See Perry v. Willard . 247 Ore. 145, 427 P. 2d
1020 (1967) ; People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden , 27 N.Y. 2d
376, 267 N.E. 2d 238 (1971).
^^"^See Lawyer v. State , 46 Ala. App. 190, 239 So.
2d 332 (1970); S.C. Op. Atfy Gen. No. 2351 (1966-1967).
^"^^See 28 C.F.R. i 2.41 (1973).
^''^See 18 U.S.C. e 3006A (1970).
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would seem that under the principles of due process and
equal protection indigent federal parolees should be pro-
vided with counsel in all cases of revocation. This view
is shared by only two federal courts of appe2a , both of
which have predicated their decisions upon the narrow
ground of equal protection. One of these same courts
has gone further and held that where a state statute exists
which permits retained counsel to be present at parole
revocation hearings the same right should accrue to in-
digent state parolees, again on the basis of ec[ual protec-
tion. Although this may be a step in the right direc-
tion, these decisions are of little comfort to those parolees
who have the misfortune to be situated outside these spe-
cific jurisdictions. While it has had the opportunity
to definitively resolve the issue, the Supreme Court has
succeeded in only muddying the judicial waters.
^^^See Lcme v. Att'v Gen, of the United States . 477
F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1973); Earnest v. Willinghaun , 406 F.2d
681 (10th Cir. 1969)
.
^^®See Cottle v. Wainwright . 477 F.2d 269 (5th Cir.
1973) .
^^^It should be remembered that only five states
have statutes which allow the presence of counsel at parole




In Gaqnon v. Scarpelll^^Q a state probationer had
been arrested in connection with the coiranission of a bur-
glary. He admitted his participation in the crime but
later recanted, claiming that his admission was made under
duress emd was vmtrue. Absent a probation revocation hear-
ing, and without the benefit of counsel, the status of pro-
bation was revoked. The question before the Court was
whether a probationer is entitled to a revocation hearing,
and, if so, whether appointed counsel is required at such a
hearing. For the first time it was conceded that no dif-
ference exists between parole £md probation status and
thus, in relicuice on Morrissey , °^ due process demanded
that a revocation hearing precede the sanction of probation
683
revocation. The Court then went on to decide the second
portion of the question but was careful to note that since
the respondent did not attempt to retain counsel there was
no occasion to reach the question of whether a parolee or
a probationer has a right to retained counsel in situations
^®°93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973).
^®^Id. at 1759.
^Q^Morriasev v. Brewer . 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
^®^93 S. Ct. 1756, 1760 (1973).
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other tham those where state authorities would be re-
quired to furnish counsel for am indigent. In the
6fl5
opinion of the majority, written by Justice Powell, it
was acknowledged that there were instances where the aid
of counsel would substantially benefit the parolee in his
fight to retain his conditional liberty. These would in-
clude cases where the uneducated parolee could not ade-
quately present his version of a disputed set of facts or
where cross-examination of witnesses or evaluation of com-
plicated documentary evidence was required. E^ren these,
though, were not thought to be sufficient for the imposi-
687
tion of cin inflexible constitutional rule. More weight
was given by the Court to the ramifications produced by
such a rule. Particularly seized upon was the assumed fact
that in most cases revocation succeeds conviction or an
admission of guilt."®® The majority also noted that any
^Q'^id. at 1760 n. 6.
^®^Justice Douglas was the lone dissenter and he
viewed the situation as one where counsel was required due
to the respondent's claim of a coerced confession. 93 S.
Ct. 1756, 1764 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
^^Ss S. Ct. 1756, 1762 (1973).
^®''ld. at 1762, 1763.
^^^The Court appears to beg the question; surely if
the parolee was afforded the services of counsel he could
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mitigating evidence which might be available to the
parolee does not depend upon the services of covmsel,^®^
furnishing counsel to all indigent parolees would turn the
revocation hearing into a full-blown adversary proceeding,
cmd the result would be to make the hearing body more likely
to resort to reincarceration since it "may be less tolerant
of marginal deviemt behavior" when it is forced into a
quasi-judicial role. ^° Seeking a different approach the
majority opinion was content to emnounce that the right to
counsel for indigent parolees was to be determined, on a
case-by-case basis, by the very entity which has the re-
sponsibility for the determination of the ultimate issue
—
the state authority which administers the probation and
parole system. The bitter irony is that this was done in
not be heard to complain at a later date that his confession
was coerced. Further, the Court ignores the fact that there
exists a preference for prompt resolution of the parole is-
sue without awaiting the outcome of emy associated criminal
trial. See notes 641-642 supra and accompanying text.
goo
Overlooked is the incarceration of the parolee,
see note 636 supra amd accompanying text, in conjunction
with his inability to compel the production of witnesses «md
evidence. See notes 659-662 supra auid accompzmying text.
^^°93 S.Ct. 1756, 1762 (1973).

196
the name of fundeunental fairness. As its final action
in the case the Court established prerequisites to aid
state officials in the implementation of its new policy. ^^^
Initially, the parolee must be informed that he has a right
to request counsel. If such a request is made covinsel
should be provided where the parolee makes a timely amd
colorable claim either that he did not violate the condi-
tions of his release, or, if he did, that there are sub-
stcmtial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation,
thereby making revocation inappropriate, which are complex
693
or otherwise difficult to develop or present. Addi-
tionally, parole authorities are charged with the respons-
ibility of considering whether or not the parolee is cap-
able of speaking effectively for himself, and are required
to state in every case the reason for ciny denial of a re-
694quest for counsel. A more open invitation to self-
incrimination abuses is difficult to imagine.
^^•"•See 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1763 (1973).
^^Presumably, these would also apply where federal
parole revocation is involved. See note 658 supra .
^^-^93 S.Ct. 1756, 1764 (1973).
6^Id.
^^^Whether or not these pitfalls await all those who
face parole revocation is unclear. Seven months after its
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The plight of the parolee should be clear. Ini-
tially regaining his liberty, he must conform his conduct
to conditions which curtail his freedom of action in a
variety of ways. Variation from the established norm can,
in many cases, subject him to a warrantless arrest. Ex-
cept in a limited number of jurisdictions any retaken
parolee remains incarcerated pending the resolution of the
revocation issue. Such issue, as a general rule, takes
precedence over criminal trials involving the seune activity
which formed the basis for the parolee's arrest, and efforts
to have the revocation hearing held in abeyance pending the
trial outcome will be unavailing. Denied compulsory pro-
cess for witnesses and evidence and usually denied an at-
torney vmless he can afford one, the parolee is exhorted
by the Supreme Court to explain the specifics of his situ-
ation to the parole authorities so that they may determine
whether or not he really needs the services of a lawyer.
decision in Gagnon the Court chose to vacate and remand for
further consideration in light of that opinion the single
apjjellate court case which held that equal protection re-
,
quired the appointing of counsel for indigent parolees
where state statute permits retained counsel to appear at
revocation hearings. See Wainwright v. Cottle , 94 S.Ct. 221
(1973). Thus the question of whether and under what condi-




If the parolee chooses not to speak, his freedom as well as
his ability to secure counsel will be inevitably forfeited;
if he succumbs to the pressures which demand disclosure
he does so in the absence of emy meaningful safeguards
which might prevent the use of these utterances against
him in a later criminal case involving the same or dif-
ferent matters. Unlike the individual who testifies in a
prior judicial or eincillary proceeding where there is most
probably an opportunity to obtain legal advice, the parolee
is left to flail about alone in the midst of a hostile en-
vironment. Under the circvimstances any testimonial deci-




The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination has been described as "the essential mainstay
of our adversary system. "^^^ If it is, then that system is
in trouble. Far too often one who stemds in the shadow of
criminal jeopardy is powerless to constrain the forces of
government which operate to extract uttersmces from him
for use later in his own condemnation. In such cases even
the defense attorney can do little, save alerting his client
to potential hazards. Clients who have made involuntary
statements while in police custody can take little comfort
from the fact that these disclosures cemnot be used against
them in the prosecution's case in chief. Instead, an ac-
cused may opt to forego giving valuable testimony in his
own behalf at trial, fearful that his former words will re-
turn to haxint him in the guise of rebuttal or impeaching
evidence. Similarly, a defendamt can no longer venture
safely onto the witness stzmd to testify at a pre-trial
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motion to suppress evidence allegedly illegally seized,
especially where non-possessory crimes are involved, since
the vitality of the underlying rationale which would have
precluded future use of his testimony has been severely
emasculated.
In a slightly different vein, those who have been
summoned to appear and give testimony or produce other
evidence before grand juries, legislative committees, or
governmental administrative agencies may initially refuse
to do so if the testimony or evidence would tend to in-
criminate them. However, such disclosure ceui be compelled
by the simple expediency of gremting immunity to the witness,
As the current trend in this area is for immunity to extend
only to the use and derivative use of the information ex-
tracted, there is a hiatus in meaningful protection re-
specting not only the acts which form the basis for the
governmental inquiry but also any activity which might be
alluded to by the witness during the course of his appear-
cmce. These dangers are accentuated where dual sovereignty
exists 2md carry over to situations where the compelling
vehicle is one or more of the mandatory disclosure statutes.
The hurdle of immunity grants need not delay com-
pulsion where the client's mental condition is at issue.
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By viewing the situation as either a waiver of the privi-
lege or non-criminal in nature, govezmmental authorities
may wrest information from an accused with virtual im-
punity. Legislative enactments which appear to protect the
defendant from having his own disclosures utilized against
him on the issue of guilt or innocence are well nigh meem-
ingless where a vmitary trial is conducted. Even a bifur-
cated trial does not insulate sm accused from the use of
these utterances for impeachment or rebuttal purposes or
for any purpose at other trials involving different mat-
ters .
Parolees are particularly vulnerable to self-
incriminating disclosures. Usually in custody and most
often without counsel, they are under tremendous pressure
to speak in the face of reincarceration for the unexpired
portion of their original sentences. Devoid of power to
compel witnesses or evidence which could aid their posi-
tion, the onus is on them alone to answer the allegations
even where a criminal trial founded upon the same set of
facts is pending and where no protections exist respecting
later use of the parolee's statement.
In all of these situations, once the speaker has
yielded the damaging testimony the cat is out of the bag;
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he can never get the cat back into the bag^^^ and this
inures to his everlasting detriment, for the prosecution
can utilize this evidence in a variety of ways. It may
alert government investigators to areas of inquiry not
theretofore recognized as being connected with criminality
and for which independent leads may readily be established.
Subsequent probing may produce witnesses whose testimony
will forge strong links in a chain of complicity between
the accused and the crime currently charged as well as
other crimes . Undoubtedly the prosecution may find the
accused's compelled statements and other evidence arrived
at by way of those statements indispensable when drawing
up the charges and questioning witnesses in advamce of
trial. During the progress of the trial information un-
covered by resort to the defendant's own words could in-
fluence the prosecution's approach to a theory of the case
amd the formulation of an opening statement, as well as
decisions respecting the order of the presentation of evi-
dence. This information would also be invaluable as an
aid ir formulating lines of questioning for both the direct
exaunination of prosecution witnesses 2md the cross-examination
^^^The metaphor was applied in a criminal context in
United States v. Bayer. 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
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of defense witnesses. Most importantly, its mere posses-
sion by the prosecution may deter the accused from taking
the witness stand in his own behalf, a tactical advantage
of immense proportions especially in those instances where
the accused is the only possible defense witness. The net
effect of all these possibilities is to shift the burden
in criminal trials by enabling the prosecution, in dero-
gation of its traditional role, to prove its case by direct
or indirect resort to the accused's own testimonial dis-
closures. And every time it is allowed to do so the road
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